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PREFACE 
This thesis contributes to developing Umwelt concepts, and various methods for 
modelling Umwelten and their interrelations. Simultaneously it offers an ana-
lysis of past and current interrelations of wolves, sheep and people, thus pro-
viding an application, and test, of the notation and methodology suggested. The 
dissertation summarises a multitude of activities of various sorts. An overview 
of my participation in research projects, organising of international conferences 
and workshops and presentations at international conferences is offered in the 
Curriculum Vitae.1 
In “Delectable creatures and the fundamental reality of metaphor: Biosemio-
tics and animal mind”, Wendy Wheeler (2010) refers to the ‘night science’ – or 
dare I say biosemiotics? – described by Francois Jacob (1988: 296), which 
“feels its way, questions itself [...] a sort of workshop of the possible [...] Where 
hypotheses take the forms of vague presentiments [...] Where the plans for 
experiments have barely taken form.” Biosemiotics’ present incoherence, on the 
negative side, is reflected in its principal openness to programmatic statements, 
on the positive. Were it not for that open atmosphere, this work would probably 
not have been possible. 
A remark on genre: Jakob von Uexküll (1936) openly agreed that the 
depiction of many human Umwelten is best carried out by artists, such as nove-
lists or poets. The genre of this text is necessarily that of the academic dis-
sertation. Though matters of Umwelt research (Umweltforschung) and Umwelt 
mapping are treated in the form of a systematised disposition, it is critical to 
keep in mind the implications of Uexküll’s abovementioned recognition: There 
are phenomena that cannot (best) be described in scientific language. The 
academic genre on the whole is given to objectification and generalization, and 
might thus not be capable of capturing phenomena which are not easily 
objectifiable. This reminder is not less important given the topic matter of this 
text – subjective experience. Warnings à la that of Gabriel Marcel (1949) with 
regard to the pitfalls of methods of objectification should be kept in mind. By 
objectifying subjective phenomena, and describing them in scholarly language, 
we convert them into another genre, and consequently a different mode of 
being – and this scholarly mode of being is not in all respects true and faithful 
to the phenomena. In particular, the detachment necessitated by abstract 
analysis is (if it were to become our only mode of being) irreconcilable with 
full-fledged participation qua incarnated, engaged being on par with other 
creatures. To some extent, then, the form of this text contradicts its message. In 
keeping with these reflections, however, I have in some cases allowed for a 
measure of variety in genre – this concerns e.g. the anecdote on the role of 
                                                     
1 Activities further included popularising texts published in 7 media, including three national 
Norwegian daily newspapers (Aftenposten, Dagbladet, Nationen), and media coverage in 6 
media, including two national Estonian media (Eesti Rahvusringhääling – online; Viker-
raadio) and one Norwegian (Nettavisen). 
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fiction in the natural sciences retold in Paper II, and the section “In search of the 
wolf’s perspective” in Paper 7. 
At the conference Zoosemiotics and Animal Representations (Tartu, April 
4–8, 2011), Colin Allen, who was one of the plenary speakers, remarked that 
semiotic models are too abstract to be of any use for ethology, and challenged 
the biosemioticians present: “Semiotics must stop talking about what it is, and 
start showing what it does!” It has been my intention with this work to 
contribute to a development of semiotics of nature which makes its metho-
dology more easily applicable, especially within the realms of ecosemiotics and 
zoosemiotics. The final point of the deep ecology platform2 states that those 
who subscribe to the foregoing seven points have an obligation directly or 
indirectly to try to implement the changes that are necessary in light of the 
ecological crisis. According to Arne Næss, the frontier of the environmental 
crisis is long and varied, and there is a role for everyone to play. In this context, 
ecosemiotics and other brands of semiotics of nature definitively have a role to 
play. As Max Oelschlaeger (2001: 226) notes: “If ecosemiotics is to be more 
than academic entertainment, then an outline is in order, however provisional or 
elliptical, of how the ecosemiotic thesis facilitates intentional cultural change”. 
                                                     
2 Quoted in full in Tønnessen 2003: 290–291. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let our initial premise be that in order to understand the natural world, we 
should start out by grasping what makes sense to the living (and in living 
systems). The result is a pluralist, phenomenologically oriented outlook in-
formed by biosemiotics. 
Ecological reality – the global ecosystem – is ultimately, and first and 
foremost, an existential realm. This does not entail that it is our realm (the arena 
of our existential experience) – no, each and every creature partakes in this 
global, existential realm. More precisely, all creatures are actively engaged in 
their relevant surroundings, which appear to them within the context of their 
lifeworlds3. No being – not even humans, individually or as a global ‘republic 
of science’ (cf. Polanyi 1962) – has total overview. For no one, in other words, 
is this existential realm “global” in the sense of being total, universal, summing-
up-everything-that-is (though humanity today represents a global species with 
an economic engagement that is approximately global – cf. Paper V). This 
existential realm that we call nature is a rich, multi-nodal web of relations of 
ecological, social and (psycho-)somatic character – world upon world, life 
within life. 
Many would assume that a superstitious anthropocentrism was a thing of the 
past – a feature of a geocentric world, perhaps. But it is in no way obvious that 
our present societies are less anthropocentric than past societies, or that our 
advanced and bureaucratic anthropocentrism is in the big picture any less 
“mythical” than that of low-tech societies. What matters the most is in what 
terms we think about our own role on this planet (conquerors, caretakers, fellow 
inhabitants?). “Today”, as phenomenologist David Abram (1997: ix) observes, 
“we participate almost exclusively with other humans and with our own human-
made technology.” Noting that we, in modern, “civilized” humanity, have “a 
strange inability to clearly perceive other animals – a real inability to clearly 
see, or focus upon, anything outside the realm of human technology, or to hear 
as meaningful anything other than human speech”, Abram suggests that “we are 
human only in contact, and conviviality, with what is not human”. 
At times nature is a mirror of culture, held up before us so as to show us a 
world of our own making. In many cases animal behaviour is a reflection of our 
culturally conditioned approach to the animals in question. In such cases our 
interaction with animal species is bound to be misrepresented if we mistakenly 
assume (in bad faith, to apply Sartre’s notion) that the animal’s current 
behaviour is its only possible behaviour. What we can observe at any given time 
is often but a single note in the behavioural repertoire of a species. Wolves are a 
case at hand. They are known to have preyed on vulnerable humans, dominantly 
children, in times of extreme ecological conditions (low prey availability) and 
                                                     
3 Throughout this introduction, ‘lifeworld’ is to be taken as synonymous with ‘phenomenal 
world’ in a loose sense, whether the notion of phenomenal world in question is Uexküllian, 
Husserlian or otherwise conceived of. Husserl’s Lebenswelt will be referred to as “Lebens-
welt”, and Uexküll’s Umwelt as “Umwelt”. 
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special societal conditions (poverty, unobserved child labour), such as in early 
modern Europe. Wolves have also preyed on people in some cases in con-
temporary India – but they would never under more normal ecological 
conditions so much as approach a human being (except in cases where the 
humans in question deliberately habituate the wolves to their presence over 
time). Those who saw the devil in wolves, in other words, saw little more than a 
reflection of their own culturally and ecologically determined approach to the 
brute animals. 
A central part, or aspect, of this dissertation is concerned with what we have 
branded as Uexküllian phenomenology. Such a phenomenology derives from 
the Umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944)4. For a general treatment 
of the question as to who can properly be called phenomenologists, see 2. 
Uexküllian phenomenology. The notion of phenomenology – which is in the 
mainstream mostly associated with human consciousness – will be treated and 
developed in the afore-mentioned section. Before we move on to presenting our 
general assessment of Uexküll’s Umwelt theory in introductory terms, however, 
a few words should be said about our relationship to Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839–1914). Besides being regarded as a modern founding father of semiotics, 
Peirce is also known for having coined ‘phenomenology’ independently of 
Edmund Husserl, with a partially overlapping yet clearly distinct signification 
(see Spiegelberg 1956). Peirce’s notion of phenomenology, later termed 
‘phaneroscopy’ etc., is treated in Paper III. As we will see there, Uexküllian 
phenomenology is not necessarily aligned with Peirce’s ideas about phenome-
nology. A disclaimer might be called for: Uexküllian phenomenology as we 
conceive of it is loyal not to any specific interpretation of Peirce, nor to his 
general philosophical outlook, but rather, to the extent that it is of any use for 
the current project, to some basic semiotic concepts of his such as those of 
symbolicity, iconicity and indexicality. It is absolutely crucial that such 
concepts are not fetishized.5  
Our main task in this dissertation is to contribute to the development of 
Umwelt concepts and models – in short, Umwelt theory in the tradition 
following Uexküll – and to attempt to describe the semiotic mechanisms that 
regulate the wolf and sheep populations in Scandinavia, especially through their 
interaction with the human species. The case study on Norwegian wolf 
management will be used as a test case for actual application of theoretical con-
cepts and models developed earlier on in the thesis. This includes development 
of phenomenological ideas in 2. Uexküllian phenomenology and development 
of biosemiotic methodology in 3. Umwelt mapping. The methodological tools to 
                                                     
4 Informative dissertations on Uexküll include Schmidt 1980 and Mildenberger 2007 – for a 
recent innovative master thesis see Woods 2011. For qualified commentaries, see also 
Pobojewska 1993a, 1993b and 2001 and Buchanan 2008. For a general introduction to 
Uexküll’s work, see Kull 2001. 
5 Some followers of Peirce have built a solipsistic metaphysics around his concepts of 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Such concepts may be of great value when applied in 
their right context, but they perform poorly as objects of worship. 
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be developed include phenomenal fields (a representation of Umwelten) and 
semiotic causation (an alternative notion of causation). Our overall aim is to 
demonstrate that a revised and further developed, updated Umwelt theory is 
applicable in the contemporary scientific context, and to point to its wide-
ranging philosophical implications. It is thus our claim that Uexküll’s thought 
can do better than simply serve as a historical source of inspiration. 
The core concept of this work is that of Umwelt transition, which represents 
an Uexküllian notion of environmental change.6 An Umwelt transition can as 
described in Paper I (p. 49) be defined as a lasting, systematic change within the 
life cycle of a being considered from an ontogenetic (individual), phylogenetic 
(population-, species-) or cultural perspective, from one typical appearance of 
its Umwelt to another. Ironically, this notion is of crucial importance partly 
because it was not to Uexküll. As detailed in Paper I, his view of nature was one 
in which ‘Planfulness‘ (Planmässigkeit) and harmony was the order of the day. 
This emphasis on the balance of nature was to a large extent typical of his 
historical era (though Darwin in his evolutionary approach naturally had to 
relate to the topic of change). One reason why Umwelt theory in Uexküll’s 
version seems outdated is exactly its ahistoricity. This orientation was Uexküll’s 
conscious choice, and resulted in a coherent theory. We would gain little, 
however, from insisting in our own time on remaining faithful to that metho-
dological stance. That would render Umwelt theory’s relevance as insignificant 
in our time of global anthropogenic environmental change.  
Theoretical and methodological parts of this thesis as well as the parts 
involving its case study are at times vastly interdisciplinary, involving semiotics 
(hereunder biosemiotics, ecosemiotics, zoosemiotics and cultural semiotics, 
with the odd nod to semioethics and existential semiotics), phenomenology and 
other philosophy (including eco-phenomenology, existentialism, conservation 
philosophy and philosophical anthropology), ethics, economy (including eco-
logical economics), human ecology, ethology, wolf ecology, etc. This is a trait 
which might at best prove to make the thesis relevant across a number of 
disciplines, but might in the worst case simply reveal its author as a true 
amateur across a number of disciplines (admittedly a lesser accomplishment).7 
We apologise in advance for its apparently all-embracing ambition. Our only 
excuse is our honest interest in studies at the crossroad of nature and culture, in 
macro-perspectives, in long-term developments and futurology, and in global 
trends. Our hope is that this orientation has resulted eventually in a set of 
models and concepts that are suitable for someone working with human-animal 
                                                     
6 The term is our coinage, not Uexküll’s. 
7 Our sentience on this point echoes that of Norwegian eco-philosophers Arne Næss and 
Sigmund Kvaløy Setreng, both of whom have emphasised the need for ‘super-amateurs’, or 
generalists, in a modern society dominated by specialists and tremendous specialisation in 
scholarly studies. Sebeok (1995) addressed a similar topic when he made his distinction 
between researchers that are like bees (generalists) and moles (specialists) respectively. In 
Sebeok’s words, I am predominantly a bee. 
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studies and related approaches to wide-ranging, interdisciplinary topics 
transcending the nature/culture divide.  
This thesis text will intermittently present programmatic statements for both 
semiotics and phenomenology. The general assumption is that unification of the 
two fields of inquiry can be mutually enriching, especially with regard to 
semiotics of nature and eco-phenomenology. But perhaps making mention of 
“programmatic statements” is not going far enough. The abundance of coinages 
and proposed directions of inquiry in this text might even give it a character of 
presenting, more than anything else, a research program.8 This designation is 
probably appropriate, given that the terms, models and topics introduced in the 
course of this dissertation leave many details to be worked out in the future, be 
it by the author of this dissertation or by other scholars, if someone were to take 
an interest in pursuing aspects of this research program as a common under-
taking. 
Among the core notions we will introduce in the course of this dissertation is 
that of a global species (see Paper V). The sheep, the third most significant case 
study creature beyond wolves and people, partakes in our ecological empire in a 
quite central position, as one of the top five livestock species globally. The 
wolf, on the other hand, does not fit in with the modern idea we have had until 
recently of how we want nature to be (unlike the dog, for which the wolf is an 
ancestor). Sheep: companion; wolf: foe.  
As mentioned, the case study concerning Norwegian wolf management 
(section 5 of the Introduction, and Paper VI and Paper VII) will function as a 
test case for our theory and methodology. To our knowledge wolf management, 
or indeed wolf ecology, has not previously been subjected to a thorough 
semiotic analysis. We expect to demonstrate the relevance of a semiotic ana-
lysis. Semiotic analysis is in our opinion well suited for the study of 
mechanisms regulating relations between the human species and other 
creatures, since it enables us to approach this topic matter from a cultural as 
well as from an ecological point of view. Through the case study, this work is 
not only theoretical zoosemiotics and ecosemiotics, but furthermore applied 
zoosemiotics and ecosemiotics. 
Though the author of the current thesis has at least one specialty – a semiotic 
understanding of wolves (and sheep) – I consider myself first and foremost a 
generalist. What is a generalist? One possible definition: A researcher/thinker who  
1)  covers a range of related yet distinct topics, and simultaneously or in parallel  
2)  examines interconnections among these topics, and ideally also  
3)  investigates the integration/incorporation of the various “levels of inquiry” 
(ranging from the most general to the most particular studies).  
In modern science, it is unworkable for one person to keep track of all 
important developments within a broad field of inquiry. Being a generalist who 
enters the fields of various specialists, there are countless examples of instances 
where I might have erred – in every particular, in every single detail, I might 
                                                     
8 See especially the platform of ten steps to a semiotics of being in Paper II. 
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have erred, and specialists might (indeed, should) be able to point that out. 
Whether or not, or rather in what cases such shortcomings affect the overall 
argument and perspective, and should lead to a revision of these, will have to be 
left to the judgment of particularly gifted masters of this text.  
We err anew, however, if we think that the particulars of our world can be 
represented perfectly by the symbolic notations of science (or of philosophy, for 
that matter).9 As a generalist, my main interest lies not in any particular segment 
of science, but in “the pattern that connects”, to borrow a phrase from Gregory 
Bateson (2000 [1972], 2002 [1979]). That said, we must see the world (in its 
natural as well as its cultural aspects) as a world of particulars – a highly 
homogenous affair, riven with exceptional instances and perhaps even illogical, 
contradictory occurrences. This world of particulars is ruled by physical forces 
and semiotic causation (see 3.2 The notion of semiotic causation). If we do not 
acknowledge as our starting point that there is a world of particulars – concrete, 
tangible reality – we are likely to develop abstractions of reality that amount to 
a ‘world of shadows’ only, in the words of Uexküll.10 
                                                     
9 On the other hand, pinpointing typical, somewhat representative particulars is crucial to 
any scientific or scholarly endeavour. 
10 On the fringes of this dissertation, or strictly speaking clear of it, are those of my academic 
publications which have not been included as component parts of this dissertation but which 
are nevertheless to varying degrees relevant for its overall subject matter. These are all 
detailed in References. In bibliographical sequence, they are: Tønnessen 2001 (on an Uex-
küllian ontology, and possibilism), 2002 (my Norwegian master thesis on Umwelt research 
and ontology), 2003 (where I introduce some Umwelt notions, and relate Umwelt theory to 
environmental ethics and deep ecology), 2008 (on past and future world economy), 2009a 
(on the nature view of environmentalists), 2009b (on the self qua ecological and pheno-
menal), 2009c (a meditation on sign growth and other growth), 2009d (on animal play in 
general and cat play in particular), 2010a (a book review on zoosemiotics), 2010b (on 
invasive wolf management and long-term goals for wildlife management), 2010c (on legal 
and illegal wolf hunting), Tønnessen and Deely 2009 (on semioethics, and the nature of 
morality) and 2011 (on semioethics, phenomenology etc.), Tønnessen and Gorlée 2010 (on 
Lotman’s visit to Norway), Tønnessen and Lindström 2010a and 2010b (on semiotics of 
perception), Tønnessen and Magnus 2010 (an interview on biosemiotics with Kalevi Kull), 
Tønnessen, Mäekivi and Magnus 2010a and 2010b (on semiotics of nature), and 
prospectively Tønnessen and Tüür 2012 (on the semiotics of animal representations). 
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1. THE BIOSEMIOTIC APPROACH 
In this first section of the introduction we will evaluate Sebeok’s depiction of 
the Umwelt as species-specific modelling system, and present our version of the 
notion of levels of biosemiosis. 
 
 
1.1. Appraisal of Sebeok’s depiction of the Umwelt  
as species-specific modelling system 
Sebeok contributed vastly in enunciating the concept of Umwelt as a “matchless 
world of significances [...] to which [a living being’s] behavior must accom-
modate” (Sebeok 2001: 74) – “its sealed-off, private monadic model of the 
universe” (ibid., 79) – the taxonomy that any living entity superimposes upon its 
universe in order to filter out otherwise unmanageable environmental noise (ibid., 
89). These three descriptions all derive from his article “What do we know about 
signifying behavior in the domestic cat (Felis catus)?” (Sebeok 1994), and 
represent but fragments of his manifold variations of Uexküll’s Umwelt theme. 
His greatest contribution as well as his more counterproductive emphasis on the 
supposedly necessarily species-specific character of an Umwelt is enveloped in 
another quote (Sebeok 1992, cf. 2001: 124), in which Sebeok defines an Umwelt 
as “the ‘model’ of a species-specific segment of individual reality”. While the 
description of an Umwelt as a modelling system11 has proven to be highly fruitful, 
the second claim has proven to be simplifying in a misleading manner.  
How many worlds are there? How many spheres within spheres – how many 
thresholds above thresholds? “[I]n the phylum Chordata alone – to which the 
genus Felis belongs – there are at least forty-five thousand known species and 
hence no fewer corresponding systems of communication”, Sebeok (2001: 194) 
states, thereby offering yet another description of an Umwelt. But is it not the 
case that populations and the like, as well, constitute systems of commu-
nication? In reality, the phylum Chordata entails far more than forty-five 
thousand different Umwelten. There are species-specific Umwelten (such as the 
human Umwelt) and more local Umwelten (such as the human/cultural Umwelt 
of Rio de Janeiro, the Carioca Umwelt), as well as more global Umwelten (such 
as the Umwelten of primates). An Umwelt is, in one fundamental sense, a 
shared, public sphere, an arena for signs that make sense to a certain group of 
Umwelt participants. Umwelten are not species-specific, but rather organism-
                                                     
11 Note that recent, more refined theorising which is arguably in line with Uexküll’s original 
work distinguishes more accurately between the Umwelt in a strict sense and the Innenwelt 
(John Deely took part in this theoretical development). In this approach “[t]he Umwelt is the 
modelled part of the functional world, whereas the modelling process belongs to the part that 
Uexküll has called Innenwelt” (Kull 2010: 348). Taking this into account, we should 
rephrase Sebeok’s assertion concerning the Umwelt as a modelling system to read that the 
Innenwelt (which is an aspect of the Umwelt in a broad sense) is the modelling system, 
whereas the Umwelt (in a narrow sense) is the resulting model. 
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specific. In categorising Umwelten the threshold of the species is indeed 
useful – and it is certainly characteristic of intraspecific communication – but 
the threshold of the species is nevertheless but one threshold among many. To 
say that Umwelten are species-specific is therefore in part arbitrary. Said 
unconditionally such statements are misleading, bordering on false.12 
 
 
1.2. The levels of biosemiosis 
In the following we introduce a tentatively all-inclusive model of various levels 
of biosemiosis (for an earlier proposal concerning explicitly “levels of bio-
semiosis”, see Logan 2007, p. 75, 80, where Robert K. Logan speculates “that 
there exist at least seven levels of biosemiosis”, adding in the end that he 
believes “there are more levels that further study will reveal”13). According to 
this model there are six levels of biosemiosis, falling under three broader 
categories (see Figure 1). 
Endosemiotics is not a very common term (except for in the writings of 
Thure von Uexküll (for an example, see Thure von Uexküll, Geigges and 
Herrmann 1993), Sebeok, and Hoffmeyer), but here it is applied to sum up, as 
an overarching umbrella notion, all the subfields of semiotics that is concerned 
with bodily, subperceptual semiosis, or, to rephrase, any activity within the field 
of semiotics whenever this scholarly activity is concerned with bodily, i.e. sub-
perceptual semiosis.14 
                                                     
12 According to Uexküll (1928: 181; our translation), the aggregate Umwelt of an entire 
species is “larger and richer than the Umwelt of each [member of that species]”. Species, in 
other words, are not totally homogeneous – there is always a certain intraspecific variety in 
behaviour and phenomena. This behavioural and phenomenological repertoire – which any 
species put on show – is partly due to differences in constitution among the organisms of the 
species, and partly owing to different life histories (cf. Uexküll’s concept of an 
Umwelttunnel). Individuality, that is to say, has its roots in physiology as well as in the 
concrete situations, or contexts, in which a living being finds itself immersed, and through 
which it has taken form not as a general being, but as an actual, particular being. 
13 Logan’s scheme is based on Hofkirchner’s idea (2002: 9) that ”there are as many different 
basic types of semiotic processes as there are basic types of systemic self-organising 
processes”. Ours differs from Logan’s in that it is perception-centric rather than aiming at 
organisational levels as such, except for in the admittedly simplified terms of the six 
subcategories depicted. 
14 In the initial conception of the levels of biosemiosis, we had located ‘biosemiotics’ in the 
place of ‘endosemiotics’. That attempt was abandoned since biosemiotics in that draft 
appeared to be a narrow undertaking concerned mainly or merely with somatic, i.e. bodily, 
semiosis. Some of the appeal of that initial draft, however, was that it might have shed new 
light on the notions of endosemiosis and exosemiosis, which is usually conceived of as 
semiosis that is internal and external to the body respectively. In the initial draft of our 
tripartite model, the boundary between ‘the outer’ and ‘the inner’ was in flux depending on 
the level of biosemiosis considered. It would thus be possible to argue that endo- and exo-
semiosis occur both at the somatic level and the social level, and that in a global ecological 
perspective all semiosis is ultimately endosemiosis. 
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Figure 1. The levels of biosemiosis. 
 
 
 
According to the above-mentioned tripartite model of the levels of biosemiosis, 
cells and organisms (individuals, where applicable) are the primary substances 
of the biological world, though there are also larger wholes. This tripartite 
model could be relevant for simple and complex life forms alike, though in the 
case of very simple – non-social – creatures it collapses into a two-category 
model. As the model demonstrates, perception is at the core of biosemiosis, 
even though not all biosemiosis is perceptual, and even though perception 
constitutes but one level (or layer) of biosemiosis. The standing of perception is 
intimately tied to the standing of the individual. With such an overall model of 
biosemiosis, the individual organism (and its lifeworld) is methodologically 
placed at the center of biological research. 
Such a perception-oriented model of biosemiosis has implications for 
cultural studies as well. Applied to humans, it evokes a perspective in which the 
human mind, or soul – as Plato and Aristotle would have it, but in a radically 
different sense – partakes in three realms. Perceptual semiosis (which is 
“social” in the primal sense of being related to the active navigating of an 
individual) is grounded in somatic semiosis, and interacting with a yet higher 
(more complex) level, namely that of superorganisms – e.g., society, or an 
animal population. It is on this highest, more-than-individual level that society’s 
often indiscernible yet absolutely principal influence on how individual 
members of society carry out their lives is to be located. In Figure 1 we thus see 
22 
the place of cultural semiotics within the scheme of levels of biosemiosis, 
alongside the ecological and the social (but grounded in super-organismic 
semiosis). 
What of the question of the threshold of semiotics, and of phenomenology? 
Our assumption, as reflected in the current presentation of the levels of 
biosemiosis, is that phenomena, aka perceptual semiosis, can be conceived of as 
a layer of semiosis. In Figure 1 we thus see the place of phenomenology within 
the scheme of levels of biosemiosis. While this definition of the relation 
between phenomena, semiosis and perception is straightforward and generally 
workable, we must acknowledge that the difference between perceptual, sub- 
and superperceptual semiosis is not all that clear-cut in actual studies. For 
instance, it is not obvious where we should draw the line between conscious and 
unconscious processes. All conscious mental processes are clearly to be 
regarded as located at the perceptual level. But what can serve as our guideline 
with regard to unconscious mental processes that affect the organism as a 
whole? Are these to be covered by our conception of perception, and thus of 
phenomena? At this point we will not conclude in any precise manner in this 
matter beyond stating that at least some of these (such as dreams) must fall 
within our conception of phenomena. Regardless of whether or not unconscious 
processes that affect the organism as a whole are to be regarded as involving 
phenomena, however, the content matter of these processes is obviously of 
semiotic nature and thus to be regarded as instances of semiosis.  
The threshold of semiosis implied by the current scheme of levels of bio-
semiosis is one in which biosemiosis is apparently equivalent with semiosis – 
all semiosis is biosemiosis. This is in line with Sebeok’s final view. In the 
biosemiotic community and beyond this stand is controversial. Pansemiosis, 
physiosemiosis (Deely, Salthe), machine semiosis (Santaella, Nöth) and induced 
semiosis are among the terms that have been applied to describe other 
prospective forms of semiosis. Of these we much prefer that of ‘induced 
semiosis’ as described by Alexei Sharov (2010), though we acknowledge that 
some descriptions of so-called machine semiosis are in effect not very different. 
In Sharov’s words (ibid., 1052), “[semiotic, or cybernetic a]gents always 
receive some of their functional information from parental/recruiter agents and 
often follow parental/recruiter goals. This induced semiosis is common for 
living organisms and artificial devices.” The difference between Sharov’s 
notion of induced semiosis and the notion of machine semiosis is that the 
former envelops ‘machine semiosis’ as a special case of a much more 
widespread phenomenon which goes well beyond human affairs and is actually 
taken to be characteristic of living agents as such. We note in conclusion that 
we have a different and somewhat narrower notion of agents than Sharov (he 
having a more cybernetic conception, we a strictly biosemiotic one), and that 
we do not necessarily share his ambition to “shift the focus of biosemiotic from 
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living organisms to agents in general” (ibid., 1050).15 What is decisive in the 
context of the levels of biosemiosis is that induced semiosis can in all cases be 
seen as an extension of biosemiosis.  
                                                     
15 Unless, that is, such a shift would first and foremost facilitate greater scrutiny of domestication, 
technological control of natural environments etc. with an ecological perspective. 
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2. UEXKÜLLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 
In this section we will treat the notion of phenomenology, the relation between 
semiotics and phenomenology, Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt and our own 
notion of Uexküllian phenomenology. The phenomenology of Charles Sanders 
Peirce is briefly treated in Paper III. See also our remarks on contemporary eco-
phenomenology in Paper I, Paper II and Paper III. 
 
 
2.1. On the notion of phenomenology 
The fields of phenomenology and semiotics are equally diverse, and thus 
equally hard to present in any comprehensive way. While most scholars today 
reckon Edmund Husserl as phenomenology’s founding figure – some too rigid-
ly so; devaluing any phenomenological strain of thought that is not sufficiently 
“Husserlian” (according to one interpretation of Husserl or another) – some, 
especially French phenomenologists, have counted even Kant and Hegel as 
phenomenologists. What is more, phenomenology has in several notable cases 
been taken to overlap with existentialism, especially in the French tradition. 
While modern phenomenology started in Germany and spread through France, 
it is by now no doubt an international movement of thought. But how can it be 
defined, and delimited? 
Heidegger’s opaque case, and his personal relationship with Husserl, is one 
odd chapter in this story. What, then, about simply following Husserl’s defi-
nition of phenomenology? Alas, he did not offer one definition of pheno-
menology. His conception of phenomenology was in constant development, and 
there is an immense difference between his various notions of phenomenology. 
Though he made a number of attempts, Husserl never succeeded in developing 
phenomenology as a philosophical system. His writings are diverse and in his 
own words incomplete. Even studying his vast Nachlass would not get us all 
that far, since at any rate there is no “final version” of his approach to phenome-
nology. 
What counts as phenomenology? As with the term ‘Umwelt’ in the case of 
Uexküll, the term ‘phenomenology’ (or ‘Phänomenologie’) existed long before 
Husserl adopted and redefined it. Kant might have been the first scholar to 
apply the term ‘phenomenology’ in a scientific, non-philosophical context. This 
first mention appeared in his 1786 publication Metaphysische Anfangsgründe 
der Naturwissenschaft (Kant 1786), where phenomenology denotes one of the 
four branches of the science of matter (physics), more specifically the branch 
that deals with apparent motion, or motion as a modality. Thus it was confined 
to a problem of physics. According to Spiegelberg (1982: 11), the first 
philosophical usage of the term ‘phenomenology’ appeared in 1764 in Johann 
Heinrich Lambert’s Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und 
Bezeichnung des Wahren und der Unterscheidung von Irrtum und Schein (see 
Lambert 1990 [1764]). Here, phenomenology denoted the theory of the varieties 
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of illusions. Lambert likely inspired Kant to adopt the term, albeit in redefined 
versions – first, as we have seen, in the context of physics, and soon with a 
redefined denotation in the context of philosophical metaphysics. The term 
‘phenomenology’ does not in fact appear in Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 
(cf. Kant 1996 [1787]), but in 1772 he wrote a letter to Marcus Herz in which 
he stated that the first theoretical part of his forthcoming work on the limits of 
sensibility and reason would consist of two parts, the first on general 
phenomenology (“die Phänomenologie überhaupt”) and the second on the 
nature and method of metaphysics (ibid.). At this stage, Kant in part equated his 
critique of pure reason with ‘phenomenology’. As Spiegelberg notes, however, 
“such a critique of human knowledge has by itself little if any affinity” with 
post-Husserlian phenomenology. There is no clear indication, for instance, that 
Kant ever conceived of phenomenology as a study of phenomena as opposed to 
things in themselves, i.e. noumena (ibid.).  
It was Hegel who first elevated something called “phenomenology” to the 
rank of a full philosophical discipline with lasting influence (Hegel 1977). 
Husserl did not refer much to Hegel, and his status as a precursor, if not 
initiator, of phenomenology is debated at best. Altogether there are at least a 
dozen of instances of fairly independent philosophical uses of the term ‘pheno-
menology’, not counting the various definitions applied by phenomenologists in 
a narrower sense (Spiegelberg 1982: 11–18). We will not say much at this 
instance about the ideas on phenomenology of Peirce, who was the first 
American philosopher to develop a notion of phenomenology. But a few words 
are required at this point to make some facts evident. First, we note that Peirce 
throughout his thinking life applied a number of different terms, using the term 
‘phenomenology’ in the main only in the period 1902–1904. As Spiegelberg 
(1982: 17; 1956) details, his struggle with Hegel’s thought is the most likely 
reason for why he eventually abandoned the term (in an overlapping inter-
pretation, Peirce abandoned the term ‘phenomenology’ partly in accordance 
with his ethics of terminology, so as not to saturate an existing term defined by 
others with totally new meaning). At any rate Peirce’s conception of what is 
here called phenomenology overlaps in part with that of Husserl, but is 
simultaneously different enough to warrant a characterisation as a genuine 
theory (or idea) of phenomenology, on a par with Uexküllian phenomenology 
as another genuine theory of phenomenology. 
To bring this subsection to a close, we note in conclusion that in a peculiar 
fashion there is an interesting development of phenomenology taking place in 
three steps, from Husserl’s last, unfinished work via Merleau-Ponty’s last, 
unfinished work (Merleau-Ponty 1968) to David Abram’s contemporary work, 
where the former unfinished work(s) plays a significant role for the later 
philosophers in this line of thought in phenomenology. This speculative or 
prospective aspect of phenomenological thought is mirrored in Heidegger’s and 
Sartre’s promised but never delivered sequels to their main works (Heidegger 
1962, Sartre 1958). 
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2.2. Semiotics and phenomenology 
We are located at the junction of nature and culture, and of semiotics and 
phenomenology. Can they be reconciled? More particularly, can subfields such 
as biosemiotics and eco-phenomenology be mutually enriching? The author of 
the current thesis believes that they can. The semiotic study of life and the 
living can emerge as properly informed only if it is capable of incorporating 
observations made in natural science, philosophy and cultural studies alike. The 
semiotic study of nature entails an experiential turn in the study of life pro-
cesses. Perception is – or should be – at the heart of the life sciences. 
In certain manifestations at least, semiotics and phenomenology have a lot in 
common as overarching fields of foundational importance for more specialised 
disciplines. Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), for instance, conceived of phenomeno-
logy as the “first layer” of any science, and characterised it as a pre-science. 
Some semioticians – biosemioticians, at least – would make similar claims on 
behalf of semiotics. We could daringly suggest that the overall task of semiotics 
conceived in such a fashion is to examine the very possibility of meaning. Here, 
Uexküll’s Umwelt theory contributes substantially with its depiction of the 
human Umwelt, which constitutes the actual perceptual horizon of any scientist 
or researcher. Semiotics can further be applied to analyse the scientific 
languages used in scientific descriptions. It can thus be argued that semiotics is 
(potentially) both a pre-science and a meta-science. 
Given such unbounded ambition and scope a remark on systems building in 
philosophy with a critical view to dogmatism is in place: Namely, one should 
bear in mind that even though the laborious construction of philosophical 
systems can be of great value, it is not an enterprise that should be taken to be 
definitive in any meaningful sense of that word. For any follower of Husserl or 
Peirce, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that although both of these largely 
systematic thinkers attempted throughout their lives to develop something akin 
to a perfect system, they never felt themselves that they managed to actually do 
so. A definitive version of either of their philosophies was never presented. 
Accordingly, any Husserlian or Peircean alleging to present anything akin to a 
perfect system should be met with a great deal of suspicion. If there was one 
thing both Husserl and Peirce promoted through their work and their work 
styles, it was a sort of rigorous yet innovative analysis which was never to be 
incarcerated by dogmas past, and only temporarily (and thus hypothetically) 
even by the dogmas of their own making. 
Both semiotics and phenomenology are so diverse areas of study that to 
purport to represent most of their significant interconnections could only be 
justified in the setting of a separate book-long work. In addition to biosemiotics 
it is in recent times perhaps especially cognitive semiotics and biohermenutics 
that have shown an interest in, and signalled affiliation with, phenomenology 
(though much the same could be said about the existential semiotics of Eero 
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Tarasti and the semioethics of Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio).16 If nothing 
else these instances are proof of a substantial interest in phenomenology among 
biosemiotics’ “closest relatives”. In 1982, a special issue of Semiotica was 
devoted to semiotics and phenomenology (Lanigan (ed.) 1982). Paul Ricoeur 
(1913–2005) is among the notable names that have been involved in semiotics 
and phenomenology alike, which include Husserl and Peirce. Contemporary 
voices of some resonance that relate to both fields include Frederik Stjernfelt 
(2007), Göran Sonesson (2007), Anton Markoš (2002) and Richard Lanigan 
(2007).17 
Though there was little direct or indirect influence between Husserl and 
Uexküll, the notion of Umwelt and the notion of Lebenswelt are as we will see 
in 2.3 Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt in part interrelated and partly overlapping 
notions. The term Lebenswelt only won acclaim after Merleau-Ponty introduced 
it in his writing based on his studies of the originally unpublished parts of The 
Crisis. The version of The Crisis that was published in Husserl’s lifetime was 
published in 1936, two years after Uexküll’s book Streifzüge durch die Um-
welten von Tieren und Menschen and four years before Bedeutungslehre (see 
Uexküll 1956 [1934/1940]), Uexküll’s last major work – but notably with the 
drafted sections about the Lebenswelt omitted. Two years later Husserl died, 
and ten years before the drafts on the Lebenswelt were published posthumously 
as part of an expanded version of The Crisis in 1954, Uexküll died. In the 
initially omitted parts of Die Krisis, Husserl argued that the crisis of European 
science was due to neglect of the Lebenswelt, from which it originates. The 
Lebenswelten, Husserl thought, were structured, and these structures were to be 
studied so as to reinvigorate the faltering scientific enterprise. In Husserl’s 
view, the only way to restore the viability of science was “to realize that science 
was in fact nothing but a distillate, as it were, from the fuller life-world” 
(Spiegelberg 1982: 146). These observations resonate well with Uexküll’s 
views presented at the end of Bedeutungslehre and other places. 
Perhaps the first two questions we should ask when discussing the relation 
between semiotics and phenomenology are these: Does phenomenology have to 
be Husserlian? And does semiotic phenomenology have to be Peircean? Though 
we find some common ground with Uexküllian phenomenology in both 
Husserl’s and Peirce’s respective phenomenologies, our general answer to these 
two questions is “no”. The worldviews of Uexküll, Peirce and Husserl, in short, 
were so different that it is more fruitful to portray their approaches as three 
genuine perspectives than to try to equate one of them with one of the others. A 
                                                     
16 Even with this modification that claim is debatable, given the interest in phenomenology 
of other subfields of semiotics including media semiotics. 
17 Lanigan’s 2007 paper has the subtitle “Towards a new science of semiotic pheno-
menology” (our emphasis). His approach, however, differs from that of the current 
dissertation in that his programmatic statements apply to the human realm only. Sonesson’s 
paper published the same year has the subtitle “A study in phenomenological semiotics” (our 
emphasis). These two titles alone are ample proof of the occurrence of other contemporary 
attempts at fusing the two fields to some extent. 
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rejection of Husserlian phenomenology, then, is not by implication a rejection 
of Uexküllian phenomenology – nor is a rejection of Peircean phenomenology 
by implication any rejection of semiotic phenomenology in general. 
Semiotics and phenomenology are both scholarly enterprises concerned with 
(the origin, emergence of) meaning. That does not make the two designations 
synonyms. However, inquiring into the semiotic aspects of phenomenology and 
the phenomenological aspects of semiotics, one fact that definitively deserves 
mention is that Husserl developed a semiotic theory of his own (see for instance 
Husserl 1994). Semiotic theoretical development also occurs in Logical Investi-
gations (Husserl 1970b) and Formale und Transzendentale Logik (Husserl 1974 
[1929]). Spiegelberg (1982: 89) asks:  
 
How far can this picture [Husserl 1970b and 1974] be related to the teachings of 
recent semiotics, especially to the distinctions between syntactics and semantics? 
[…] Husserl himself developed […] an a priori grammar for all possible lan-
guages […] For semantics, understood as a study of the relationships between 
signs and designate, Husserl did not set aside any separate study; yet his later 
phenomenology of meanings includes the theoretical insights from which rules 
concerning legitimate and illegitimate meanings could be derived. Husserl was 
primarily concerned in pure logic as a study of the designate of our symbols, both 
as propositional meanings and as ontological objects meant through them, prior 
to studying their relationship to the stratum of linguistic expressions. Such study 
may then lead to the formulation of semiotic laws and rules. 
 
In what remains of this section, we will briefly treat the semiotic reception qua 
rejection of Husserl (by way of John Deely) and even more briefly the pheno-
menological reception of Uexküll (by way of Maurice Merleau-Ponty), and explain 
the idea of phenomena conceived of as a layer of semiosis in summary terms. 
Unlike the semioticians mentioned previously in this paragraph, John Deely 
is a contemporary voice of considerable resonance who has quite explicitly 
dismissed the enterprise of phenomenology (lest it be pure Heideggerianism18). 
Deely is representative of the attitude that semiotics is more progressed than 
phenomenology, and that phenomenology is largely a dated enterprise. In Deely 
2007: 7 (footnote 9) he asks:  
 
                                                     
18 In Deely and Novak 1970 Deely refers (p. 330) to “the essential superiority of Heideg-
gerean phenomenology over every other form.” He further states (ibid., 331) 
 
that the Heideggerean conception of Phenomenology departs from the Husserlean 
conception precisely on the basis of the key aspects in which Heidegger's notion of 
“das Sein” differs from Husserl's – still more from Brentano's – conception of the 
“Intentionalität des Bewusstseins” [intentionality of consciousness] and agrees 
with, or rather returns to, the classical notion of “esse intentionale” as first formu-
lated and subsequently developed in the Arabic and Latin traditions of Aristotelian 
commentaries culminating in 1637 with the Cursus Philosophicus of Jean Poinsot. 
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Why should there not be a postmodern rebirth for phenomenology, wherein the 
modern idealistic limitations of its founder and founding are overcome? I 
would agree that, even though Husserl himself opted for idealism, a phenome-
nologist can opt for realism. Phenomenology as a method is “on the fence” 
between realism and idealism. But by its method Phenomenology is not, and 
has no way of moving, beyond the modern impasse; it can only take sides 
within the modern context and as a matter of “individual preference”, in 
contrast to methodological principle.19 
 
Deely’s claims are in short 1) that Husserl was an idealist, 2) that pheno-
menology is epistemology, not ontology and 3) that Husserl’s phenomenology 
was Cartesian and thus typically modern. However, 1a) Husserl later approach 
in The Crisis was arguably at odds with idealism and 1b) major pheno-
menologists including Merleau-Ponty were not idealists, 2) major phenome-
nologists including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre did not conceive of 
phenomenology as an epistemological enterprise only, 3a) Husserl’s later 
approach in The Crisis was arguably explicitly at odds with Cartesianism and 
3b) major phenomenologists including Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty were 
consistently anti-Cartesian. There is thus not sufficient reason, in our opinion, 
for being as dismissive of phenomenology as Deely is. See also Jeffreys 2010. 
Deely’s overall framework is detailed in Four Ages of Understanding (Deely 
2001), where he divides the history of philosophy into four eras: 1) Ancient 
thought, 2) Latin thought, 3) Modern thought and 4) Postmodern thought, which 
Deely takes to be synonymous with semiotic thought. His rejection of Husserl 
and in consequence phenomenology must be seen in light of his categorisation 
of Husserl as a Modern thinker. The Moderns, in Deely’s reading, starting with 
Descartes, took representations to be self-representations (i.e., ideas) only, and 
thus lost sight of representations as other-representations, which leads to a 
(triadic) conception of sign that transcends, and bridges, the different modes of 
being. It is therefore, in Deely’s thought, only postmodern, i.e. semiotic, 
thinkers who can overcome the age-old contradiction between idealism and 
realism. In that grand narrative Deely frames Husserl as an idealist. 
As for the phenomenological reception of Uexküll’s work, Merleau-Ponty, 
for his part, related explicitly to Uexküll in his lectures in the late 1950s, as 
reflected in the posthumously compiled work Nature, which has only fairly 
recently been translated into English (Merleau-Ponty 2003). Merleau-Ponty’s 
treatment of Uexküll as described in Nature took place in the second in a series 
of three courses which he held a few years before his sudden death. It is worth 
                                                     
19 This corresponds to Deely’s statement in Tønnessen and Deely 2011:  
 
Phenomenology as it came out of Husserl is an epistemology, and it is a very 
modern idealism. You could be a phenomenologist and not necessarily be an 
idealist, but as a matter of fact Husserl was an idealist. And as a matter of fact, 
within phenomenology you do not have the means to make a decision between 
realism and idealism. So the whole problem of idealism versus realism is a creation 
of modern philosophy, and it is the problem that semiotics moves beyond[.] 
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noting that this second course started off with Descartes, and can be seen as an 
attempt to deconstruct the Cartesian notion of nature and offer an alternative to 
it. It is in this context Uexküll’s Umwelt theory is treated by Merleau-Ponty – as 
a potential substitute to what he regarded as a highly problematic conception of 
nature. For a brief treatment of Merleau-Ponty’s take on Uexküll, see Paper I (p. 
60) (and for a much more comprehensive treatment of both Merleau-Ponty’s 
and Heidegger’s relating to Uexküll, see Buchanan 2008).  
What does it involve to conceive of phenomena as a layer of semiosis? It 
must imply conceiving of phenomena as semiotic, and further conceiving of 
some further semiosis as non-phenomenal, perhaps located “below” and 
“above” the layer of phenomena. More specifically, given our views as detailed 
in 1.2 On the levels of biosemiosis, we conceive of this further, non-phenomenal 
(or non-perceptual) semiosis as being super-perceptual and sub-perceptual 
respectively. There are thus in basic terms, in the grand scheme of things, three 
layers or levels of semiosis – and phenomena, the perceptual kind of semiosis, 
is situated as the central layer.  
We can envisage at least four different possible fundamental relations 
between semiotics and phenomenology:  
1)  that these are two distinct fields,  
2)  that these are fields which overlap but furthermore cover their distinctive 
areas,  
3)  that semiotics encloses phenomenology altogether and  
4)  that phenomenology encloses semiotics altogether.  
 
In this thesis we vouch for position 3.20 This implies that of the two terms 
‘semiotics’ and ‘phenomenology’, ‘semiotics’ is definitively the most general 
term. The main axiom of Uexküllian phenomenology as presented in the 
context of this section could be that the phenomenon is a special case of 
semiosis. Semiosis, in other words, is the general entity, or process, of which 
phenomena are part. The axiom just mentioned could be taken to imply that 
phenomenology can be regarded as a subdiscipline of semiotics, as sketched in 
1.2 On the levels of biosemiosis.21 
                                                     
20 Husserl, who held that the phenomenological threshold is lower than the semiotic, would 
likely argue for position 4, or alternatively position 2. John Deely’s rejection of pheno-
menology to the effect that these are mutually excluding fields (i.e., competing perspectives) 
implies adopting position 1. 
21 Our assertion that semiotics may be conceived of as more comprehensive than pheno-
menology may strike many as absurd, given that Husserl, for one, held that phenomenology 
envelops all the phenomena of mind. The difference between Uexküllian and strictly Husser-
lian phenomenology on this point is that the former operates with a vastly wider notion of 
‘mind’. While a Husserlian phenomenologist may find Uexküllian phenomenology to be 
absurdly broad, speculative, or conceptually bewildered, an Uexküllian phenomenologist 
may find Husserlian phenomenology to be unduly narrow. 
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2.3. Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt 
In Herbert Spiegelberg’s monumental The Phenomenological Movement: A 
Historical Introduction (Spiegelberg 1982, 768 pp.), Uexküll is only mentioned 
once (p. 146), in the context of Husserl’s development of the notion of 
Lebenswelt:  
 
Now this world in the sense of an all-inclusive horizon was clearly not the 
world in the sense of objective science or cosmology. It was the world as 
experienced by a living subject in his particular perspective, however distorted, 
hence clearly a subjective and relative affair. The only form in which this 
concept had found entrance into science was that of a subjective environment 
(Umwelt) as introduced into animal psychology especially by Jakob von Uex-
küll.22  
 
In preparation of 2.4, regarding the notion of Uexküllian phenomenology, it is 
crucial to address the question concerning the possible association of Husserl’s 
Lebenswelt and Uexküll’s Umwelt. In how far are they comparable, or even 
overlapping notions? “Consciously we always live in the life-world;” Husserl 
(1970a: 379) wrote in what would become one of the appendices to The Crisis 
(“[The Life-World and the world of science]”); “normally there is no reason for 
making it explicitly thematic for ourselves universally as world. Conscious of 
the world as a horizon, we live for our particular ends, whether as momentary 
and changing ones or as an enduring goal that guides us.”23  
The term ‘Lebenswelt’ occurs occasionally in some earlier texts by Husserl 
(in his manuscripts as early as 1917, and in print first in 1924), but only 
emerges as a special and prioritised theme in The Crisis (Husserl 1970a), 
Husserl’s last and unfinished work (Spiegelberg 1982: 162). The first times the 
notion was mentioned in print in Husserl’s lifetime, it referred to items shared 
by several people in the same “life group”.24 In the posthumous version of The 
Crisis (Husserl 1954, cf. Husserl 1970a), the Lebenswelt surfaces as a special 
theme in section h), in Husserl’s discussion of Galileo’s “mathematization of 
nature”. The title of subsection h) is “The Life-World as forgotten foundation of 
meaning for natural science”. This famed and influential subsection was 
according to Spiegelberg inserted into the manuscript only at the galley stage. 
“This fact and the absence of the concept from both the Vienna and the Prague 
                                                     
22 Note that Uexküll did not approve of the animal psychology (Tierpsychologie) of his time. 
More accurately, the notion of a subjective world was introduced by Uexküll in biology via 
the emerging field of ethology (the study of animal behaviour). 
23 The Lebenswelt has by now two times been characterised by mention of the term horizon. 
“Of considerable importance”, remarks Spiegelberg (1982: 117), was […] Husserl’s new 
concept of the horizon of the perceptual field, inspired largely by William James’ conception 
of the ‘fridges’ of our perceptual consciousness. It finally led to the development of the 
phenomenology of the life-world encompassing all horizons.” 
24 As such it resembles our notion of common-Umwelt to some extent – see Tønnessen 2003: 
288–291. 
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lectures”, he writes (ibid.), “suggests that it was not until 1936 that the idea 
became focal in Husserl’s thought.” Given that Husserl died in 1938 that would 
leave only two years at most for its proper development by Husserl.  
But as a matter of fact, the sections on the Lebenswelt were omitted from the 
version of The Crisis that appeared while Husserl was still alive. As Spiegelberg 
(1982: 144) narrates, “[p]ractically nothing of the theme of the Lebenswelt or 
world of lived experience was known to outsiders during Husserl’s lifetime. 
The only time that Husserl came close to releasing it was when he prepared the 
second installment of the Crisis text [cf. Husserl 1954, first published in 193625] 
for publication in Philosophia during his last years.”  
In Carr’s observation (1970: xli), the Lebenswelt presents Husserl’s pheno-
menological program with two overarching difficulties. 
 
One questions one of the most important aspects of Husserl’s over-all theory, 
and the other threatens to undermine its claim to scientific rigor. In the first 
case, if we take seriously the “pregivenness” of the life-world, upon which the 
author repeatedly insists, Husserl’s earlier idealism seems to be in difficulty. 
[…] if it [the life-world] is in turn to be dealt with in terms of transcendental 
constitution, as Husserl also insists, then it seems to lose precisely what was 
described as one of its essential features, its pregivenness. 
 
The first difficulty, then, concerns a conflict between pregivenness and tran-
scendental constitution. Husserl’s beloved notion of the ‘transcendental’, how-
ever, was fuzzy and in constant development. As to idealism, it is by no means 
essential for us to come to the rescue of Husserl’s earlier understanding – in 
fact, being in conflict with idealism does not pose a problem to us at all. The 
second difficulty emerging from the introduction of the Lebenswelt theme in 
Carr’s reading concerns a conflict between the Lebenswelt as pregiven in the 
sense just mentioned and how theory then comes to depend on the Lebenswelt 
as its only source. “But if every theoretical activity presupposes the structures of 
the life-world, this must also be true of phenomenology, which in this case 
cannot be without presuppositions.” Again, this poses a problem for pheno-
menology as outlined in Husserl’s earlier career, but not for Uexküllian pheno-
menology, since Uexküllian phenomenology does not have to claim to be 
without presuppositions. Carr’s observations imply that phenomenologists have 
to choose sides between the early Husserl and the late Husserl, but do not pose 
any related problem to an Uexküllian phenomenologist, lest she be of an idealist 
persuasion or hold that phenomenology is without presuppositions even with 
regard to the role of Umwelt for theory. 
As Spiegelberg (1982: 144) notes, the some ninety pages of The Crisis that 
are, in its draft version, devoted to the subject of the Lebenswelt “do not contain 
more than first indications as to the directions” of Husserl’s final, radical step in 
developing phenomenology. If we are nevertheless to conclude on to what 
                                                     
25 Note that the 1954 version includes parts not included in the 1936 version, in the form of 
appendices. See also Husserl 1970a. 
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extent the notions of Lebenswelt and Umwelt are comparable, or even over-
lapping, our first observation will have to be that there is a profound difference 
between Uexküll’s theoretical starting point and that of Husserl. Namely, while 
Uexküll places any lifeworld in principle on equal terms, and emphasises 
differences, Husserl takes the human lifeworld to be the default lifeworld. 
Admittedly, Uexküll did in one sense also start off methodologically with the 
human lifeworld, and then proceeded by identifying those of the human Umwelt 
objects that were also to be found in non-human Umwelten. But Uexküll’s 
interest for significant, radical otherness results in a pluralistic worldview all the 
same, and he stresses that there is a difference between Umwelt methodology 
and the manifold reality of nature. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger, the second 
most influential phenomenologist, had any comparable detailed interest in the 
lifeworlds of other creatures.26 While Uexküll’s worldview is pluralistic, theirs 
is gradualistic in the sense that non-humans are simply more or less human-like. 
To them, Man and his world is the only measure for what counts as real and 
significant.  
When Husserl says that “[c]onsciously we always live in the life-world” 
(1970a: 379, our emphasis), he refers to humans, to people. But that does not 
mean that he conceived of the Lebenswelt as a human enterprise only. As Carr 
informs in a footnote to The Crisis (Husserl 1970a: 6), ‘surrounding world’ is 
used throughout for ‘Umwelt’ in the English translation. The term ‘Umwelt’ 
appears already on one of the first pages, in a central passage (ibid.).  
 
In our vital need – so we are told – this science [contemporary European 
natural science] has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle precisely the 
questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous 
upheavals, finds the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaningless-
ness of the whole of this human existence. Do not these questions, universal 
and necessary for all men, demand universal reflections and answers based on 
rational insight? In the final analysis they concern man as a free, self-
determining being in his behavior toward the human and extrahuman sur-
rounding world [Umwelt] and free in regard to his capacities for rationally 
shaping himself and his surrounding world [Umwelt]. What does science have 
to say about reason and unreason or about us men as subjects of this freedom? 
 
Surely, the use of the term ‘Umwelt’ in a German text is occasionally tricky to 
interpret, given that it can refer either to ‘environment’ in its common, general 
sense or to the more specific Uexküllian notion of Umwelt. In some cases, 
however, Husserl refers explicitly to animal lifeworlds. In one of the appendices 
to The Crisis, for instance – “The attitude of natural science and the attitude of 
                                                     
26 Of course, neither Husserl nor Heidegger was a biologist. But in as much as they 
addressed matters of Man’s exceptionality, they had an obligation, even as philosophers, to 
familiarise themselves with biological knowledge. Heidegger’s notion of ‘the animal’ as 
“poor in world” (Heidegger 1995) in principle is particularly telling of his sweeping conclu-
sions. 
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humanistic science: Naturalism, dualism, and psychophysical psychology“, 
written before 1930, Husserl (1970a: 331) refers to a new attitude toward men 
and animals, “toward men and animals not as bodies to be investigated 
consistently and descriptively in the attitude oriented towards nature but as men 
(or animals) who have their bodies as living bodies, who have their personal 
surrounding world [Umwelt], oriented around their living bodies as the near-far 
world […]” (our emphasis). In this case, there is no doubt that ‘Umwelt’ is 
applied in an Uexküllian sense. We find a similar statement, one which stresses 
Husserl’s gradualistic stance with regard to the human species and how other 
lifeforms compare with it, in the main body of The Crisis (Husserl 1970a: 238, 
our emphasis): 
 
As the correlative abstraction teaches us, man (and everything else that is real 
in animal form) is, after all, something real having two strata and is given as 
such in pure experience, purely in the life-world [Lebenswelt] […] The indi-
vidual psychology must, then, be the foundation for a sociology and likewise 
for a science of objectified spirit (of cultural things), which after all refers, in 
its own way, to the human being as person, i.e., to the life of the soul. And all 
this can be applied by analogy – just as far as the analogy reaches – to 
animals, to animal society, to the surrounding world [Umwelt] with its 
specifically animal signification. 
 
To summarise, Husserl’s conception of Lebenswelt implies that there are animal 
lifeworlds (Lebenswelten) as well, “as far as the analogy reaches”. The human 
Lebenswelt is the measure of other lifeworlds, and their model insofar as 
methodology is concerned. While there are limits to how far the Lebenswelt 
notion and the Umwelt notion are comparable, they are evidently partly 
overlapping. To the extent that this is the case, one should not forget that 
Uexküll’s development of the Umwelt notion for the most part preceded 
Husserl’s development of the Lebenswelt notion (in that sense, we could even 
claim that there is a measure, albeit small, of Uexküllian phenomenology in 
Husserl’s late phenomenology). 
The point at which Uexküllian phenomenology and Husserl’s late con-
ception of phenomenology are the most similar concerns the lifeworld (as in the 
human Umwelt) as the forgotten foundation of meaning for natural science. As 
reported in 2.1 On the notion of phenomenology, Husserl’s ideas about 
phenomenology were so rich, so manifold and so contradictory that it is not 
only hard to define ‘phenomenology’ consistently, but even to define what 
‘Husserlian thought’ as such involves. This fact should embolden us to pursue 
our deepest intuitions regardless of dogma and tradition. Rethinking pheno-
menology is justified by the mere fact that Husserl himself never stopped 
rethinking phenomenology. 
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2.4. The notion of Uexküllian phenomenology 
The reason why it makes sense to propagate a variant of phenomenology under 
the label ‘Uexküllian’, apart from the descriptive foundation in Umwelt theory, 
is that Uexküll’s fundamental premises about the nature of life are desperately 
needed in our time – and in the life sciences of our time. While today’s life 
sciences are for the most part reductionist – neglecting the reality of the 
individual, the primary stakeholder in nature – Uexküll’s call for a subjective 
biology echoes Husserl’s call for a return to the things themselves in the most 
meaningful way possible, by in effect implying a return to the study and 
perception of nature qua individuals, nature qua living creatures. 
Perception is not as such a self-reflective activity, but rather a sustained 
attempt of grasping something which in part opposes the subject and in part 
constitutes its very being. There is a world out there – a world of differences, a 
world of creatures, almost all of them differently constituted than oneself, but 
many of them nevertheless constitutionally related to oneself. In this world of 
existence-through-and-with-others, consciousness no doubt plays a part, but by 
no means delineates the horizon of our entire bodily awareness. In fact, 
consciousness is but a special case of awareness – a much more common 
phenomenon, appearing in countless forms ranging from the amoeba to the 
(ludicrous?) human genius.27 While consciousness might very well represent the 
most novel evolutionary innovation in which we partake, being conscious is, in 
general terms, not a prerequisite for navigating in the world of the living. For us 
humans – us mindful creatures – the existential (and epistemological!)28 
challenge is first of all a matter of not getting trapped in our own minds. By 
neglecting the foundation of consciousness – its natural sources; its bodily 
underpinning and its evolutionary roots – we risk being very poor examples of 
big-brained animals. 
What we present under the label of ‘Uexküllian phenomenology’ in this 
dissertation is characterised by an assumption of the (in the realm of life) 
universal existence of a genuine first person perspective, i.e., of experienced 
worlds. Uexküllian phenomenology as we will portray it is an example of – a 
special case of – a semiotics of being, taken to be a study of signs designed so as 
to emphasise the reality of the phenomena of the living (see Paper II).  
We have no doubt that some semioticians will think that Uexküllian pheno-
menology is not sufficiently or properly semiotic, and that some phenome-
nologists will think that Uexküllian phenomenology is not sufficiently or 
properly phenomenological. This would at least be a predictable fate for a 
daring philosopher-become-semiotician who easily risks being regarded as a 
philosopher only among semioticians and as a semiotician only among 
philosophers. It would also be an implication of the radicality (as in novelty) of 
                                                     
27 There are as many notions of awareness as there are of consciousness. The definition of 
awareness as “a much more common phenomenon” than consciousness is to be used in this 
dissertation. 
28 And ethical! 
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Uexküllian phenomenology as it is presented in this dissertation. Accepting 
Uexküllian phenomenology presupposes a willingness to think anew about what 
phenomenology is all about. It cannot on all points be in accordance with old 
definitions of phenomenology, for in itself it entails elements of a new 
definition of phenomenology. 
In this section we will address how Uexküllian phenomenology differs from 
traditional phenomenology – which has for the most part been consciousness-
centred – how it differs from notable phenomenologies by not adopting neutra-
lity with regard to the reality status of phenomena, and how it resembles other 
phenomenologies in various aspects. We will further treat – however briefly – 
the basic difference between Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s approach to 
perception, and point to the theoretical possibility of other conceptions of 
Uexküllian phenomenology than that of the current thesis. 
First, however, another disclaimer is called for (cf. our Peircean disclaimer 
in the beginning of this Introduction). As we argue in this thesis (especially in 
Paper I), the Umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll needs to be updated with 
regard to its neglect of the historical dimension of life processes. At some other 
points, as well, his work is too marked by his time and his concrete influences – 
a case at hand is his relation to Kant. If one examines the way Uexküll himself 
tried to generalise his biological findings and make them relevant for politics, 
the picture becomes even gloomier (see Harrington 1999, treated in Tønnessen 
2003, and Uexküll 1920). A general disclaimer is therefore in order: Uexküllian 
phenomenology as we portray it is loyal not to Uexküll’s thought in detail but to 
his essential finding that nature is constituted by the intricate relations of all 
living creatures, which are all subjects of the phenomenal world at large. 
Uexküllian phenomenology should be rigorously undogmatic. This applies not 
only to Uexküll’s work, but also to semiotics as a scholarly discipline. 
The definition of phenomenology in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo-
sophy (Smith 2011) reads like this: “Phenomenology is the study of structures 
of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.” Such a 
notion of phenomenology is much too narrow to even begin to cover the 
substance of Uexküllian phenomenology. While this definition is largely in line 
with the conception of the phenomenal world of Kant, Hegel and Husserl (to the 
extent that the former two addressed matters of phenomenology in a modern 
sense of that word), it is outdated if we consider contemporary eco-pheno-
menology or indeed Uexküllian phenomenology. 
While we do interpret Umwelt theory as a genuine theory of phenome-
nology, and thus as qualified phenomenology, we must as mentioned acknow-
ledge that we have a special take on phenomenology which will inevitably be 
regarded by some as in fundamental conflict with phenomenology as they 
conceive of it. A point at hand is the role of subjective appearance. For David 
Abram as well as for Charles Sanders Peirce and Edmund Husserl, pheno-
menology is, or should be, concerned with subjective appearances as they 
appear, regardless of their connection to any ‘reality’. This stand is typical of 
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Abram’s phenomenological animism (see our critique in Paper III29), Peirce’s 
phaneroscopy and Husserl’s phenomenology alike, and occurs as one of the 
core criteria for what counts as phenomenology in Spiegelberg 1956. As we 
hope to demonstrate throughout this dissertation, our stand is instead that even 
though absolutely all (human) perceptions are worthy of analysis and comment, 
it is crucial to distinguish between those perceptions that correlate to 
corresponding realities and those that do not. In the latter case we often have to 
inquire into the symbolic construction which must be understood in order to 
explain how such perceptual inconsistencies can arise in the first place (as an 
example, consider this dissertation’s 4.5 The symbolic construction of the Big 
Bad Wolf in contemporary Norway). 
Where Husserl and Peirce – and arguably Abram, given his animism – stress 
the principal insignificance of whether or not phenomenal objects have real 
existence beyond their appearance, Uexküllian phenomenology has evolved 
from empirical science and presupposes the assumption that wherever there are 
functional relations there are real, existing entities or processes. Distinguishing 
between real and illusory objects thus becomes pertinent. In place of Husserl’s 
phenomenological slogan “To the things themselves!” we can credibly place 
our own To the Umwelt objects themselves!30 
                                                     
29 In defence of Abram, we should consider what his animism aims at. This is a crucial point, 
since we understand that in his view revising this one point in his philosophy would tinker 
with his overall message. Abram’s animism can fruitfully be contrasted with Cartesian 
dualism – as an attempt to deconstruct, or counteract this long-held metaphysical thought 
(Wendy Wheeler pointed this out to us). Instead of distinguishing between mind and matter, 
Abram seems to suggest (and in an all too narrow way, at that), we should take refuge in 
immediate experience as it is. This refuge is apparently a logical step, in terms of pheno-
menology. – Is Abram’s animism in line with Husserl’s phenomenology? On one hand, the 
two appears to agree that any belief in the existence of things underlying experience should 
be suspended. On the other hand, Abram might actually be said to be in violation of this 
principle of bracketing, given that he appears to draw ontological conclusions based on his 
animism. The later Husserl would likely criticise Abram for taking a naïve, natural attitude 
as his alpha and omega. 
At any rate, Abram’s animism finds support in its alliance with oral cultures and typical 
animal experience alike. In order to become animal in the sense of Deleuze (see Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, and the title of Abram 2010), we have to do as the animals do. From that 
perspective Abram’s animism is simply a consequence of his empathic attitude to animals. 
We could further argue that a sort of alignment with physical nature, with seasonal variations 
etc., constitutes a suitable ideal for a way out of the ecological crisis. From that perspective 
one could choose to see Abram’s animism as an allied view, in that Abram favours exactly 
this kind of participatory relationship with both living creatures and physical nature in a 
wider sense. Our conclusion must be that Abram’s animism serves a number of good 
intentions which are worth being followed up in their own right, but that it serves poorly as 
metaphysics or ontology. 
30 As we will see in 6.1 Theoretical findings (see particularly Figure 13, depicting a tripartite 
model of the human Umwelt), we are in this thesis eventually able to distinguish between 
Umwelt objects as encountered, Umwelt objects as anticipated and Umwelt objects as 
conceptualised. 
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What other approaches in phenomenology is Uexküllian phenomenology in 
line with? As it turns out, is has aspects in common with several approaches, 
but differs from each of these in other respects. Like Heidegger’s pheno-
menology, for instance, it at times resembles (philosophical) anthropology. Like 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Sartre’s phenomenologies it emphasises the role of the 
corporeal, and like Sartre’s phenomenology it stresses (in our concrete version 
of it) phenomena related to absence and meaninglessness. All that said, 
Uexküllian phenomenology does differ fundamentally from much that goes 
under the name of phenomenology. Husserl for one did not envision any 
phenomenology of particulars (nor did Peirce). On this point, however, Uex-
küllian phenomenology has a number of allies in post-Husserlian phenome-
nology, but none of these have taken as its starting point that absolutely all 
living creatures are englobed in phenomenal worlds, and thus that we can 
legitimately speak about individual phenomenologies (in the sense of “the 
phenomenology of individual X”) throughout the realm of the living. 
Uexküllian phenomenology in our depiction is particularly affiliated with a 
line of phenomenological development that goes from the late Husserl via 
Merleau-Ponty to the contemporary phenomenologist David Abram. As 
Spiegelberg (1982: 538) narrates, “what Merleau-Ponty attempted was to go 
beyond Husserl by consciously extrapolating certain lines, mostly from un-
published texts, as far as he knew them, and by playing down others in the 
published writings.” In a somewhat comparable vein we build on yet go beyond 
the phenomenological works of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Abram.  
Our natural affiliation with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is best 
expressed by way of his cherished thesis of the primacy of perception. If we 
have adopted this thesis without much critical reflection, it is testament to the 
fact that we do associate with his approach. As Spiegelberg (ibid., 560) 
explains, primacy “simply means that perception constitutes the ground level 
for all knowledge, and that its study has to precede that of all other strata such 
as those of the cultural world and specifically that of science.” In his main work 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (1962) left out a number of 
aspects of perception which had been treated by Husserl. Of particular interest 
is the fact that he predominantly omitted any “mention of Husserl’s 
characterization of perception as the act in which an object is bodily given” 
(ibid.). “In spite of its comprehensive title, this is not the final phenomeno-
logical monograph of perception”, Spiegelberg concludes, pointing out that it 
also contains substantial philosophical discussions which had not traditionally 
been associated with the topic of perception. “Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of perception”, he summarises (ibid., 560–1), “is primarily an attempt to explore 
the basic stratum in our experience of the world as it is given prior to all 
scientific interpretation.” Increasingly through his interest in Husserl’s notion of 
Lebenswelt, Merleau-Ponty’s was “actually a phenomenology of the world as 
perceived rather than of the perceiving act.” Husserl, in contrast, focused on the 
act of perception, as an act of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty instead focused on 
what is perceived, and the material of perception. In a sense Merleau-Ponty 
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returned to “the things themselves” (as in material reality – though this was not 
Husserl’s intent) much more consistently than did Husserl himself, except in his 
eventual development of the Lebenswelt notion. And the difference between 
Merleau-Ponty and (at any rate the early) Husserl with regard to perception is 
not simply a difference in emphasis. Merleau-Ponty’s approach implies that 
“perception emerges as the act designed to trace elementary meaning as actually 
already present in the world prior to our interpretations. This emphasis on 
meaning as discovered, not bestowed by investing acts, is certainly new, though 
it is not an absolute innovation” (ibid., 563). 
In conclusion, we find it appropriate to make clear that Uexküllian phenome-
nology as it is conceived of in this dissertation is not the only possible version 
of Uexküllian phenomenology. One could for instance have envisioned an 
ahistorical (to some extent even an atemporal) Uexküllian phenomenology – 
which might have been more in line with both Uexküll and Husserl, judging by 
the letters contained in their respective works. That road, however, is not the 
one taken here, since we regard the ahistoricity of the Umwelt theory as its 
weakest point, and have chosen change as our very topic. Such an Uexküllian 
phenomenology might have been “more Uexküllian” in a strictly biographical 
sense, but it would have been poorer qua phenomenological philosophy, and 
qua philosophical theory relevant for contemporary science. Had our concern 
been that of the historian of philosophy, that approach would certainly have 
been more appropriate than our current undertaking. But our primary concern is 
to contribute to an updated Uexküllian thought, and we can thus not offer 
allegiance to Uexküll in all details any more than we are prepared to offer 
allegiance to all that is associated with the term ‘phenomenology’. 
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3. UMWELT MAPPING 
This section is concerned with the question of method. Insofar as scientific 
method is discursive, the current section is further concerned with factual 
discourse. An intricate problem with factual discourse is that empirical argu-
ments are often superficial and disconnected from the intuitions underlying and 
often driving the discourse. Empirical knowledge in oversight terms is crucial to 
any interdisciplinary project, and perhaps especially to those that, like this one, 
crosses the nature/culture divide. It is an expressed goal for this dissertation to 
avoid being dogmatic. An undogmatic theory or theoretical approach must be 
empirically grounded, and its theoretical framework revisable in light of 
empirical findings.31 Any theory is a simplification of actual reality. Empirical 
reality complicates matters exactly because there are virtually always excep-
tions, counter-examples, to proposed theories, which are by their very nature 
simplifications of actual matters. Viable theories handle these challenges by 
adapting to them; less feasible theories by neglecting them for as long as they 
are allowed to. 
Semiotics as an interdisciplinary approach can thrive only by absorbing 
knowledge from other, narrower, more specialised fields. Many ‘grand 
narrative’ approaches in semiotics and philosophy – semioethics as presented 
by Ponzio and Petrilli (2005), to mention but one example – are empirically 
weak. Petrilli, who in a forthcoming interview concedes that the semiotics (aka 
philosophy) of John Deely is dogmatic, does not regard her own work as 
dogmatic.32 But theories without (sufficient) empirical grounding are dogmatic. 
Dogmatic theories carrying grand narratives eventually end up as self-
confirming worldviews. The perilous circumstance is that any ‘fact’ has to fit in 
with the overall narrative. The solution is not to avoid narratives – because after 
all we all operate with narratives that guide our lives, our views and our actions 
(and that statement is valid even for philosophers, insofar as they are human) – 
                                                     
31 Any theory needs direction, e.g. prioritisation of topic matter and concise analysis. Theory 
with no direction is hardly theory at all. It is therefore a balancing act not to be solely 
theoretical (as in dogmatic), and simultaneously not be solely empirical (as in without 
theoretical direction). 
32 After all, very few – except for believers in Christian or other dogmas portrayed as such – 
would admit to being dogmatic. ‘Dogmatic’ is as a rule a designation for others, not for 
oneself. It should be noted, however, that dogmatic theories can offer valuable theoretical 
developments, and frequently do. In the case of Ponzio and Petrilli, part of the appeal of their 
work on semioethics derives from shared intuitions which can be traced back to common 
vocabulary etc. Building extensively on the history of semiotics and philosophy, their work 
resonates with the thought of many in part because they share central references with their 
readers. Drawing on the history of thought is a fine way of instigating theory. The problem 
arises when the contemporary scene globally in terms of social and ecological relations is 
interpreted predominantly via historical, often outdated concepts and models of thought. 
There is ample proof that several factual claims made by Ponzio and Petrilli in the context of 
semioethics are in actual fact derived deductively, from theory, and not derived from 
empirical observation (and that the empirical landscape contradicts their claims). 
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but to be clear about them, and to expose them to a brute meeting with 
empirical reality. The real problems occur when alleged facts are but deduced 
from overarching theory, rather than induced from empirical reality. There is 
nothing wrong with starting off by proposing hypotheses on the grounds of 
deductive reasoning. But if these hypotheses are not tested by comparing them 
to empirical facts derived by way of induction – and corrected, revised, in case 
of any discrepancy – they are of poor value. Deduction tested and confirmed by 
induction is legitimate bordering on scientific; deduction with no or only poor 
empirical testing is dogmatic. 
The remaining of this section is devoted to developing visual representation 
of an adaptation of Friedrich Brock’s phenomenal fields in the context of 
Umwelt transition, and to present the notion of semiotic causation. 
 
 
3.1. Visual representation of Brock’s phenomenal fields 
As we have seen, the phenomenal world at large – ‘nature’ considered as the 
totality of all the lifeworlds of all the living on this planet we call “Earth” – 
mirrors ‘the biosphere’ understood as the sphere of the living in a more material 
sense. In our take on mapping the human impact on and in nature (see Paper IV 
in particular), “Man’s place in nature” will methodically be rephrased as 
“humankind’s place in the phenomenal world at large’. What matters in this 
reconfiguration of the natural world is, to put it simply, what matters to the 
living themselves. That, at least, is the pronounced goal of Umwelt mapping as 
it is described here. 
In Paper II, p. 385, we describe Friedrich Brock’s attempt (1939) to develop 
something akin to an ethogram of subjective experience. The problem according 
to Brock (ibid., 37) is that each Umwelt considered as a whole is unique by 
definition and therefore escapes comparison – but the functional cycle, on the 
other hand, can serve as foundation for comparing Umwelten. While Brock 
suggested that the four main types of functional cycles could serve as key 
notions in categorising behaviour, which is assumed to reflect private expe-
rience (strictly speaking a mere repetition of what Uexküll taught), we state in 
Paper II that rather than describing these ‘phenomenal fields’ (as we call them) 
comparatively, in comparison of different life forms, we may just as well 
describe these four main phenomenal fields for one single species, population, 
or individual organism, over time. 
This point is worth dwelling on, for the sake of clarity. Brock’s seminal text 
is entitled Typenlehre und Umweltforschung: Grundlegung einer Idealistische 
Biologie, in English Type Theory and Umwelt Research: Foundation of an 
Idealistic Biology, and is dedicated to Hans Driesch (1867–1941) and Uexküll, 
“my teachers” (“meinen Lehrern”). Section three out of five of this brief treatise 
(pp. 10–18) is entitled “Die Umweltlehre Jakob v. Uexkülls als metodische 
Grundlage einer ‘Idealistischen Biologie’” (“The Umwelt theory of Jakob von 
Uexküll as a methodological basis for an ‘idealistic biology’”). We note in 
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passing that our estimation of Brock’s text does not involve any support of his 
introduction of idealist biology as such.33 Brock’s portrayal of idealistic biology 
is partly motivated by polemic with zoologist Hermann Weber (1899–1956), cf. 
Brock 1939: 2 (our translation – here and in the following). According to Brock 
it is Weber  
 
who in his above-mentioned treatise [Weber 1931] has seen and sharply out-
lined the core of the problem, so that his formulation can serve as a first intro-
duction to our way of thinking. He writes: “The Umwelt theory is, as Brock 
once explicitly emphasised, a typology, no evolutionary theory […] Needless 
to say, this concerns a purely idealistic typology which has nothing to do and 
wants nothing to do with evolutionary thought.”34 
 
Brock’s stand is problematic given our critical understanding of Uexküll’s 
ahistoricity. “The Umwelt theory […]”, writes Brock (ibid., 3) ”is, as Weber 
correctly writes, a typological and no historical method.“35 Further adding to 
the problématique is the fact that Brock states dogmatically (ibid., 14) that 
“[t]he behaviour of all animals is linked to a particular finite number of 
signifiers [meaning carriers].”36 The implication of our statement that rather 
than describing Brock’s phenomenal fields comparatively, in comparison of 
different life forms, we may just as well describe these four main phenomenal 
fields for one single species, population, or individual organism, over time (cf. 
Paper II, 385), is thus a radical revision of Brock’s view. While his was a static 
and finite biological typology, ours is a dynamic and indeed historical biolo-
gical typology. We share the conviction, however, that (ibid., 36) “[t]he main 
task […] is to express the biological sense context between an animal subject 
and its world, as it is symbolised through the functional cycle and its signifier 
[meaning carrier], including in its seemingly insignificant capacities.“37 
                                                     
33 Brock’s text makes mention of Leibniz, Plato and Goethe, but is for the most part 
nominally influenced only by Leibniz and Plato and substantially influenced perhaps only by 
Goethe, who figures in a much more important role, though no work by him (nor of these 
other two) is included in the text’s bibliography. No major philosopher is referenced in 
Brock’s treatise. 
34 “[...] der in seiner oben genannten Abhandlung [Weber 1931] den Kern des Problems 
gesehen und scharf umrissen hat, so daß seine Formuliering als erste Einführung in unsere 
Gedankengänge dienen mag. Er screibt: ‘Die Umweltlehre ist, wie auch Brock einmal 
ausdrücklich betont, eine Typologie, keine Entwicklungslehre ... Unnötig, ausdrücklich zu 
sagen, daß es sich dabei um eine rein idealistische Typologie handelt, die mit den 
Entwicklungsgedanken nichts zu tun hat und zu tun haben will.‘” 
35 “Die Uexküllsche Umweltlehre [...] ist, wie Weber richtig schreibt, eine typologische und 
keine historische Methode.“ 
36 “[d]as Verhalten aller Tiere ist an eine beswtimmte endliche Zahl von Bedeutungsträgern 
geknüpft.” 
37 “[d]ie Hauptaufgabe [...] ist es jedoch, den biologischen Sinnzusammenhang zwischen 
Tiersubject und seiner Welt, wie er durch die Funktionskreise und ihre Bedeutungsträger 
symbolisiert wird, auch in der scheinbar unbedeutundsten Leistung zum Ausdruck zu 
bringen.” 
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We reiterate that the exact expression ‘phenomenal field’ is our own 
coinage. When Brock sets out to depict the Umwelten of two different 
creatures, he writes (ibid., 37): 
 
The Umwelten of two quite different animals [...] can symbolically be depicted 
as circles, in which the animal subject has its standpoint in the center. Since the 
Umwelten qua wholes, as we have seen, are not at all comparable (cf. p. 11), 
we draw the circles with different sizes and furthermore we draw one 
completely and sketch the other. For the sake of simplicity we divide the circle 
in four equal parts. These could represent the four most important biological 
fields, which we in the Umwelten can characterise as functional cycles. We are 
thinking about the field of medium38 mastery, of sexual activity, of prey and 
enemy encounters. In the field of prey we pin down the nourishment qua 
signifier [meaning carrier] as a cross. A precisely similar dietary marker of the 
animal subject now plays a role in both Umwelten. These lines are the symbol 
for the same performative principles within equally toned functional fields in 
different Umwelten.39 
 
In the figure of Brock 1939: 37, the four fields which we call phenomenal fields 
are by Brock called: 
 
“Feld der Medium-beherrschung”  = Field of medium mastery  
“Feld der Beute-begegnung”   = Field of prey encounters 
“Feld geschlechtlicher Betätigung”  = Field of sexual activity 
“Feld der der Feind-begegnung”  = Field of enemy encounters 
 
Prior to presenting visual representations suitable for our current project of such 
phenomenal fields, we should make it clear, by way of a conceptual 
clarification, that the ontological maps (also described as ecological 
sociograms) introduced in Paper IV (Figure 1–3) could more specifically rather 
be called relational Umwelt maps (because they show an Umwelt creature in its 
relations to others, i.e., as an instance of relational being), whereas the term 
ontological map could fruitfully be applied as a more general term, enveloping 
                                                     
38 Medium in the sense of physical medium (be it aquatic, terrestrial, sub-terrestrial, aerial) 
with an eye to biological functions. 
39 “Die Umwelten zwei recht verschiedener Tiere [...] seien symbolisch als Kreise 
dargestellt, in deren Mittelpunkten das Tiersubjekt seinen Standort hat. Da die Umwelten als 
Ganzes, wie wir sahen, gar nicht vergleichbar sind (vgl. S. 11), zeichnen wir die Kreise 
verschieden groß und außerdem ziehen wir den einen aus und stricheln den anderen. Der 
Einfachheit halber wollen wir die Kreise je in vier gleiche Sektoren teilen. Diese stellen die 
vier wichstigsten biologischen Felder dar, welche wir in den Umwelten als Funktionskreise 
kennzeichnen konnten. Wir denken an das Feld der Mediumbeherrschung, der 
geschlechtlichen Betätigung, der Beute- und Feindbegegnung. In den Beutefeldern zeichnen 
wir die Nahrung durch ein Kreuz als Bedeutungsträger ein. In beiden Umwelten zieht sich 
jetzt je eine völlig gleiche Markierung vom Tiersubjekt zur Nahrung hin. Diese Lienen sind 
das Symbol für die gleichen Leistungsprinzipien innerhalb gleichartig getönter 
Funktionsfelder in verschiedenen Umwelten.” 
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both relational Umwelt maps (aka ecological sociograms) and phenomenal 
fields as subcategories.40 
We start out by depicting one Umwelt qua phenomenal fields. 
 
Figure 2. Phenomenal fields. 
 
 
In Figure 2 we depict an Umwelt by way of four phenomenal fields cor-
responding to the four main functional cycles. As we plainly see, this is an 
adaptation of Brock’s original draft. Umwelt objects associated with any of 
these functional cycles will here show up inside the relevant phenomenal field, 
whether we choose to represent them in words, iconically coded or otherwise 
coded. Note that in the case of the functional cycle of the partner, which 
Uexküll as a rule took to be related to sex/reproduction, we will in some cases 
generalise and refer this category to social companions in general. In terms of 
ecology, our popular notion of ‘food’ is related to foraging behaviour, and our 
notion of ‘partner’ to social behaviour in general and courtship behaviour etc. in 
particular. 
                                                     
40 Note that Kalevi Kull suggested the term ‘relational Umwelt map’ as an alternative to 
‘ontological map’. Relational Umwelt maps and phenomenal fields should in principle be 
interchangeable in that the same Umwelt circumstances can theoretically be represented 
either via phenomenal fields or via a relational Umwelt map (as an exercise, we could 
redraw the relational Umwelt maps in Paper IV’s Figure 1 and Figure 2 in terms of pheno-
menal fields). Some information, however, might be lost in representation in both cases. 
What is lost when we depict Umwelt circumstances in terms of phenomenal fields is 
complex relations (interconnections among a group of Umwelt creatures). What is lost when 
we depict Umwelt circumstances in form of a relational Umwelt map is in one sense the 
central standpoint of the Umwelt creature. In general, representation qua phenomenal fields 
is most workable when what we want to emphasise is the full, or integrated, picture of an 
Umwelt creature in perceptual and behavioural terms; relational Umwelt maps when what 
we want to emphasise is complex ecological interrelations. Used in combination, they 
supplement each other. 
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 Umwelt transition can in principle be depicted figuratively very easily, by 
juxtaposing the four main phenomenal fields (or but one, two or three) 
representing functioning before a specific change and another set of pheno-
menal fields representing functioning after the change has occurred. Here it is 
of significance whether the Umwelt creature in question remains the same or 
not. If it does, there is continuity (as in constancy) either in an individual life or 
in evolutionary terms. If it does not, there are either reproductive, phenotypical 
or other fundamental changes occurring in the process depicted.  
 As an example, we will present a figurative depiction of the evolutionary 
phenomenon of wolves becoming dogs. While in the initial Umwelt situation a 
wolf relates to humans as enemies, in the eventual Umwelt situation a dog (the 
evolutionary product, after numerous generations) relates to humans predom-
inantly as a partner (as in social companion) and only marginally as an enemy. 
Any depiction whatsoever is a simplification, and if depicted only in two steps 
this figure would be drastically so. The tool box of phenomenal fields is flexible 
in principle and in practice, however, in that a series of fields can be depicted 
whenever we want to go in detail – as illustrated by Figure 3, where the 
evolutionary phenomenon of wolves becoming dogs is represented in somewhat 
more detail. 
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3.2. The notion of semiotic causation 
The notion of semiotic causation is mentioned in Paper II (p. 378, 383), and 
even given as a keyword for that article, but even so not thoroughly treated 
there. Ever since the four causes of Aristotle were rejected – with but one 
exception, efficient causation – the modern scientific worldview has been faced 
with the challenge of explaining how it can be that there are acts, intentions etc. 
in a world of solely mechanical interaction. Philosophers holding mechanistic, 
deterministic worldviews have problems explaining how there can be something 
like free will. Various peculiar ideas have been introduced in order to solve this 
problem throughout the history of philosophy, including Leibniz’ idea that “the 
realm of efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other […] 
matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the best guidance for 
spirits” (Leibniz 2009 [1710]: 279). A proper understanding of what we call 
semiotic causation makes such groundless speculations unnecessary. If we 
accept that there is not only efficient causation but also semiotic causation, the 
existence of free will is not as bluntly paradoxical as it inevitably is in the 
context of mechanistic worldviews. Combined with a modern understanding of 
a stratified universe, however, where anthropogenic change only affects limited 
regions and layers of reality at large (as in ‘the universe’), there is nevertheless 
no imminent need for rejecting all views of determinism in purely mechanistic 
processes, insofar, that is, as these views concern “higher” levels, and “larger” 
regions, of physical reality than those that we live our day-to-day lives in on 
contemporary Earth. 
Unlike efficient causation, semiotic causation is not wholly predictable, 
because it involves a measure of interpretability and of interpretation. Semiotic 
causes are open to interpretation, in the sense that a semiotic effect is proof of a 
semiotic cause. We aim at developing the notion of semiotic causation as an 
umbrella term – an overarching, general term which might cover several more 
specific notions of causation, many of which are already in circulation in 
scholarly literature, biosemiotic discourse included. Attempts have been made 
by others as well to pinpoint such a general notion, though perhaps not as 
explicitly as we are doing in this dissertation (or at any rate not as we are doing 
it in this dissertation). An example: “To my way of thinking”, Peter Wills wrote 
in email correspondence distributed in the biosemiotic community in 2011, 
“biosemiotics rejects the reductionist claims and ascribes a reality to signs (as 
possible causes of things) in biology.” Another biosemiotician, the delectable 
Wendy Wheeler, has written (2010, quoted in Paper II, 378–379) that her 
“strong hunch is that abduction via ‘family resemblances’ (plays of semiotic 
similarity and difference) is a central driver of evolution so that the 
relationships between organisms and environments, egg and sperm, cell and 
DNA, rather than being mechanically deterministic, are in fact much more like 
conversations: their causality is semiotic.” Wheeler’s hunch, as we state in 
Paper II (379, emphasis added here) is paralleled by Uexküll’s observations to 
48 
the effect that a creature’s Umwelt consists of the signs which cause it to 
respond.41 
The briefest possible definition of semiotic causation would be this one: 
When a sign acts as a cause, the causal process at hand is a process of semiotic 
causation. In a more technical manner, we can say that the semiotic cause X 
causes the semiotic effect Y to appear as a sign of X whenever Y appears as a 
sign of X. In other words, the sole appearance of the sign Y as a sign of X is in 
the framework of semiotic causation sufficient evidence for X being the cause 
of Y – in terms of semiosis, X is then the cause of Y. 
As we see, wherever there is successful (as in effective) semiosis, there is 
semiotic causation. A sign that is but intended does not cause anything, except 
for perhaps in the mind of the intending semiotic agent. A sign that is intended 
as a specific sign and consequently is seen as such, on the other hand, is an 
effective sign, a sign giving rise to semiotic causation. And yet intention is no 
criterion for semiotic causation, since the key to initiating, generating semiotic 
causation lies in the eyes of the beholder – in something being interpreted as a 
sign. Semiosis, therefore, is potential causation – a sign is a potential cause.42 
It is our conviction that experience, cognition, feelings and other subjective 
phenomena can only be explained (as meaningful phenomena) if we allow for 
something akin to semiotic causation, operating at different levels of biological 
integration wherein we observe emergent qualitative novelties. A notion of 
semiotic causation might at first glance seem innocent enough, but it has 
ramifications of fundamental ontological and epistemological significance. In 
most interpretations it will defy mechanistic worldviews, which is in our times 
often represented by philosophical positions such as physicalism (“the thesis 
that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, 
that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical” – Stoljar 
2011) and epiphenomenalism (“the view that mental events are caused by 
physical events in the brain, but have no effects upon any physical events” – 
Robinson 2011). 
                                                     
41 A notion of semiotic causation could even in some measure be associated with Husserl’s 
notion of intentionality. “Incidentally,” as Spiegelberg (1982: 155) writes, “Husserl uses the 
term ‘intention’ not only for a feature of acts but also for the relation between the sign (or 
symbol) and its referent […] in fact this is the sense which occurs first in the Logische 
Untersuchungen [see Husserl 1970b]. […] However, this relation between symbol and 
symbolized is clearly the offspring of intentional acts which establish ‘objective’ 
intentionality in the field of symbolism.” 
42 Note that semiotic causes and semiotic effects are in many cases interchangeable in the 
sense that one and the same sign can in one context be a semiotic cause and in another 
context be a semiotic effect. This interchangeability corresponds to the generally flexible 
relation between sign, object and interpretant in standard Peircean thinking. 
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4. CASE STUDY:  
NORWEGIAN WOLF MANAGEMENT 
This section will start out by giving an overview of field trips conducted, and 
then in sequence treat the cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep, Arne Næss’ 
philosophy of wolf management, invasive management in Scandinavia of the 
wolf – a shy animal, and the symbolic construction of the Big Bad Wolf in con-
temporary Norway. All photos reproduced here are taken (and edited) by the 
author. 
First, however, a little background in summary terms – and a brief 
description of the preliminary outcome of ongoing policy reviews.  
 
 
Figure 4. Umwelt transition in human relations to sheep and wolves. 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts a summary of fairly recent changes in the way in which 
humans, more specifically Norwegians in contemporary times and the near past, 
relate to wolves and to sheep. While the wolf has become less of an enemy 
(though in the eyes of a substantial minority it remains an enemy) and has 
become a partner (as in social companion, perceptually conceived of in 
conceptual terms) to many contemporary Norwegians, the sheep, which has 
traditionally been both food and partner (as in social companion) is now 
becoming less of a partner, due to steadily increasing ratios of number of sheep 
to number of sheep farmers. As we see in Figure 5, this latter development 
points in the direction of a future in which humans might ultimately vanish 
altogether as Umwelt objects in the Umwelten of sheep. 
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Figure 5. Umwelt transition in the relation of sheep and humans (overstated). 
 
 
In conclusion of this subsection a few remarks are required on the preliminary 
outcome of ongoing policy reviews. As it happens policy reviews are currently 
being conducted in both Norway and Sweden. A brief summary: 
Norway: The population target (three litters per year inside the “manage-
ment area for breeding wolves”43, popularly called the ‘wolf zone’) was reached 
for the first time in 2010. The ‘predator settlement’44 of June 2011, which 
garnered support from all parties in parliament, included a notable policy 
change in the provisions for self-defence45 that now permits predators (in-
cluding wolves) to be killed to protect dogs during direct attacks by predators.46 
Telling of the controversies of wolf politics, most of the policy review was in 
the case of the wolf postponed. The population target for wolves will be 
evaluated once desired negotiations with Sweden (awaiting the Swedish policy 
review) on the status of border wolves have concluded, at the latest in 2013. 
The wolf zone will be evaluated as well. 
Sweden: The Swedish policy review commenced in 2009 and will during 
2012 involve a broad evaluation of existing management measures including 
the new measures implemented in the period 2009–2012. Initially a population 
target was set to 210 individuals, and mass hunts with thousands of volunteer 
hunters were conducted during the winters 2009/2010 and 2010/2011. These 
were the first such hunts in Sweden since the wolf won status as protected 
species, and each hunt culled >10% of the current Swedish wolf population. 
Since these mass hunts began, the Swedish government has been in conflicted 
dialogue with EU authorities, which claim that Sweden may be in violation of 
the EU’s Habitats Directive, which details the policy restraints concerning 
                                                     
43 ‘Forvaltningsområde for ynglende ulv’. 
44 ‘Rovviltforlik’. 
45 ‘Nødvergerett’. 
46 The protection of livestock was already provisioned in the farmers’ right to self-defence. 
The ‘predator settlement’ provisions, which protect dogs, have in effect extended the self-
defence policies beyond farmers to apply to hunters as well. 
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protected species. The legality and legitimacy of wolf hunts sanctioned by 
Swedish law is thus questioned and under official review. In August 2011, the 
Swedish government announced that pending the EU’s review, the licensed 
hunt planned for the winter 2011/2012 has been cancelled. During this period, 
substantially more ‘protective hunts’47 were announced to be temporally per-
missible whenever problematic individuals cause havoc. The population target 
introduced in 2009 was furthermore withdrawn, with no replacement. A 
decision on new population targets will be made in 2012. New management 
methods in the field include relocation of wolves, be it of troublemakers or 
genetically valuable individuals. Further plans are in development for intro-
ducing wolf pups born in zoo captivity into the wild by inserting them into 
litters of free-range wolves, with the purpose to counteract inbreeding. 
 
 
4.1. Field research 
Research for this case study was conducted at field trips to zoological gardens 
with captive wolves and to the Norwegian municipalities of Rendalen and Stor-
Elvdal. Further research consists in an interview at Statistics Norway, an inter-
view with wolf socialiser Runar Næss in Oslo and an interview at 
SKANDULV’s annual research seminar in 2010 (which took place in Sweden). 
A total of approximately 16 interviews were collected.48 The centrality of the 
municipality of Rendalen in particular in the context of the Norwegian wolf 
conflict (Stor-Elvdal is a neighbour municipality) is due to the fact that it is 
situated just outside the Norwegian wolf zone. More than half of all wolves that 
have been killed legally in contemporary times have been shot in Rendalen.  
The following four zoological gardens were visited for this case study: 
  
Kristiansand Zoo, Norway (58⁰11’ North, 8⁰08’ East) 
Visited May 15, 2009 (and more) 
Home to captive wolves (not socialised) 
Interviewee:  Olav Åsland, zookeeper 
 
Langedrag Mountain Farm and Wildlife Park, Norway (60⁰26’ North, 
8⁰52’ East) 
Visited September 22–24, 2010 
Home to captive wolves (both socialised and not socialised wolves) 
Interviewees: Frank André Soma, zookeeper 
  Tuva Thorsen, general manager 
 
                                                     
47 “Skyddsjakt” (in singular). 
48 We write ”approximately” because in a number of cases it is unclear whether more or less 
informal discussions are to be counted as interviews. The number 16 represents those 
interviews listed in this section by name of interviewee (with one married couple counted as 
one interview). 
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Polar Zoo, Norway (68⁰41’ North, 18⁰06’ East) 
Visited March 8–11, 2010 
Home to captive wolves (both socialised and not socialised wolves) 
Interviewees: Stig Sletten, zookeeper 
Frode Wærum, zookeeper 
 
Tallinn Zoo, Estonia (59⁰24’ North, 24⁰39’ East) 
Visited in 2009 
Until recently, home to captive wolves 
Interviewee:  Aleksei Turovski, parasitologist and zoosemiotician 
 
Figure 6 displays the location of the places we have visited in the course of the 
current case study work, including the four zoos, the Swedish SKANDULV 
seminar, Oslo and Rendalen/Stor-Elvdal. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Field trips – map of places visited. 
 
 
The field trip to the municipalities of Rendalen and Stor-Elvdal, in the region 
of Hedmark in Central Norway, was conducted October 28 – November 2, 
2010. Locations (villages) visited: 
* Øvre Rendal/Berset (Rendalen) (61⁰53’ North, 11⁰04’ East) 
* Åkrestrømmen (Rendalen) (61⁰41’ North, 11⁰12’ East) 
* Koppang (Stor-Elvdal) (61⁰34’ North, 11⁰03’ East) 
* Unset (Rendalen) (61⁰57–58’ North, 11⁰05–06’ East) 
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Interviewees: Sigvald Akre, head of Rendalen Renselskap (an association of 
landowners managing a population of semi-domesticated 
reindeer) 
Halgrim Breie, head of section for planning and business in 
Rendalen municipality 
Lars Gangås, state–licensed wolf hunter in Norwegian Nature 
Inspectorate (SNO), hunting leader for Southern Norway 
Kjetil Granlund, sheep farmer, head of the NGO Hedmark 
Sau- og Geitalslag (Hedmark association of sheep and goat 
breeders) 
Norvald Illevold, mayor of Rendalen municipality; member of 
Arbeiderpartiet (Labour party) 
Gudrun and Ole Karl Romenstad, former sheep farmers; now 
running Romenstad Hytte- og Gardsferie (Romenstad cottage 
and farm holidays) 
Håvard Haug, head of section for planning and business, Stor-
Elvdal municipality 
 
Additional interviews: 
Terje Bø, head of Section for wildlife in Norwegian Directorate 
for Nature Management (DNO), interviewed at SKANDULV’s 
annual research seminar 2010, held in Strömsberg, Sweden, 
November 15–17, 2010 
Runar Næss, freelance wolf socialiser (Animal Zoolution), 
activist, interviewed in Oslo October 11th 2010 
Espen Søbye, statistician at Statistics Norway, interviewed at 
the library of Statistics Norway, Oslo, October 12th 2010 
 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 summarise some of the findings from Langedrag, 
Kristiansand Zoo and Polar Zoo respectively. Concerning Polar Zoo, see also 
Paper VII. The remaining interviews, especially those conducted in Rendalen 
and Stor-Elvdal, have been of crucial importance for the arguments featured in 
4.5 The symbolic construction of the Big Bad Wolf in contemporary Norway, 
6.2 Umwelt futurology: Three Umwelt scenarios and 6.3 Future perspectives: 
Deep and shallow solutions. 
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Figure 7. Waiting for wolves. From Langedrag Nature Park and Mountain Farm, more 
specifically the seating area inside the enclosure of the shy wolves. September 2010 (the 
day of the first snow that winter). 
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Figure 8. Feeding time. From Kristiansand Zoo, May 2010. At 1 p.m. every day in the 
tourist season, a zookeeper enters the enclosure of the wolves (which are all shy) and 
leaves pieces of meat dispersed in the terrain facing the vantage point on the footbridge. 
When the audience is numerous, there is no mutual gaze between wolf and the 
onlookers. 
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Figure 9. Life at Polar Zoo. March 2010. The wolves figuring in these four photo-
graphs are socialised. The woman depicted is one of the human companions they have 
bonded with at an early age. From top left: (1) Wolf with zookeeper in the Salang 
Valley (Salangsdalen), where the enclosure is located, (2) wolf lying by a typical 
vantage point on high ground, (3) in-pack fighting in the proximity of the highly trusted 
zookeeper (who never interferes – visibly, at any rate – in order to leave an entirely 
positive impression), (4) a peaceful moment. 
 
 
4.2. The cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep 
In this section we review the cultural semiotics of wolves and sheep, though the 
review is in this version far from comprehensive.  
The noun wolf refers in its primary sense to various predatory carnivorous 
mammals of canid species of North America and Eurasia that usually hunt in 
packs. A narrower definition implies that ‘wolf’ refers only to Canis lupus, the 
grey wolf. The domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris) and the semi-wild dingo 
(Canis lupus dingo) are at any rate excluded from the ordinary usage of the term 
‘wolf’. More ambiguous creatures in terms of wolfishness include the ‘Ethio-
pian wolf’ (Canis simensis), the ‘Red wolf’ (Canis rufus) and the coyote, also 
known as the ‘Prairie wolf’ (Canis latrans). 
The word wolf appears in English, German, Dutch and Afrikaans. In Greek 
the word for wolf is transcribed as ‘lykos’ (as in λύκος), in Latin the word is 
‘lupus’, in Spanish and Portuguese ‘lobo’, in French ‘loup’, in Italian ‘lupo’, in 
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Danish, Norwegian and in older Swedish ‘ulv’ (but in contemporary Swedish 
‘varg’), in Icelandic ‘úlfur’, in Serbocroatian ‘vuk’, in Slovenian (and Russian – 
as in волк) ‘volk’, in Czeck and Slovak ‘vlk’, in Polish ‘wilk’, in Latvian 
‘vilks’, in Lithuanian ‘vilkas’ and in Estonian ‘hunt’, in Chinese transcribed as 
‘lang’, in Japanese as ‘ookami’, in Arabic as ‘theeb’. 
A second meaning of the word wolf is, in the words of the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, “a man given to seducing women” – synonyms include ‘Casanova’ 
and ‘womaniser’, related words and phrases include ‘ladies’ man’, ‘seducer”, 
‘whoremaster’ and ‘whoremonger’. Wolves have symbolised lust for more than 
two thousand years.49 In Roman slang, lupa, literally female wolf or she-wolf, 
meant ‘whore’, a connotation that is found even today in the Spanish loba, the 
Italian lupa and the French louve. In Anglo-Saxon culture ‘wolf’ was in ancient 
times equated with ‘prostitute’, or a “sexually voracious female”, but later came 
to signify “sexually aggressive male”. This latter use was first recorded in 1847 
(Online Etymology Dictionary). In this context we should also recall that bitch 
(cf. the insult “son of a bitch”) literally means female dog, or the female of 
other canines such as wolves and foxes. 
A third meaning of the word wolf is, according to the same dictionary, “a 
person who habitually preys upon others” – synonyms include ‘bloodsucker’, 
‘shark’, ‘vampire’ and ‘vulture’, related words include ‘exploiter’, ‘destroyer’ 
and ‘devourer’, the antonym is said to be ‘prey’. The verb to wolf, which might 
be taken to mean “to eat like a wolf”, is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictio-
nary as “to swallow or eat greedily” – synonyms include ‘devour’, ‘gulp’, 
‘inhale’, ‘scoff’ and ‘slop’. 
In Old Norse, vargr (cf. the Swedish varg) meant “outlaw”, almost as in the 
Old English wearg, “criminal”, “felon”. It was also used in the sense of 
“murderer”, “slayer” – a fact that complicates research aiming at deciding cause 
of death by reviewing Norse church books, since “killed by vargr” could mean 
either “killed by wolf” or “murdered”. Varg Vikernes, the front musician of the 
Norwegian black metal band Burzum, explained on the band’s homepage50 that 
“the name Varg is not a name that I chose for fun”. “Varg means wolf, thief, 
burglar, murderer […] a varg is a symbol for Man’s bestiality” (ibid.). Vikernes 
was recently released from prison, after serving time for murdering a band 
colleague and setting churches on fire in the 1990s.51 In Norse society, varg 
signified not only the particularly murderous “slayer wolf” that wrecked havoc 
on herds, but also a human outlaw, a person one would not be punished for 
killing. 
Another term that due to its cultural impact must be mentioned in this 
subsection is that of the werewolf, also known as a ‘lycanthrope’ (from the 
                                                     
49 Speaking of canines, consider also the ‘vixen’, the female fox – in cultural imagery 
another sexual predator, as it were. Cf. further the connotations of ‘foxy’. 
50 Www.burzum.com, my translation. 
51 Note that he has now changed his name to abandon the ‘Varg’ name, apparently in order 
to avoid being associated with murder and his past (?) engagement with Satanism and Neo-
Nazism. 
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Greek ‘lykos’, “wolf” and ‘anthropos’, “man”). The English ‘werewolf’ might 
derive from the Old English wer or were (man, human of the male form) and 
wulf (wolf, beast). An alternative explanation is that it derives from the Old 
English warg (as in Old Norse vargr) and wulf. 
SUBTLEXus, developed by Brysbaert and New (2009), is a corpus of 
American English drawn from the subtitles (legends) of 8,388 films, totalling 
some 51 million words. The word ‘wolf’ appears 1,034 times, in 376 of the 
films. While the word frequency is not all that high, the word appears in no less 
than 4.5 % of the films included in the corpus. This compares with mentions of 
the word ‘animal’ in 16.4 % of the films, ‘cat’ in 16.5 %, ‘dog’ in 36.4 % and 
‘man’ in 96.0 % of the films. Interestingly, the word frequency of ‘wolf’ and 
‘sheep’ are approximately similarly high. Less frequent forms and derivations 
include ‘wolves’ (179 films, 2.1 %), ‘werewolf’ (55 films, 0.7 %), ‘wolfman’ 
(11 movies, 0.1 %), ‘wolfing’, ‘wolfed’ and ‘wolfish’. 
Another major source for matters of word frequency is the 400 million word 
Corpus of Contemporary American English, created by Mark Davies of 
Brigham Young University. This collection of texts is drawn from the period 
1900–2010 and is arranged into genres (spoken, fiction, popular magazine, 
newspaper, academic) in which each genre is represented by samples of 
approximately 80 million words, as well as into subgenres. Here more than half 
of the occurrences of ‘wolf’ are found in the genre of fiction. A fair amount 
occurs in the genre of popular magazines. The word appears much less 
frequently in academic texts and spoken language (which is mainly represented 
by television programmes). ‘Wolf’ occurs in 38 of the 43 subgenres and is 
found in each of the subgenres within fiction, popular magazine and newspaper 
genre categories. In magazines, the frequency is highest in those related to 
sports and ‘women/men’. In fiction the word is prevalent in subgenres such as 
‘books’, ‘science fiction/fantasy’ and ‘movies’, but rarer in juvenile fiction. The 
word ‘wolfman’, which is also listed, occurs predominantly in fiction (subgenre 
‘science fiction/fantasy’) and newspapers (subgenre ‘life’). 
When ‘the laser man’52, a sniper who had shot at immigrants in Malmö, 
Sweden, and killed an ethnic Swede who had an immigrant boyfriend – was 
caught, newspapers reported that he was “a quiet and lonely wolf” (my 
translation – Dagbladet November 7, 2010). This designation was based on the 
statement of a neighbour. The term lone wolf is well known in Western culture, 
and is quite often associated with similar acts of contemporary terrorism. More 
generally it refers to an introvert, perhaps secretive person who is unusually 
independent or asocial. When the ‘Norway attacks’ occurred on July 22, 2011, 
killing 77, both Norwegian and international media referred to the anti-Muslim 
terrorist as a lone wolf. Time magazine, for example, wrote about “The 
worrying rise of the lone-wolf terrorist” (Time, July 28, 2011, story by William 
Boston). 
                                                     
52 Translation of ‘lasermannen’, a nickname he attained in Scandinavian media. 
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Other expressions include being hungry as a wolf (a simile in which the wolf 
is equated with the phenomenon of hunger, especially extreme hunger, 
bordering on starvation), to be thrown to the wolves, to keep the wolf away from 
the door, to be dancing with wolves, and to be a wolf in sheep’s clothing, an 
idiom of Biblical origin. To be a wolf in sheep’s clothing means to have a 
superficial appearance that is different than one’s true identity, a person not to 
be trusted. A wolfpack has acquired the modern meaning of a group of cars 
travelling together in close proximity to each other. The Danish expression 
“(her er det) ugler i mosen”, literally “(here there are) owls in the bog”, which 
signifies something akin to danger, something suspicious, or “Something’s not 
right here”, is a distortion of an original expression, ‘uller i mosen’ (or ‘ulver i 
mosen’), meaning ‘wolves in the bog’ in a Danish dialect.  
In Norwegian, ‘ulvegrå’, literally ‘wolf-grey’ refers to a shade of grey 
associated with the fur of many wolves (it is described as a “light greyish 
yellow”, according to Bokmålsordboka – our translation). Further, in 
Norwegian, ulvetid, literally “time of the wolf” or “wolf-era”, signifies a brutal 
period with no peace (ibid.), a period “when everyone is in combat or 
competition with each other” (The Language Council of Norway – our 
translation). The origin of the word goes back to Voluspå, a poem in the Poetic 
Edda, which deals with Ragnarok, the Norse version of the end of times. 
‘Ulvetid’ is also applied to periods in which the wolf is numerous and intrusive; 
cf. also ‘ulveår’, literally “wolf-year”, a year so to speak in the sign of the wolf 
(i.e., a year characterised by brutal hardship). 
As we see, a majority of expressions making reference to the wolf are 
implicitly morally condemning or otherwise portrays the wolf in bleak terms. 
The wolf is an animal associated with violence, plotting, unruly hunger, and 
loneliness. This infamous animal is made mention of in proverbs in various 
languages, including variations of “speak of the devil (and the devil appears)”: 
Про волка речь, а волк навстречь (“Speak about the wolf, and meet the wolf”; 
Russian proverb), Quand on parle du loup, on en voit la queue (“When we 
speak of the wolf, we see his tail”; French proverb). The wolf-whistle, a two-
toned sound that might or might not be made by ‘wolf-whistling’, i.e. inserting 
two fingers into the mouth in order to produce a loud and penetrating tone, is 
one of the examples that do not fit with this picture. Being used to approach, to 
compliment, or possibly mock a sexually attractive person, the wolf-whistle 
belongs instead to the category of sexual connotations.   
People whose names draw on the wolf include the aforementioned musician 
and convicted murderer Varg Vikernes, the Kiowa chief Lone Wolf, the 
Cheyenne war leader Little Wolf, the Cheyenne chief Wolf Robe, the authors 
Thomas Wolfe (1900–1938) and Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), posthumanist 
Cary Wolfe, Stephen Wolfram, the creator of the search engine Wolfram|Alpha, 
and Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). Adolf (cf. the English ‘Adolph’, the Italian and 
Spanish ‘Adolfo’ etc.) derives from the Old High German ‘Athalwolf’, 
composed of ‘athal’ or ‘adal’ (‘noble’) and ‘wolf’, and means “noble wolf”. 
Other (in)famous persons named Adolf include the king Adolf of Nassau 
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(1255–1298) and various kings of Sweden, a number of European dukes and 
princes, three saints (Spanish, German and Ugandan), Holocaust organiser 
Adolf Eichmann (1906–1962) and philosophical anthropologist Adolf Portmann 
(1897–1982). 
Given names meaning wolf includes the Hungarian ‘Farkas’, the Hebrew 
‘Ze`ev’ and ‘Zev’, and the Scandinavian ‘Ulf’ (as in Ulf Lundell, the Swedish 
singer) and related composite names including ‘Ulfbjörn’ (literally “Wolf-
bear”). Ulf derives from the Old Norse ‘Úlfr’, which was probably much more 
common in ancient times than Ulf is today, as evidenced by runic inscriptions. 
Variations included ‘Olf’ and ‘Ulv’. Currently around one in one thousand 
Norwegian males are named Ulf, and more than one in one hundred Swedish 
males. The Serbian (and Croatian) ‘Vuk’ (as in Vuc Drašković, the Serbian 
politician), the short form of ‘Vukasin’ (‘wolf’), is common. As far as we know 
these are all male names – but note that Vuk comes in many variations, both 
masculine (‘Vuki’, ‘Vukota’, ‘Vuksan’ etc.) and feminine (‘Vukica’, ‘Vuka’, 
‘Vukava’, ‘Vukana’, ‘Vukmila’, ‘Vukmira’, ‘Vukna’, ‘Vukoslava’, ‘Vukostana’ 
and a number of others), and that composite forms of the Old Norse -úlfr appear 
to have included some feminine versions. ‘Wolf’ as well is used as a given 
name, as in the name of American journalist Wolf Blitzer. 
Another common given name is Wolfgang, as in Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart, or Wolfgang Wolf, a German coach and former football player. Wolf-
gang is derived from Old High German ‘wulf’ and ‘gang’, meaning “path”. 
Further given names for males derived from the word ‘wolf’ in combination 
with some other word are ‘Alf’ (pet form of Adolf), ‘Bertolf’ and ‘Bertulf’, 
‘Ingolf’, ‘Ralf’ and ‘Ralph’ (“wise wolf”), ‘Randal’ and ‘Randall’, ‘Randolph’, 
‘Raul’ and ‘Raúl’ (“wise wolf”), ‘Rolf’ and ‘Rudolph’ (cf. ‘Rudolf’ etc., and pet 
forms including ‘Rudi’ and ‘Rudy’ – “famous wolf”), and ‘Ulrick’ (“wolf 
power”). Further female forms include the Basque ‘Otsana’ and the Scandi-
navian ‘Ylva’ (both meaning “she-wolf”), the Swedish ‘Ulva’ and the English 
‘Ralphina’. 
In the United States, the surname ‘Wolf’ appears to be used dominantly by 
those of European and Native American descent, and only exceptionally by 
those of African or Asian descent. Other surnames in use internationally include 
the Scottish ‘Lyall’ (“shield wolf”), the English ‘Lovell/Lowell’ (“little wolf”), 
the Romanian ‘Lupescu’, and variations such as ‘Wolff’, ‘Wolfman’, ‘Wolfs-
berger’, ‘Wulf’, ‘Wulff’ (as in Christian Wulff, the president of Germany), 
‘Wülf’ and ‘Wülff’. Native American surnames include ‘Lonewolf’, ‘Spotted-
Wolf’, ‘Wolf Woman’ and ‘Wolf Child’. 
There are a number of place names derived from the word ‘wolf’. These 
include municipalities in the United States named ‘Wolf’, the municipality of 
‘Wolverhampton’ in England, the Croatian city ‘Vukovar’ and villages ‘Vuko-
jevac’ and ‘Vucomerić’, and the Croatian river ‘Vuka’. Further, a volcano in the 
Galápagos Islands has been named ‘Wolf’, as have a crater on the moon, and 
six stars (Wolf 359 in the constellation of Leo, etc.). These seven celestial 
objects have been named after astronomer Max Wolf. 
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Wolverhampton in England is the home of Wolverhampton Wanderers 
Football Club, nicknamed ‘Wolves’ or ‘The Wolf Pack’ and currently playing 
in the Premier League. Other wolfish sport teams include the Italian football 
club Roma and the Portuguese national rugby team, both of which are nick-
named “the wolves” (‘i lupi’ and ‘os lobos’ respectively). A number of ships of 
the British Royal Navy are named HMS Wolf, and in the United States there are 
radio channels with names such as WOLF (AM) and WOLF-FM, and a 
television station called WOLF-TV – not to forget a company named Great 
Wolf Resorts which specialises on indoor waterparks. 
During the Second World War, ‘Werwolf’ signified a Nazi plan designed by 
Joseph Goebbels from 1944 and gone public by March 1945. Guerrillas 
recruited from SS and Hitlerjugend were supposed to conduct combat behind 
enemy lines as the allies advanced on German ground. Fears of a Nazi 
insurgency surfaced and survived the actual end of the war, but the propaganda 
overshadowed the plan’s actual realisation. Operation Werwolf has been 
depicted quite vividly in a number of fictional genres – it appears for instance in 
Lars von Trier’s 1991 film Europa and in the second episode of the third season 
of the contemporary television series True Blood. 
Occasionally names of various sorts are given to actual wolves as well. 
Some, such as The Beast of Gévaudan (in French: ‘La Bête du Gévaudan’), are 
infamous man-eaters – this particular beast caused havoc in 1764–1767. It is not 
entirely certain, however, that it was in fact a wolf (or indeed but one animal). 
In contemporary Scandinavia, a wolf that migrated from the East was 
nicknamed Ivan by Norwegian media. Ivan was soon found dead, a victim of 
poaching. Other Scandinavian wolves in the wild are typically named according 
to what wolf pack they belong to, which is in turn named after the geographical 
area they inhabit. ‘The Galven bitch’, for instance, is the alpha female of a pack 
which inhabited the area of Galven. Free-range wolves in Scandinavia are 
further given numerical names which place them in hereditary terms. In zoo-
logical gardens, individual naming is the rule. At Polar Zoo, the northernmost 
zoo on the planet, the six wolves as of spring 2010 were called ‘Gaida’ 
(female), ‘Nanook’ (male), ‘Steinulv’ (male), ‘Nayla’, ‘Ylva’ and ‘Luna’ 
(females). 
The mythical founders of the city of Rome, Romulus and Remus, had 
according to tradition been suckled by a wolf before they were found by a 
shepherd. The legendary cave of the she-wolf was according to media reports 
uncovered by archaeologists in 2007, in proximity to the palace of Emperor 
Augustus. In ancient Rome this cave was a place of worship. Here, then, we 
face a narrative in which a wolf saves the lives of two children who would later 
grow to be great men. It is also noteworthy in our context that the two twins 
were later retrieved by a shepherd, a caretaker of sheep – and brought up to 
become shepherds themselves. The historical basis of Rome’s foundation myth 
remains disputed. In one tradition, the she-wolf Lupa or Luperca is a wolf-
goddess, who was subject to cult practices and was believed to protect sheep 
from wolves. The festival Lupercalia, or “wolf festival”, was celebrated near the 
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cave of Lupercal. The religious ceremonies were headed by ‘the Luperci’ (“the 
brothers of the wolf”), an order of priests dressed in goatskins, and involved the 
sacrifice of goats and dogs. Figures of the myth foundation are depicted in 
ancient Roman iconography, including on coins. 
In Norse mythology, Fenrisúlfr, or Fenrir, is the name of a wolf, a son of 
Loki (by birth a gargantuan troll of sorts, later a god and certainly a trickster – a 
shape-shifter for sure). The name might be derived from “wolf of hell”, 
influenced by Christian conceptions of the devil as lupus infernus. Great malice 
was expected from Fenrir. He is foretold to kill the god Odin during Ragnarok, 
the Norse end of times, and one of Fenrir’s sons would swallow the sun and 
another the moon. Fenrir appears in both the Poetic Edda and the Prose Edda, 
the latter composed by Snorri Sturluson (1178/79–1241). In the Prose Edda we 
are told that the gods, because of the prophecies, bound Fenrisúlfr, and that he 
bit off the god Týr’s hand, which had been placed in his mouth as a sign of 
good faith. It must be mentioned that Fenrisúlfr grew abnormally. Much of this 
is described in the book Gylfaginning. After the sun and the moon were 
swallowed by the wolf’s sons, the earth would shake violently, mountains 
would fall, and Fenrisúlfr would be free and go into the open with his mouth 
opened wide, with his jaws touching the sky and the earth. Soon an immense 
battle would take place in which Fenrisúlfr would swallow Odin, who would 
have come to fight him, only to be slain by his son. 
In the works of William Shakespeare, the word ‘wolf’ appears in no less 
than 20 of his plays, plus in one of his sonnets, Sonnet 96. In the latter text 
Shakespeare’s use of the image of the wolf is conventional, but with a twist: 
“How many lambs might the stem wolf betray, / If like a lamb he could his 
looks translate!” In these lines, the familiar notion of a wolf in sheep’s clothing 
is presented as deceitful mimicry, as always, but here, notably, as a phenome-
non of translation. Translation, then, is potential betrayal. In many cases 
Shakespeare’s mention of the wolf is conventional and apparently motivated by 
a wish to make a stark contrast. The wolf is characterised as warlike (Cymbe-
line), howling (Macbeth, A Midsummer Night’s Dream), grinning (Venus and 
Adonis), and greedy (King Lear, plus this appearance in Timon of Athens): “[I]f 
thou wert the ass, thy dulness would torment thee, and still thou livedst but as a 
breakfast to the wolf: if thou wert the wolf, thy greediness would afflict thee, 
and oft thou shouldst hazard thy life for thy dinner […]”. 
First of all the wolf is hungry, indeed ravenous (driven by hunger). It is the 
iconic predator (The Rape of Lucrece, Venus and Adonis, and this appearance in 
Twelth Night): “If one should be a prey, how much the better / To fall before the 
lion than the wolf!” In Macbeth we hear about the tooth of a wolf used as an 
ingredient in a witch’s brew, and in Part III of King Henry VI we are told about 
the poisonous tongue of the She-wolf of France. The wolf is embodied hunger – 
predatory hunger – pure hunger. 
We now return to wolf imagery in religious texts. Epistle to the Son of the 
Wolf, the last major work of the founder of the Bahá’í faith, Bahá’ulláh, is a 
letter written in around 1891 to a Muslim cleric, the son of another cleric, Áqá 
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Najafí whom Bahá’ulláh nicknamed “the wolf” due to his persecution of 
Bahá’ís. Wolves play quite a different role in Norse mythology, where the god 
Odin was said to be accompanied by two wolves, named ‘Geri’ and ‘Freki’, 
though both of these names derive somehow from “greedy”. The two wolves 
appear in the Poetic Edda, where they are fed by Odin at the table, as well as in 
Snorre Sturlason’s Prose Edda. As wolf-warriors – and icons of a warrior 
culture – the two embody fierceness in a positive sense, and might. In the poem 
Voluspá in the Poetic Edda we meet the monstrous wolf Fenrir, as mentioned 
previously, who is being fed by Odin’s flesh during Ragnarok. There are 
parallels to part of this wolf imagery in other pagan religions, including ancient 
Greek and Germanic beliefs (for instance, wolves were sacred to the Greek 
Apollo). 
In the Quran the wolf is mentioned in a few passages, in the form of a 
possible danger, a devourer whose presence means that people have to be 
looked after. The imagery of the Bible is more powerful, and has certainly been 
influential in shaping Western perceptions of the wolf, especially when 
contrasted with the Bible’s treatment of sheep and lambs (all quotes in the 
following are, unless otherwise noted, from the New International Version, 
2010). The references are not many, but more than one of them is of great 
symbolic significance. The above-mentioned phrase wolf in sheep’s clothing 
originates from the Gospel of Matthew, 7:15, where Jesus is recorded as having 
said in a sermon: “Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s 
clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves” (King James Version). In 
Genesis 49:27 a man is likened to a ‘ravenous wolf’, and in Jeremiah 5:6 “a 
wolf from the desert” stands ready to “ravage” along with lions and leopards. In 
John 10:11–16, where Jesus presents himself as the good shepherd, the wolf is 
again juxtaposed with sheep. 
 
I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. 
The hired hand is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep. So when he 
sees the wolf coming, he abandons the sheep and runs away. Then the wolf 
attacks the flock and scatters it. The man runs away because he is a hired hand 
and cares nothing for the sheep.  
 
I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me – just as the 
Father knows me and I know the Father – and I lay down my life for the sheep. 
I have other sheep that are not of this sheep pen. I must bring them also. They 
too will listen to my voice, and there shall be one flock and one shepherd. 
 
In the book of Isaiah, there are two passages where mention of the wolf is made 
to portray paradise – heaven. In these passages the image of the wolf as a 
predator and enemy of sheep is drawn on to convey the promised change of 
relations – enemies will become peaceful neighbours, the weak will become 
strong, etc. In Isaiah 11, “The branch from Jesse”, we are told that the wicked 
will be slain, and Judah’s enemies will be destroyed. Mixed with these violent 
images, however, there is a measure of heavenly peace (Isaiah 11:6–9):  
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The wolf will live with the lamb, 
the leopard will lie down with the goat, 
the calf and the lion and the yearling together; 
and a little child will lead them. 
The cow will feed with the bear, 
their young will lie down together, 
and the lion will eat straw like the ox. 
The infant will play near the cobra’s den, 
the young child will put its hand into the viper’s nest. 
They will neither harm nor destroy 
on all my holy mountain, 
for the earth will be filled with the knowledge of the LORD 
as the waters cover the sea. 
 
Isaiah 65:17–25, “New heavens and a new earth”, offers a similar image, in 
partial repetition of Isaiah 11. 
 
“See, I will create 
new heavens and a new earth. 
[…] 
I will rejoice over Jerusalem 
and take delight in my people; 
the sound of weeping and of crying 
will be heard in it no more. 
[…] 
The wolf and the lamb will feed together, 
and the lion will eat straw like the ox, 
and dust will be the serpent’s food. 
They will neither harm nor destroy 
on all my holy mountain,” 
says the LORD. 
 
Thus far we have treated wolves. As mentioned, sheep figure even more 
significantly in religious imagery, especially in the Christian tradition. Both the 
adult sheep and the lamb play a decisive role in Christian imagery. In the 
already quoted John 10:11, where Jesus presents himself as the good shepherd, 
he later walks in the temple courts of Jerusalem during the Hanukkah festival, 
and is challenged to speak plainly about whether or not he is the Messiah (John 
10:25–28). 
 
Jesus answered, “I did tell you, but you do not believe. The works I do in my 
Father’s name testify about me, but you do not believe because you are not my 
sheep. My sheep listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me. I give 
them eternal life, and they shall never perish; no one will snatch them out of 
my hand.” 
 
In the Christian context, Jesus is not only likened to a shepherd, but also to a 
lamb. The Latin term Agnus Dei, lamb of God, refers to Jesus Christ in his role 
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as a global paschal lamb, offering – sacrificing – himself for the sake of 
humanity. In Christian iconography, Jesus is sometimes depicted as a lamb – 
occasionally as a bleeding lamb. In English-speaking liturgy, there are several 
variations over a theme such as this one: “Lamb of God, you take away the sin 
of the world, have mercy on us”. 
To return to the image of the shepherd, “The parable of the lost sheep” (Luke 
15:1–7) stands out as an emblematic story. 
 
Now the tax collectors and sinners were all gathering around to hear Jesus. But 
the Pharisees and the teachers of the law muttered, “This man welcomes 
sinners and eats with them.” Then Jesus told them this parable: “Suppose one 
of you has a hundred sheep and loses one of them. Doesn’t he leave the ninety-
nine in the open country and go after the lost sheep until he finds it? And when 
he finds it, he joyfully puts it on his shoulders and goes home. Then he calls his 
friends and neighbors together and says, ‘Rejoice with me; I have found my 
lost sheep.’ I tell you that in the same way there will be more rejoicing in 
heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons 
who do not need to repent. 
 
Here, as we see, a ‘lost sheep’ is likened to a sinner. In Matthew 31–46, a 
decisive distinction is made between sheep and goats in a discourse by Jesus. 
This time around, according to the mainstream interpretation, the sheep 
represent the blessed, those who will inherit heaven, whereas the goats represent 
the cursed, those who will not. 
 
But when the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, 
then he will sit on the throne of his glory. Before him all the nations will be 
gathered, and he will separate them one from another, as a shepherd separates 
the sheep from the goats. He will set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats 
on the left. Then the King will tell those on his right hand, “Come, blessed of 
my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the 
world” […] Then he will say also to those on the left hand, “Depart from me, 
you cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels” 
[…] These will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal 
life. 
 
Figure 10 shows six stuffed (as in mounted) wolves, yet another matter of the 
cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep. 
 
66 
 
 
Figure 10. Six stuffed (mounted) wolves in Norway. From top left: (1) The mounted 
wolf in the public library in Koppang, central Stor-Elvdal, (2) the stuffed wolf in the 
reception area of the municipal building of Rendalen, where there is also a stuffed lynx 
and a stuffed wolverine, (3) the two stuffed wolves at Langedrag Nature Park and 
Mountain Farm and (4) the two mounted wolves in the café of Polar Zoo. Each of these 
wolves has a unique life story. The wolf in (1) was badly injured after it was hit by a 
train. The library wanted to present the stuffed wolf preying on a sheep, but was not 
allowed to. Besides, its jaw had been dislocated in the traffic accident, making such a 
display practically difficult. The wolves in (4) are the ones mentioned in Article VII’s 
final footnote: “One of them was the first to escape its enclosure in the zoo. It did not 
get far.” 
 
 
4.3. Remarks on Næss’ philosophy of wolf management 
I have great respect for the work of Arne Næss (cf. Tønnessen 2003, an article 
devoted to interpretation of the Deep Ecology platform within an Uexküllian 
framework). But in his suggestions for wolf policies, it becomes evident that he 
had trouble, at least in this particular case, with translating fundamental norms 
into workable operational principles. Næss’ 1974 article “Self-realization in 
mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves” says little about 
wolves, and his emphasis is on pointing out that their cultural setting is very 
different from that of bears: “There is a great respect for bears, whereas wolves 
are more dreaded than respected” (ibid., 239). Part of the difficulty is that Næss, 
in the very same article, argues that value attribution can be based on the 
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common considerations of laypeople (the general public). Such value attribution 
may work for the well-respected bear, but not so well for the traditionally 
demonised wolf. What status is the wolf to have if the sole criteria for 
attributing moral status are the culturally problematic judgements of the locals 
in any given community? 
Næss’ positive contribution in his 1974 article is his principled discussion of 
‘mixed communities’ of humans and animals, and the general, egalitarian 
norms/maxims of self-realisation, self-determination, etc. In Næss and 
Mysterud (1999 [1987]), the predation of wolves on sheep is dealt with in some 
detail. The only norms that are treated extensively, however, concern individual 
suffering. The authors attempt to do away with numerical considerations by 
introducing norms such as: “Severe suffering endured by a living being x is of 
no less negative value than severe suffering endured by a living being y, what-
ever the species or population of x and y!” (345). Additional norms are 
introduced to stress that population numbers are not significant. But how do we 
compare the torment of hundreds of sheep in the moments preceding wolf 
predation, and the distress of thousands of survivors – on top of the partly 
irrational fear of tens and hundreds of thousands of people – with the joys and 
sorrows of a few wolves? Though population numbers alone cannot lead us to 
significant conclusions in the case of wolf conservation, despite what some 
antagonists populistically suggest, they are clearly relevant when we examine 
the true extent of suffering etc.53 
In the case of wolf predation on sheep, Næss and Mysterud suggested a 
compensation scheme (such a scheme is in effect today). But if the coexistence 
of wolves and sheep farmers causes insoluble problems, we are told that 
“territorial changes must be considered: the removal of wolf or sheep or 
farmers” (ibid., 352). Will the mixed community turn out to be but an 
unrealisable Utopia? Ecological segregation may work in Norway, a sparsely 
populated country, but in the more densely inhabited parts of the world such 
strategies are hardly viable: Mixed communities are a prerequisite. Ironically, 
by choosing wolves and sheep as their study animals (as have I in this case 
study), Næss and Mysterud in effect reproduce erroneous popular perceptions 
that give exaggerated weight to sheep in the human perception of wolf ecology 
                                                     
53 Emphasising population numbers tends to favour farmers whose stocks of domesticated 
animals by far outnumber large carnivores. But the direct comparison is absurd. If taken 
seriously as a dominant guideline for ethical reasoning, it would imply that no species with 
comparatively few specimens would have any chances for continued existence. Given that 
all large wild animals are comparatively few in number in comparison to the populations 
sustained by livestock practices (see Paper V), employing this principle would cause 
conservation efforts to come to a halt, as far as any large (and therefore comparably rare) 
wild animal is concerned. The direct comparison is absurd for at least two reasons: Firstly 
because there is no resource base for any competing number of large wild animals, and 
secondly because the argument implies that the fewer in number an endangered species is 
the less importance it should be given. Common conservationist logic would say the 
reverse – that the fewer in number an endangered species is, the more importance it should 
be given, so as to safeguard its continued existence. 
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(see Paper VI), and exaggerated weight to wolves in the perception of sheep 
ecology. Why base conservation policies on such misleading terms? 
In conclusion, Arne Næss did not provide a solution to the (perceived) 
problem of wolf conservation in Scandinavia. But he was clear in his value 
statements. And he and Mysterud were totally right in observing that “unfortu-
nately, experts and researchers have a tendency to avoid norms and values at a 
fundamental level” (ibid., 346). To make such value statements today, we 
repeat, “is a social obligation” (ibid., 347). 
 
 
4.4. On invasive management of shy animals 
The current situation of the Scandinavian wolf involves a strange paradox: The 
future of the wolf, a master of seclusion, apparently depends on its being 
managed by conservationists to an extent that makes the very notion of “wild 
wolves” appear dubious. The wolves, of course, are not always aware of what is 
being done for their sake, and when they do encounter wildlife managers the 
encounter is as a rule an unpleasant one. Indeed, the encounter with humans is 
not supposed to be a pleasant experience for a wild animal such as the wolf. 
Whereas a wolf’s life might actually be saved by conservationist intervention 
through the use of helicopters and tranquilisers, with the aim of medical/ 
surgical treatment, for instance, what the wounded or sick animal experiences is 
rather that it is hunted, captured, and forcefully incapacitated. 
Even more telling than these modern fairytales of wildness is the fact that 
with widespread use of modern technologies such as radio-collars, the wolf is 
no longer the one in the human-wolf relationship that has the best overview of 
the whereabouts of the other. That used to be the normal position of the wolf – 
consider Næss’ dated statement (1974: 239) that wolves “are rarely seen and 
very careful to stay out of trouble. There is therefore a reasonable chance that 
the life communities comprising a (fairly small) number of wolves will persist”. 
In the case of non-radiocollared wolves, however, the wolf may still have the 
best overview. One might be tempted to state that the wolves of Scandinavia are 
actually no longer wild, but that this, alas, is kept secret from the wolf. For all 
the wolf knows, it is still a wild animal – and it still behaves like one. But are 
we justified in claiming that a (more or less) free-ranging wolf is truly wild, 
simply because it does not know that it is being thoroughly managed? 
The topic of wildness is a matter of ongoing debate in the wildlife manage-
ment community (cf. also our treatment at the end of Paper VI). In the scope of 
this section we will relate it solely to questions of shyness and actual human 
interference (especially on the management side). In terms of being shy and 
fearful, the wolves on the Scandinavian Peninsula clearly qualify for the term 
‘wild’ – they have retained their fear of people. The degree of human inter-
ference, however – including the fact that these wolves are familiar with several 
human artefacts and constructions, and that they are dependent on wildlife 
69 
management – seems to suggest that shyness is not a sufficient criteria for 
wildness. 
Two studies have been conducted to investigate Scandinavian radio-collared 
wolves’ tolerance of the presence of humans, by Wam (2003) and Karlsson et 
al. (2007). Wam found that 123 out of 125 trials with five wolves resulted in the 
wolf running away immediately, and concluded that these wolves were shy 
animals, showing no sign of habituation (Karlsson et al. reached a similar 
conclusion). “Instinctively a wolf in Scandinavia today knows it should avoid 
approaching persons,” notes Wam (ibid., 28), alluding to the evolutionary law 
of the survival of the shyest (our coinage). The bed site preference of the wolves 
indicates their ability to learn. Prior to being disturbed, the wolves used 
overlooking sites high in the terrain, while after being disturbed they typically 
sought secluded sites. Wam estimates the chance of a hiker being confronted by 
a wolf in Scandinavia as practically nil. This assertion is reinforced by an 
independent finding that only a tiny minority of dog owners whose dogs were 
attacked by wolves saw any sign of the wolves prior to the attacks (Backeryd 
2007: 11). 
The local specimen of the human species no doubt influence Scandinavian 
wolf ecology at many levels, ranging from constitution of the prey base to 
habitat preferences and movement patterns. In this subsection, however, we will 
point to a connection which comes into particularly sharp focus: Wolf mortality 
is indubitably dominated by human causation. The first wolf in the modern 
population to die of old age was a 14-year old alpha female found dead in the 
winter of 2002–2003. Her death is reported by Olsen 2003, who observed that 
mortality was high even before the fairly recent leap in mortality. Her survey 
encompassed 84 retrieved dead wolves, 18 of which were radio-collared. Only 
roughly one out of five of the wolves died of natural causes. Vehicle trauma 
(wolves hit by cars or trains) was the single most frequent cause of death, 
causing more than one out of four deaths. From another point of view shooting 
appears as the cause of more than half of all deaths. These include wolves 
hunted legally, including those shot to protect livestock, and wolves hunted 
illegally. According to Olsen’s calculations of the 81 wolves with known causes 
of death 51% “were probably shot to death”. The figure, however, is higher – 
since Olsen did not include the four wolves whose death was categorised under 
disease/anomalies, which were shot to death because of their bad condition, nor 
the juvenile female that was shot after being observed with a serious injury on a 
hind leg. As a matter of fact, 57% were shot to death. Counting these, the 
proportion effectively dead from human-related causes is not 82%, as Olsen 
reports, but 87%. Management-related deaths alone account for more than two 
out of five deaths included in the study. 
A more recent survey of wolf mortality (Liberg et al. 2008) similarly 
estimates that natural causes of death account for around a fifth of overall 
mortality. Here, illegal hunting is estimated to account for half of the chance a 
wolf has of dying in each year (i.e., half of the mortality rate). If that assessment 
is correct, an estimated 136 wolves (± 56) were killed illegally 1999–2006. 
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Further evidence of illegal hunting is reflected in the fact that three of the 
wolves killed in traffic in Olsen’s survey had old bullet wounds. Liberg et al. 
report 11 similar cases among retrieved dead wolves. The very latest survey of 
wolf mortality in Scandinavia, Liberg et al. 2011, reiterates that poaching 
accounts for approximately half of total mortality, and introduces new methods 
for estimating ‘cryptic poaching’, which the authors define as poaching not 
detected by conventional methods.  
In a multi-use landscape, even shy wolves inevitably come in contact with 
human artefacts and constructions – though these objects might have a very 
different significance for the wolves (if any), and might not be associated with 
humans. In general Scandinavian wolves tend to avoid areas with human acti-
vity. In winter roads and railways provide useful paths that save wolves from 
the efforts of hiking in heavy snow (hence the high occurrence of vehicle trau-
ma). In addition to cars, trains, snowmobiles, bullets, etc., wolves might en-
counter even more products of civilisation as a direct result of management 
policies. In Scandinavia these include helicopters, various electronic installa-
tions making use of light or sound (e.g., radios with timers) in order to scare 
wolves, labels and instruments and radio-collars weighing up to a kilogram 
(Arnemo and Fahlman 2007: 7), as well as medication, including sedatives and 
penicillin, that are routinely used during surgery in the field. Before a legal hunt 
is licensed, attempts are made to protect livestock with various physical obstac-
les, or to scare the preying wolf with shots, shouts, throwing of stones, etc. 
Nine of the ten wolves in Olsen’s study that were shot to death to protect 
livestock were shot by licensed state game wardens from helicopters, all in Nor-
way. Helicopters are also used when wolves are darted and chemically im-
mobilised as part of captures in which tissue samples, hair samples, faeces, 
EDTA blood, and serum are collected. During captures, wolves are often 
partially awake. “Animals that have been captured before (especially wolves),” 
note Arnemo and Fahlman (ibid., 6), “will usually run for cover when they hear 
the helicopter”. During the last two decades, far more than 2,000 captures of 
free-ranging brown bears, wolves, wolverines, and lynx have been carried out in 
Scandinavia. SKANDULV started capturing wolves only in 1998, but had after 
five years captured 52 wolves, 16 of which had been immobilised two or three 
times (Olsen, ibid., 17). 
As Figure 11 shows, even socialised wolves, which have been habituated to 
the apparently entirely positive presence of humans, retain a certain shyness.  
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Figure 11. Secluded overview. Socialised wolf at the Polar Zoo, March 2010. 
 
 
4.5. The symbolic construction of the Big Bad Wolf  
in contemporary Norway 
As we write in Paper VII (p. 318): 
 
Current carnivore management would not have met such hostile resistance on 
the countryside, had it not been for some other facts […] Since 1999, one third 
of all farms in Norway have closed down […] In reality, the wolves are not 
blamed for the sheep they kill – they have come to symbolize the threats, 
dangers and decline facing Norwegian agriculture. The wolf, in short, has 
become a scapegoat. 
 
We have seen in 4.2 The cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep how wolves and 
sheep have historically often been juxtaposed, especially in the context of the 
Bible. In cultural terms, hardly any animals are as loaded with symbolic value 
as the wolf and the sheep. And the shared importance is no coincidence, since 
the symbolism of the two animals has frequently developed in explicit 
opposition to each other. In the Scandinavian context and in the Norwegian 
context in particular, the wolf’s vivid symbolicity in current times is enforced 
by the occurrence of conspiracy theories (cf. our retelling of the widespread 
conviction that Scandinavian wolves have been secretly and purposefully 
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reintroduced in Paper VI p. 292). Many of the fiercest opponents of wolf 
conservation believe that researchers and the authorities intentionally 
misrepresent the population number of wolves, and distrust official reassurances 
that the wolf does not pose much danger to people. In result, the human 
perception of wolves has in large measure decoupled from ecological reality.54 
 And this decoupling of perception and empirical circumstances does not 
only apply to conspiracy theorists. Whenever national Norwegian media cover 
predation on sheep, for instance, the wolf is typically pictured for illustrative 
purposes – despite the fact that wolverines, lynx, and brown bears all account 
for a much greater percentage of predation on sheep. The wolf has become a 
poster boy for large predators in general. What wolves are taken to signify 
depends not so much on actual wolf ecology as it does on certain cultural/ 
societal developments. These are, justly or unfairly, associated with the 
presence of wolves, and with governmental conservation policies. For many 
rural dwellers, as we write in Paper VII (p. 316), wolf management has come to 
symbolise the (alleged) ignorant hostility and imperialistic (as in unjustly 
intervening) tendencies of the urban elites. 
 The sheep’s symbolicity is, in the Norwegian context, grounded in open 
landscapes, which are typically taken to be intrinsically Norwegian. The idea of 
the Norwegian nation is built on the memory of an initial clearing and 
cultivation of the original (pre-Norwegian) landscape. We see this plainly in the 
two first verses of Ivar Aasen’s “The Norwegian”55, which is in effect treated as 
a national anthem (our translation, in literal form). 
 
Between hills and mountains out by the sea 
the Norwegian has been given his home, 
where he himself has dug the foundations 
and himself put their houses on top of them. 
 
He looked out at the rocky beaches; 
there was no one, who there had built. 
“Let us clear a place and build dwellings, 
and so we own the clearing safely.” 
 
The symbolicity of sheep in Norway is effectively associated with the symbo-
licity of outer pastures, which have been crucial in Norwegian sheep husbandry 
                                                     
54 We note in passing that much of the hate towards the wolf can be ascribed to its habit of 
overkill. During my visit to Rendalen, one interviewee contrasted the wolf’s occasionally 
unsubtle eating habits with those of the brown bear. At one occasion a bear came and killed 
just one of his sheep – and since the bear ate this one sheep that it took, the scene was not at 
all as meaningless as the scene of some twenty sheep and sheep carcasses dispersed in the 
landscape in the apparent case of a mass murder, a massacre. 
55 “Nordmannen” – also called “Millom Bakkar og Berg ut med Havet” [Between Hills and 
Mountains out by the Sea]. Note the doubtful truth value of the second line of the second 
verse – the Sami people and their very different ‘buildings’ etc. in the North were not 
recognised as such by the colonising Norwegians. 
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but are now under pressure. One reason is the general move from extensive to 
intensive farming practices. At any rate a common perception in rural areas is 
that outer pastures are being devalued, and that traditional Norwegian farming 
practices are under threat. In visual imagery, this is best expressed by a 
phenomenon called ‘gjengroing’, imperfectly translated to English as over-
growth. Overgrowth in this sense implies that an originally open, cleared 
landscape is taken over by forest, weeds and other vegetation without direct 
agricultural value.56 Such a landscape, with growing irrelevance (so to speak), 
reduced utility and (notably, in perceptual terms) an obstructed view, has 
become a symbol of the hardships of rural areas and Norwegian agriculture. Our 
thesis is that it is this perception which is at the base of the contemporary 
symbolic construction of the Big Bad Wolf in Norway. It is this idea of the 
changing landscapes as symbolic of rural troubles and the loss of traditional 
livelihoods that is fuelling, reinforcing, the wolf’s negative symbolicity and the 
apparently never-ending conflict on wolf management. 
In conclusion we point out that even though there is indeed an actual process 
of overgrowth in contemporary Norway, it is not reasonable to assume that it is 
predominantly caused by predator management in general or wolf management 
in particular. It is true that Norway is growing over (as it is likewise true that 
Norway is melting), but the fact that Norway as a whole is gradually being 
reforested is first and foremost a result of natural growth in the wake of 
deforestation that took place until late in the 1800s57 (and secondarily a result of 
climate change). At any rate we observe that a landscape in transition has 
become a powerful symbol of the defeat which many in rural Norway feels 
subjected to – a defeat for lifestyles and farming methods alike (especially 
small-scale farming), a defeat for time-honoured traditions and for local 
communities in areas that are abundant in space and natural diversity but less so 
in people and immediate opportunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
56 The imperfection of the English translation is due to the further connotations of 
‘gjengroing’. Particularly, that “et landskap gror igjen” [a landscape grows over] implies that 
it is being congested, clogged, blocked. 
57 In other words, in the era in which ”The Norwegian” was written as telling of Norwegian 
nationhood. 
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5. SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES 
The seven component papers of this dissertation have all been written solely by 
Morten Tønnessen and been published in the period 2009–2011, four of them as 
articles in academic journals (Paper 1, Paper II, Paper V and Paper VI) and 
three of them as book chapters (Paper III, Paper IV and Paper VII). 
 
Paper I Morten Tønnessen 2009. Umwelt transitions: Uexküll and 
environmental change. Biosemiotics 2(1): 47–64. 
This article introduces the notion of Umwelt transition, an Uexküllian notion of 
environmental change. The Umwelt theory of Uexküll is criticised for its 
methodological and theoretical ahistoricity. The assumption that the environ-
ment (including its mixture of species) is generally stable is argued to be a false 
premise. Another notion introduced in this article is that of Uexküllian 
phenomenology, as characterised by an assumption of the (in the realm of life) 
universal existence of a genuine first person perspective, i.e., of experienced 
worlds. It is suggested that acknowledging this distinctiveness of the Umwelt 
theory is critical for eco-phenomenology as well as for biosemiotics; the latter 
of which can only thus thrive as a true semiotics of being rather than a mere 
‘semiotics of functioning’. The article entails a brief review of Uexküll and 
phenomenology, a summary review of some modern findings on macro-
evolution, and concluding reflections on the ontological and epistemological 
outlook of Umwelt theory qua Uexküllian phenomenology. 
 
Paper II Morten Tønnessen 2010. Steps to a semiotics of being. 
Biosemiotics 3(3): 375–392.  
This article presents a platform of semiotics of being in ten steps. These ten 
points summarise much of the author’s ongoing research activity. In brief, they 
address 1) the role of the individual in semiotics of being, 2) the notion of 
Umwelt as ultimately referring to an existential realm, 3) existential universals 
(i.e., features all living creatures have in common), 4) Umwelt in its relation to 
language, 5) Uexküllian phenomenology and its association with phenome-
nologists David Abram and Ted Toadvine, 6) the task of portraying the natural 
history of the phenomenal world, 7) the imperative task in contemporary times 
of Umwelt mapping, 8) the roots of the ecological crisis in humankind’s 
domestication of animals and plants, 9) globalisation as expressed by correlated 
trends of depletion of semiotic diversity and semiotic diversification, and 10) 
the prospective field of semiotic economy. The article treats the “grand systems” 
of Language, Economy and Nature and the theme of value in nature (partly via 
an anecdote on the role of fiction in natural science) in an essayistic manner, 
and further addresses Umwelt terminology and Umwelt mapping.58 
                                                     
58 On p. 384 of Paper II there is a regrettable mistake (emphasised) in the following 
sentence: “The Umwelt (and the Innenwelt), the functional cycle/circle and contrapuntal 
relations (Kontrapunktischen Verhalten) are all integrated concepts.” The German 
‘Verhalten’ means behaviour, the correct term is ‘Verhältnisse’ (relations). 
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Paper III Morten Tønnessen 2011. Semiotics of being and Uexküllian 
phenomenology. In: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.): Pheno-
menology/Ontopoiesis Retrieving Geo-Cosmic Horizons of 
Antiquity (= Analecta Husserliana CX/110), 327–340. 
This chapter presents semiotics of being and Uexküllian phenomenology in 
summary terms. Semiotics of being is characterised as a study of signs designed 
to emphasise the reality of the phenomena of the living. In the course of the 
paper Uexküllian phenomenology is related to the eco-existentialism of Peter 
Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990), to eco-phenomenology (including David Abram 
and Ted Toadvine), and, very briefly, to various brands of semiotics of nature 
(biosemiotics, ecosemiotics, zoosemiotics). A few remarks are made on the 
partial resemblance between Uexküllian phenomenology and Anna-Teresa 
Tymieniecka’s ‘phenomenology of life’, and on its basic difference to the 
‘phaneroscopy’ of Peirce. The idea of phenomena conceived of as a layer of 
semiosis is illustrated by way of an example involving Larry David and a tick. 
In the closing remarks, which also address the topic of human freedom, it is 
stated that there can be no sharp distinction between philosophy and the life 
sciences, but rather a gradual transition from the more-or-less philoso-
phical/generic to the more-or-less scientific/specific. This is an implication of 
Uexküllian phenomenology’s pluralism and emphasis on studying the 
particulars of the living. 
 
Paper IV Morten Tønnessen 2011. Mapping human impact: 
Expanding horizons – interdisciplinary integration. In: Tiina 
Peil (ed.): The Space of Culture – the Place of Nature in 
Estonia and Beyond (= Approaches to Cultural Theory vol. 1), 
Tartu: Tartu University Press, 93–106. 
This chapter is concerned with the question of how we can map the impact that 
humankind is having on (or rather in) ecosystems worldwide. The basic 
movement in the text is one from self to world, and it is claimed that the way 
our human selves practically branch off into the world of others can be 
represented figuratively based on qualitative analysis of aggregate numerical 
environmental data, with Uexküllian terminology at the base. In the course of 
the chapter three figures are presented, all involving ontological maps (see our 
note on the alternative designation ‘relational Umwelt map’ in 3.1 Visual 
representation of Brock’s phenomenal fields). One of these maps (Figure 1) is 
concerned with traditional relationships between humans and animals in gross 
terms. The chapter presents some reflections on qualitative and quantitative 
studies – with particular emphasis on the biosemiotic approach, compares the 
ecological footprint notion and our own notion of ontological niche (first 
introduced in Tønnessen 2003), and presents a simplified procedure for 
interpreting numerical data qualitatively. 
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Paper V Morten Tønnessen 2010. The global species. New formations: 
a journal of culture/theory/politics 69 (Special Issue guest-
edited by Ashley Dawson, Imperial Ecologies): 98–110. 
Featured as additional content in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(www.britannica.com). 
This article explores the historical process of globalisation by assessing the 
planet’s colonisation by the human species and its affiliated species. It is argued 
that this established global ‘colonial organism’ means the installation of an 
ecological empire, organised with Homo sapiens placed highest in the hierarchy 
and with crop species, pets, and livestock enjoying positions of privilege. The 
landscape has been altered to accommodate the proliferation of these various 
species, making the geographical spread of lifeforms on a global scale much 
easier. Thereby we as a species have further provided global breeding grounds 
for other species that might not otherwise have been able to spread at a global 
scale. The article addresses the ecology of capitalism, the politics of bio-
semiotics, and the ecosemiotics of globalisation – and presents a systematic 
review of the global distribution of key livestock species. It further reviews the 
international distribution of crop species and, more fragmentarily (given the 
lack of global data), the occurrence of pets internationally. The article also 
addresses the beginnings of globalisation, which is sketched in form of four 
consecutive waves: 1) of the global presence of humans, 2) of the presence of 
our affiliated species, 3) of human management (our administrative range) and 
4) of the growth economy. A key hypothesis in the context of land use, drawing 
on the example of Bangkok, is that our global civilisation is organised around 
urban settlements with ecological space repeatedly concentrically organised as 
urban areas – rural areas – wasteland. 
 
Paper VI Morten Tønnessen 2010. Wolf land. Biosemiotics 3(3): 289–
297. 
This article makes use of the notion of wolf land, which is to be considered as 
an ambiguous term referring to “the land of the wolf” from the wolf’s 
perspective as well as from a human perspective. The general circumstances of 
the Scandinavian wolf population are presented, as is the Norwegian wolf 
controversy in particular. The rationale for the choice of these particular study 
animals is summarised in three points: 1) wolves are among the most adaptive 
mammals on Earth – as evidenced by today’s enormous variety of dog (Canis 
familiaris) breeds, 2) wolf management is typically controversial, and not less 
so in the otherwise peaceful Scandinavian context, where it has given rise to a 
symbolic strife between rural traditionalists on one side and conservationists 
popularly associated with the government and urban elites on the other, and (3) 
the modern Scandinavian wolf population has been monitored and sampled 
practically speaking since its foundation – as a result, there is a rich body of 
scientific literature on the topic. The final section of the article entails identifi-
cation of changing factors in current Scandinavian wolf ecology in terms of its 
semiotic niche (see Hoffmeyer 2008) and ontological niche respectively. In a 
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concluding comment addressing the now controversial notion of wilderness it is 
suggested that the critical question to be asked is not whether or not Man is part 
of nature, but what the exact character of our relations in nature is. In a similar 
vein, we should not ask whether or not human artefacts are “natural” – but to 
what extent they also appear as Umwelt objects for other creatures.  
 
Paper VII Morten Tønnessen 2011. I, wolf: The ecology of existence. In: 
Ane Faugstad Aarø and Johannes Servan (eds.): Environment, 
Embodiment and Gender, Bergen: Hermes Text, 315–333. 
This chapter ultimately addresses but two topics: The nature of the wolf, and the 
nature of Man. These two topics are methodologically problematic for two 
different reasons: Man’s nature because we are the topic to be investigated and 
can thus not judge it without bias; the wolf’s nature because we are not wolves 
and can thus not know firsthand what it is like to be a wolf. The text is organ-
ised into five parts, the three first treating in sequence the politics of wolves and 
sheep (in the Scandinavian context), ecological alienation, and then distinctive 
being vis-à-vís communal being (intended as complementary designations 
applicable on humans and all other living creatures). Ecological alienation can 
be taken to describe a state of mind, and of social life, in which vital constituent 
parts of the lifeworld of the creature in question are either absent or perceived 
and treated in an abnormal way. It is stated that such alienation is correlated 
with both abnormally low (wildlife) and abnormally high (livestock) population 
densities. The modern Scandinavian wolf population has at least at times 
qualified for this designation. When preceding gradual extinction or occurring 
in a phase of recolonisation, ecological alienation is a transitional phenomenon. 
The fourth part is entitled “Man is not a sign” and introduces the 
anthropocentric mistake, namely to reason (erroneously) that human reality is 
practically all there is. We tend to think in terms of language, and in terms of 
language, all is language – all is human. The final part is entitled “In search of 
the wolf’s perspective” and involves a paraphrasing of a famous section from 
Sartre 1958, applied to the wolves of Polar Zoo. The reality of absence and 
meaninglessness in animal lives is thus presented yet again. In this respect the 
chapter contributes to a biosemiotically oriented existential semiotics. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this section we present a few general theoretical findings, sketch three Um-
welt scenarios in the context of Norwegian wolf management, and eventually 
present in brief our future-oriented perspectives on deep and shallow solutions 
in the same context. 
 
 
6.1. Theoretical findings 
A central part of our revision of Uexküll’s Umwelt theory and methodology 
concerns developing various notions of change (i.e., specific notions, or 
categories, of Umwelt transition). This enterprise is all the more rewarding 
because it turns out that a concept of Umwelt transition is fundamentally and 
fruitfully different from more traditional notions of environmental change. 
Umwelt transition, then, cannot be equated with ‘environmental change‘ in the 
common sense – these are in no way synonymous. An Uexküllian notion of 
environmental change is characterised by an attempt to consider how what is 
otherwise called environmental change is experienced from the point of view of 
the living (i.e., living beings). But that is only the start of it – because in terms 
of Umwelt transition a range of other phenomena which are not usually as-
sociated with environmental change also qualify for the term, including bio-
logical and cultural phenomena alike. 
In short, anything that qualifies as ‘content’ of any given lifeworld – in other 
words, any Umwelt object, and any meaning factor – qualifies in principle as 
something for which there may be Umwelt transitions. All phenomenal content 
is potentially subject to environmental change in an Uexküllian sense. The 
result is a notion of environmental change that is substantially different from a 
mainstream notion that subjects environmental change to ecosystems only (and 
in physio-chemical terms only). In contrast Umwelt transitions may occur at a 
number of scales ranging from the individual organism to the global ecosystem. 
Furthermore, while the mainstream notion of environmental change predomi-
nantly concerns change on a macro-evolutionary timescale, Umwelt transitions 
may additionally occur not only regularly on an ecosystem level but even 
regularly in individual lives (see Paper I p. 49). As such it is a concept that can 
be applied as a common tool for both developmental and evolutionary biology, 
and moreover in biology and cultural studies alike. 
One recurring problem of Umwelt theory and methodology as outlined in 
this dissertation is that there are several aspects of the life processes – among 
those several of a phenomenal (as in perceptual) character – which it does not 
capture. In particular, it appears to fall short whenever we are not dealing with 
individual organisms but with superorganisms. A scheme developed in 1.2 The 
levels of biosemiosis suggests that there is super-organismic semiosis – in that 
scheme, such semiosis is characterised as super-perceptual or macroscopic 
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semiosis, and it constitutes the third and most complex level of biosemiosis.59 
This thesis has predominantly been concerned with the perceptual (also called 
organismic) level of biosemiosis, and it is evident that deeper engagement with 
the other levels of biosemiosis, super-organismic semiosis included, is required 
in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the ecology of perception. 
In the process of updating Umwelt theory with regard to both historicity and 
super-organismic complexity, we have learned that our understanding of other 
aspects of Umwelt theory might change as well. On a par with the realisation 
that applying historicity within Umwelt theory implies a critical view on the 
balance of nature and on the notion of Umwelten as perfectly meaningful 
entities,60 for instance, is the discovery, in light of our tentative examination of 
complexity in the relations between Umwelten, that a number of individual 
Umwelten are actually incomplete when viewed in isolation, as singular, 
individual Umwelten. This concerns what we will call Umwelt assemblages 
(consider the synchronised behaviour and perception of a rider and a horse) and 
swarm Umwelten, and the coordinating Umwelt alignment involved in both 
cases. In the case of swarm Umwelten, consider the example of a school of fish. 
The lifeworlds – the Umwelten – of the individual fishes in the school of fish 
are only fully meaningful given the presence of the others, not in isolation. In 
similar ways, of course, even our human Umwelten qua individuals are 
ultimately meaningful only given the presence of several others, and our 
behaviour and perception is frequently synchronised with that of others, 
conspecifics in particular. Both Umwelt assemblages and swarm Umwelten are 
examples of what we have in Paper I (p. 52 – here in plural form) called 
aggregate Umwelten (see also Paper III, particularly the cautionary remarks on 
pp. 330–331 and in footnote 4). 
The perspective described above has not been treated explicitly within the 
confines of this thesis, but will be developed in a monograph which we intend 
to complete in the time to come. This work will prospectively develop several 
aspects of the current dissertation. It should be duly noted that on the points 
where we have found and will find it advantageous to revise Uexküll’s thought, 
our aim is either to bring his thought into our own era, or to expand upon the 
notion of the organism as relational. The Umwelt, to sum up, is neither neces-
sarily as harmonious and fulfilled, nor by definition as complete as Uexküll 
would have it.61 
The human Umwelt, being the most complex species-specific Umwelt we 
know, could in consequence of its complexity be said to be the most difficult 
Umwelt of all to map in any revealing detail. Umwelt research is usually 
                                                     
59 Note, however, that there are numerous instances of simple super-organismic semiosis, 
and similarly numerous instances of complex sub-perceptual semiosis – and that the latter 
may very well be more complex than the former, if compared. The scheme in 1.2 pinpoints 
levels of biological complexity only in specific cases, not comparatively. 
60 Notably, Uexküll did not have any notion of meaninglessness in animal lives. 
61 But perhaps his harmonious, fulfilled, and in part his complete Umwelten can serve as 
ideals to us, in ecopolitics (lest they obstruct our truly social inclinations!). 
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conceived of as a biological discipline, but the scholarly scope should be 
broadened considerably whenever Umwelt research is concerned with detailed 
study of human Umwelten. In such cases the partly overlapping fields of 
psychology, sociology, folkloristics, ethnology and anthropology are indispens-
able sources, and familiarity with – or qualified indirect access to – these is 
required for any truly competent Umwelt researcher in the human domain. 
While simple, familiar, typical or emblematic situations might be the easiest to 
depict, for instance in drawing a particular functional cycle, a complex set of 
relations – or a complex behavioural pattern – is inevitably much harder. Future 
development of the notion of swarm Umwelt as applicable in cultural studies 
(where cultures will be methodologically approached as superorganisms) might 
enrich our methodological tool box considerably.  
The visual representations of Brock’s phenomenal fields (see 3.1) have 
proven to be useful, but will gain by being further developed so as to facilitate 
more detailed and precise depictions of lifeworlds. This is particularly pertinent 
if such visual representations are to be applied in empirical biological studies 
properly speaking. While some general guidelines can be given, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that workable visual representations will have to be case-specific 
and thus adapted to the appropriate design in each specific case. Adapting the 
phenomenal fields to particular study must imply to customise, standardise and 
specify each of the fields e.g. in accordance with the exact sensory range of an 
organism (with defined minimum and maximum values). The starting point of 
this simple circular model is four perceptual/behavioural categories represented 
figuratively as 4 x 90°. Custom-made phenomenal fields will likely involve 
precise subdivision of these 90° sections according to a chosen relevant scale. 
Further precision can be attained by utilising the radius as well as an exact and 
defined scale. Sensory channels or other elements (such as classes of Umwelt 
objects in terms of functionality) may be colour-coded. 
Figure 12 shows a basic representation of intragroup variation, be it within a 
species or within a lifeform otherwise delineated, which is also important to 
emphasise whenever relevant. In the case of wolves it certainly is relevant, 
given their advanced social system and furthermore the apparent occurrence of 
wolf personalities. 
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Figure 12. Phenomenal fields – intragroup variation. 
 
 
A further shortcoming of Uexküllian methodology as developed in the current 
thesis concerns the lack of detail in representations of the human Umwelt. As 
we see in Figure 4 Umwelt transition in human relations to sheep and wolves, 
that representation (in the form of phenomenal fields) is somewhat informative 
but nevertheless clearly inaccurate. Particularly: How telling is it to present 
wolves as social companions of humans (in the case of shy, free-range wolves)? 
In fact it is false and misleading in most senses of the term ‘Umwelt’. Thus the 
need to develop the phenomenal fields further in the human case (and as it turns 
out, a further development might to some extent be a relevant specification in 
the case of animals in general as well). 
Figure 13 shows a tripartite model of the human Umwelt (which might in 
generalised form be adapted to general biological usage, insofar as the layers of 
mediated Umwelt and of the conceptual world is relevant in each specific case). 
 
 
a)       b)  
 
Figure 13. a) A tripartite model of the human Umwelt, b) combined with phenomenal 
fields. 
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As we see, the three-layered model of the human Umwelt in 13 a) results in 
combination with the four phenomenal fields in the twelve more specific fields 
incorporated in 13 b). A few words are required to make clear what the three 
designations in 13 a) stand for. By core Umwelt, we mean the aspect of Umwelt 
in which one interacts directly and immediately with other creatures or Umwelt 
objects, in (to use a figure of speech) “face-to-face” encounters. Core Umwelt 
objects (or rather the Merkmalträgern (“trait carriers”) associated with them) 
are characterised by being located at roughly the same place as the Umwelt 
creature in question, and co-located momentarily in temporal terms as well. By 
mediated Umwelt, we mean the aspect of Umwelt in which Umwelt objects are 
encountered indirectly by way of some mediation (memory, fantasy, anti-
cipation, intermediary recurrence, etc.). Mediated Umwelt objects are thus 
mediated through space, possibly also through time. We suggest that this aspect 
of Umwelt can generally be associated with Uexküll’s notion of the search 
image (Suchbild).62 By conceptual Umwelt, we mean the aspect of Umwelt in 
which one navigates among Umwelt objects in terms of predicative reasoning in 
general or human language in particular. Conceptual Umwelt objects are in the 
latter case Umwelt objects whose functional meaning is imprinted linguis-
tically.63 We theorise that these three layers interact dynamically so that one or 
two of the layers are occasionally temporarily suspended (in other words, 
human perception is subsequently focused – more or less exclusively – on 
different Umwelt layers). 
Where can we place the wild wolf qua social companion for humans in this 
improved version of the phenomenal fields? If in the core Umwelt, then the 
wolf in question has actually been encountered – a rarity in actual modern life – 
and (at the very least) been perceived by the human Umwelt creature in a 
friendly manner. If in the mediated Umwelt, then the wolf has only appeared as 
an Umwelt object by way of mediation (for instance because the human 
specimen is looking for wolves, dreaming about wolves, or watching wolves in 
television documentaries). If in the conceptual Umwelt, then the human in 
question has likely heard or read something that made wolves principally 
positive Umwelt objects. If we were to redraw Figure 4, referred to above, we 
see that depending on circumstances we could place wolves as Umwelt objects 
either in the mediated Umwelt or in the conceptual Umwelt (or both), but only 
exceptionally in the core Umwelt. 
 
 
                                                     
62 This suggestion implies that the mediated Umwelt might be a universal aspect of 
Umwelten as such. 
63 This third and most novel aspect of Umwelt in evolutionary terms corresponds to what 
Sebeok called humans’ secondary modelling system (the ‘animal’ Umwelt in his scheme 
being the primary modelling system – see also footnote 11, in 1.1 Appraisal of Sebeok’s 
depiction of the Umwelt as species-specific modelling system). 
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6.2. Umwelt futurology:  
Three Umwelt scenarios 
En masse, Umwelt scenarios – scenarios for future societal and/or ecological 
states in terms of Umwelt – constitute Umwelt futurology.64 When it comes to 
future scenarios, extreme scenarios are sometimes telling, if only applied 
hypothetically. One such scenario in our context would be the systematic 
disappearance of sheep husbandry in Norway, or the end of Norwegian 
agriculture as such. Another could involve the end of management (a daunting 
thought to most wildlife managers, as we learned at SKANDULV’s seminar). In 
this penultimate subsection we sketch three fundamentally different Umwelt 
scenarios for Norway with regard to wolves and agriculture (sheep husbandry in 
particular). The scenarios are labelled (1) Business as usual, (2) No wolves, and 
(3) Reinvigorated agriculture.65 There are groups of Norwegians favouring each 
one of these scenarios – in that sense none of them are wholly unrealistic. 
Umwelt scenario (1): Business as usual. A mainstream scenario which 
takes business as usual for granted will involve fewer farmers and bigger farms. 
Some livestock populations including cattle might decline further, whereas as 
others including pigs and poultry (which have both already been subjected 
almost exclusively to indoor Umwelten, in mass settings) might continue to 
grow. Furthermore, the importation of feed is likely to increase further. Given 
ever-increasing ratios of number of livestock to number of farmers, Norwegian 
agriculture will have to become increasingly industrialised, and in economic 
terms investment will increasingly dominate over labour. Overall production as 
measured in volume might increase somewhat. The implications for sheep 
husbandry will be that most small-scale sheep farming will come to an end, 
whereas some of those farmers holding large numbers of sheep will hold even 
larger numbers of sheep. Sheep husbandry is simultaneously likely to become 
more concentrated geographically, with pockets here and there. As for wolf 
management, the relation between Norwegian and Swedish wolf management 
regimes will be crucial for what the Norwegian situation will be. If Sweden 
remains on the whole more hospitable to wolves than Norway, it is conceivable 
that current trends involving an unusually high proportion of stray wolves 
(which are statistically more likely to become ‘troublemakers’) in Norway will 
only amplify – no matter how Norwegian wolf management is developed. 
Umwelt scenario (2): No wolves. An Umwelt scenario involving no wolves 
on Norwegian territory can take on several forms. For instance, there might or 
might not be wolves in Sweden (and Finland), and there might or might not be 
other large carnivores in Norway (and in Sweden and Finland). The ecological 
situation would vary accordingly. If there were no wolves but were other large 
                                                     
64 Political Umwelt futurology aims to achieve a particular desired Umwelt transition. 
65 In the current context we have not found it necessary to define an exact time perspective, 
but given available global scenarios on future demographics, climate change etc. it would be 
reasonable to relate to a period stretching to 2050–2100 but not further. 
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carnivores in Norway, another species might be made into a symbol of large 
carnivores in general. If on the other hand there were no large carnivores left in 
Norway, a new symbol of agricultural and rural hardship would perhaps 
emerge, replacing wolves and predators. If there were no wolves in Sweden, not 
many migrant wolves would get to Southern Norway – if there were no wolves 
in Finland or on the Russian side of the Norwegian border in the north either, 
then neither would there be many migrants in Northern Norway. But if there 
were indeed a substantial number of wolves in but one of these places 
(particularly in Southern Sweden), the result would inevitably be a constant 
influx of stray wolves. Even in a Norwegian “no wolf” scenario, in other words, 
there would be wolves appearing from time to time, and the wolves appearing 
would in percentual terms be highly likely to be troublesome individuals in 
terms of predation on sheep, given current practices. It is plausible in such a 
situation that wolf depredation on sheep in Norway would not at all decline, 
unless systematic and immediate culling of immigrating wolves was effectively 
implemented. From an antagonist standpoint, the “no wolf” scenario presumes 
in order to work well that there were no wolves in Sweden either, and 
consequently no wolves in Finland, and consequently no wolves in North-
Western Russia. The crucial question with regard to agricultural interests 
becomes: How would Norwegian agriculture fare, given the wolf’s repeated 
functional extinction? Leaving the question of the occurrence of other large 
predators in the absence of the wolf aside, we observe that if agriculture 
develops as in the Umwelt scenario Business as usual, then at any rate a huge 
number of farmers will lose their livelihoods, particularly those with small-
scale, traditional practices. 
Umwelt scenario (3): Reinvigorated agriculture. Our third scenario pre-
supposes that Norwegian agriculture is reinvigorated. Here, this is intended as 
implying that (a) the number of farms grows, (b) the number of farmers grows, 
(c) agricultural output overall grows, and (d) Norway’s degree of self-
sufficiency increases. In such a development, labour will balance investment as 
an input factor. The ratio of number of livestock to number of farmers will 
either remain fairly stable or decrease, to the effect that there might be more 
human labour to put in for each animal. This would enable sheep farmers to 
invest more in spending time (perhaps by way of hired labour) on inspections in 
the field at summertime and perhaps even herding. The overall development 
would favour labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive practices, which 
would benefit livestock in terms of human-animal sociality in that the presence 
of their human caretakers would remain, and perhaps even be augmented. And 
what of the wolf? The wolf would no more be regarded as deeply problematic 
for Norwegian agriculture in general and sheep farmers in particular. Its 
negative symbolicity would wane. Almost no matter how many wolves there 
were in Norway, sheep farmers would most likely have other preoccupations 
altogether. This is the scenario of conviviality.  
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6.3. Deep and shallow solutions 
As we saw in 6.2, both Business as usual and the No wolves scenario might in 
fact result in recurring problems with wolf depredation on sheep of comparable 
extent to what is the case today. We observe that the future development of 
Norwegian sheep husbandry and Norwegian wolf ecology is overall indepen-
dent of each other in that one does not determine the prospects of the other in 
strictly ecological terms. Simultaneously, the future prospects of Norwegian 
wolf management depend on the future development of sheep husbandry (and 
Norwegian agriculture at large), not in ecological terms properly speaking but 
in perceptual (and thus semiotic) terms – or, as we may say, in terms of 
semiotic causation (cf. 3.2 The notion of semiotic causation). As a mirror image 
of agricultural developments, future wolf symbolicity will in its negative 
aspects likely reflect the perceptions of and in agriculture, and the development 
of this symbolicity is in turn decisive for the prospects of wolf conservation in 
Norway. 
The Scandinavian management regime at large appears to be bent first of all 
on negotiating agreement along the urban-rural axis. Its “blend of good causes”, 
however, has proven to be a failure, at least if we are to judge by perceptions 
articulated along this conflict axis. The authorities have no doubt under-
estimated the power of, and role of, symbolism in carnivore politics.66 In 
designing and enacting a wolf management regime, it is absolutely essential to 
take into account what perceptions people have in various sectors of society, 
and to acknowledge that perceptual development (qua cultural phenomenon) 
has its own dynamic and may span over generations.  
 To frame this politically, we see that there is a profound difference between 
approaching Norwegian wolf management in a deep and a shallow manner, to 
apply a key distinction propagated by deep ecologist Arne Næss (1973). 
Whereas a shallow approach implies addressing each ‘environmental problem’ 
directly and out of context, a deep approach must imply to contextualise any 
given problem and then address the whole complex of issues that are in one way 
or another related to it (if only by way of runaway semiotic causation). In the 
current context it is arguably the case that however we choose to address the 
issue of wolf conservation in terms of management methods etc., we are bound 
to fail in our efforts unless other, more fundamental societal developments 
develop favourably. A deep approach to Norwegian wolf conservation, then, 
ironically implies addressing a range of apparently unrelated issues, the future 
development of Norwegian sheep husbandry included. To work for the wolf, 
one must work for the sheep.67  
 
 
                                                     
66 If the current thesis has potential for practical applications in wildlife management in 
Norway or beyond, its basic contribution is this: An acknowledgement of the need for 
analysis in context (not only biologically but furthermore culturally). 
67 And not only for the sake of the wolf! 
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SUMMARY 
The main task of this dissertation is to contribute to the development of Umwelt 
concepts and models – in short, Umwelt theory in the tradition after Uexküll – 
and to attempt to describe the semiotic mechanisms that regulate the wolf and 
sheep populations in Scandinavia, especially through their interaction with the 
human species. A case study on Norwegian wolf management is used as a test 
case for the application of theoretical concepts and models developed in the 
thesis. The overall aim is to demonstrate that a revised and further developed, 
up-to-date Umwelt theory is applicable in the contemporary scientific context, 
and to point to its wide-ranging philosophical implications. It is thus our claim 
that Uexküll’s thought can do better than simply serve as a historical source of 
inspiration. 
Our initial premise is that ecological reality – the global ecosystem – is 
ultimately, and first and foremost, an existential realm. More precisely, all 
creatures are actively engaged in their relevant surroundings, which appear to 
them within the context of their lifeworlds. The core concept of this work is that 
of Umwelt transition, which represents an Uexküllian notion of environmental 
change. Since Uexküll himself did not engage such a notion, but rather pre-
sented Umwelt theory as a methodologically ahistorical approach, Uexküllian 
phenomenology as we depict it cannot in detail be taken as representative of 
Uexküll’s thought. This thesis text intermittently presents programmatic 
statements for both semiotics and phenomenology. The general assumption is 
that unification of the two fields of inquiry can be mutually enriching, espe-
cially with regard to semiotics of nature and eco-phenomenology. 
 In the first section of this dissertation, 1. The biosemiotic approach, we start 
off with a critical appraisal of Sebeok’s depiction of the Umwelt as a species-
specific modelling system. In categorising Umwelten the threshold of the 
species is indeed useful – and it is certainly characteristic of intraspecific com-
munication – but the threshold of the species is nevertheless but one threshold 
among many. We further introduce a tentatively all-inclusive model of various 
levels of biosemiosis, where the central level is constituted by perceptual 
semiosis and further levels by sub-perceptual and super-perceptual semiosis. In 
the course of this subsection the place of cultural semiotics within exosemiotics, 
and the place of phenomenology within semiotics, is presented. 
 The second of four topical sections, 2. Uexküllian phenomenology, addresses 
the notion of phenomenology and establishes how diverse the field of pheno-
menology is. There is thus no ultimate definition of phenomenology, nor defini-
tive criteria for what counts as phenomenology. A subsection on semiotics and 
phenomenology reviews interconnections between the two fields and raises the 
following questions: Does phenomenology have to be Husserlian? And does 
semiotic phenomenology have to be Peircean? Though we find some common 
ground with Uexküllian phenomenology in both Husserl’s and Peirce’s respec-
tive phenomenologies, our general answer to these two questions is ‘no’. 
Deely’s rejection of phenomenology is rebuffed because his claim that 
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phenomenology is in its nature idealistic, epistemological only, and Cartesian is 
not telling of the philosophies of several major phenomenologists. A subsection 
on Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt concludes that it is partly overlapping with 
Uexküll’s Umwelt notion. Husserl’s conception implies that there are animal 
lifeworlds (Lebenswelten) as well, but the human Lebenswelt is the measure of 
other lifeworlds and their model insofar as methodology is concerned. A 
concluding section on the notion of Uexküllian phenomenology states that 
Uexküll’s call for a subjective biology echoes Husserl’s call for a return to the 
things themselves in the most meaningful way possible, by in effect implying a 
return to the study and perception of nature qua individuals, nature qua living 
creatures. Uexküllian phenomenology differs from most established phenome-
nologies by not being consciousness-centred, and by not adopting neutrality 
with regard to the reality status of phenomena. We establish that it – in our 
depiction – is particularly affiliated with a line of phenomenological develop-
ment that goes from the late Husserl via Merleau-Ponty to the contemporary 
phenomenologist David Abram (though we have some reservations with regard 
to the latter’s animism). 
 The third section, 3. Umwelt mapping, begins by reflecting on the general 
problem of factual discourse. It is stated that semiotics as an interdisciplinary 
approach can thrive only by absorbing knowledge from other, narrower, more 
specialised fields. Proper empirical grounding is essential. The first subsection 
treats Friedrich Brock’s drafted Umwelt typology and presents an adaptation of 
his phenomenal fields. We establish that rather than describing these compa-
ratively, as Brock proposed, we may just as well describe these four main 
phenomenal fields (corresponding to Uexküll’s four main functional cycles) for 
one single species, population, or individual organism, over time. While his was 
a static and finite biological typology, ours is a dynamic and diachronic bio-
logical typology. The second subsection is devoted to the notion of semiotic 
causation, which can be defined in the following way: When a sign acts as a 
cause, the causal process at hand is a process of semiotic causation. In a more 
technical manner, we can say that the semiotic cause X causes the semiotic 
effect Y to appear as a sign of X whenever Y appears as a sign of X. A semiotic 
effect is thus proof of a semiotic cause. Unlike efficient causation, semiotic 
causation is not wholly predictable, because it always involves a measure of 
interpretation. In terms of Umwelt we can state that a creature’s Umwelt 
consists of the signs which cause it to respond.  
 The final topical section, 4. Case study: Norwegian wolf management, puts 
forward a little background in summary terms. While the wolf has become less 
of an enemy, the sheep is becoming less of a social companion. A brief 
overview is given of the preliminary outcome of ongoing policy reviews in 
Norway and Sweden. The section further presents an overview of field trips and 
interviews conducted, and includes a number of photographs from the former. A 
thorough yet not comprehensive review is offered of the cultural semiotic of 
wolves and sheep. In the case of the wolf two prominent categories of symbolic 
imagery concern violence (and plotting, and unruly hunger) and sex (and 
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seduction). In the works of Shakespeare, the wolf is (among other things) 
embodied hunger – predatory hunger – pure hunger. The sheep derives much of 
its symbolicity, particularly in the Bible, from being juxtaposed with the wolf. 
A further subsection makes remarks on Næss’ philosophy of wolf management, 
concluding that Næss did not provide a concrete solution to the problem of wolf 
conservation in Scandinavia. The next subsection addresses invasive manage-
ment of shy animals, and covers among other things human objects in wolf 
Umwelten. The final subsection treats the symbolic construction of the Big Bad 
Wolf in contemporary Norway. It is stated that the human perception of wolves 
has in large measure decoupled from ecological reality. The sheep’s symbolicity 
is in the Norwegian context grounded in open landscapes, which are typically 
taken to be characteristically Norwegian. Its symbolicity is effectively 
associated with the symbolicity of outer pastures, and the perception that Nor-
way is growing over.  
 Section 6, Conclusions and further development (following section 5, 
containing article summaries), starts off with theoretical findings. Umwelt 
transition cannot be equated with environmental change in the common sense, 
for it is a wider notion applicable in biology (be it developmental or evolutio-
nary) and cultural studies alike. One recurring problem of Umwelt theory and 
methodology as outlined in this dissertation is that it appears to fall short when-
ever we are dealing with superorganisms. To address this shortcoming, further 
conceptual developments are outlined. Some general guidelines for customising 
the phenomenal fields are presented, and it is established that in empirical 
biological studies particularly workable visual representations will have to be 
case-specific. A tripartite model of the human Umwelt (which may be applied 
in combination with the phenomenal fields – and generalised so as to apply to 
animals in general) is sketched. In the penultimate subsection three Umwelt 
scenarios for future wolf ecology and sheep husbandry in Norway are intro-
duced, named (1) Business as usual, (2) No wolves and (3) Reinvigorated agri-
culture respectively. The final subsection establishes that future wolf symboli-
city in its negative aspects – in the Norwegian context mirroring agricultural 
developments – will determine the prospects of wolf conservation. The autho-
rities have underestimated the power of, and role of, symbolism in carnivore 
politics. In political terms there is a profound difference between approaching 
Norwegian wolf management in a deep and a shallow manner (Næss 1973). 
However we choose to address the issue of wolf conservation in terms of 
management methods etc., we are bound to fail in our efforts unless other, more 
fundamental societal developments develop favourably. Whereas a shallow 
approach implies addressing each ‘environmental problem‘ directly and out of 
context, a deep approach must imply to contextualise any given problem and 
then address the whole complex of issues that are in one way or another related 
to it (if only by way of runaway semiotic causation). 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Uexkülli fenomenoloogia ja omailma üleminekud:  
Norra hundipopulatsiooni majandamise  
ökosemiootiline analüüs 
Selle väitekirja peamiseks ülesandeks on anda oma panus omailma mõistete ja 
mudelite arendamisse (teisisõnu omailmateooriasse Uexkülli järgses traditsioo-
nis) ning püüda kirjeldada semiootilisi mehhanisme, mis reguleerivad Skandi-
naavia huntide ja lammaste populatsioone, pöörates eriti tähelepanu nende 
interaktsioonidele inimesega. Norra hundimajandamise juhtumianalüüsi kasuta-
takse töös, testimaks väitekirjas arendatud teoreetiliste mõistete ja mudelite 
rakendamist. Töö üldiseks eesmärgiks on näidata, et redigeeritud ning edasi-
arendatud omailmateooria on rakendatav kaasaegses teaduslikus kontekstis, 
ning osutada selle laiaulatuslikele filosoofilistele järelmitele. Töös väidetakse 
seega, et Uexkülli ideid saab kasutada paremini kui lihtsalt ajaloolise inspirat-
siooniallikana.  
Töö algseks eeldusekse on, et ökoloogiline reaalsus – globaalne öko-
süsteem – on põhiolemuselt ning esmajoones eksistentsiaalne vald. Täpsemalt 
öeldes on kõik olendid aktiivselt kaasatud nende jaoks olulistesse ümbrustesse, 
mis ilmnevad neile nende eluilmade kontekstis. Selle töö võtmemõisteks on 
omailma muutus, mis on uexkülliaanlik keskkonnamuutuse mõiste. Kuna Uex-
küll ise sellist mõistet ei kasutanud ning oma omailmateooriat esitas ta pigem 
kui metodoloogiliselt ajatut lähenemist, ei saa selles töös kujutatud uexkül-
liaanlikku fenomenoloogiat oma detailides pidada Uexkülli enda mõtte esinda-
jaks. See väitekiri pakub kohati välja programmilisi väiteid nii semiootika kui 
fenomenoloogia jaoks. Autori üldine seisukoht on, et nende kahe uurimisvald-
konna ühendamine võiks olla vastastikku rikastav, pidades seejuures eriti silmas 
looduse semiootikat ning ökofenomenoloogiat. 
Selle väitekirja esimeses jaos 1. Biosemiootiline lähenemine alustatakse Se-
beoki omailma kui liigispetsiifilise modelleeriva süsteemi kirjelduse kriitilise 
heakskiiduga. Omailmasid liigendades on liigi lävi kindlasti kasulik ning see on 
kindlasti iseloomulik liigisisele kommunikatsioonile, kuid liigilävi on siiski üks 
lävi paljude seas. Järgnevalt tutvustatakse üht võimalikku kõikehõlmavat eri-
nevate biosemioosi tasandite mudelit, milles keskseks tasandiks on taju semioos 
ning teisteks tasanditeks on tajust lihtsamad ning tajust keerukamad semioosid. 
Selles alajaotuses esitatakse kultuurisemiootika koht eksosemiootikas ning 
fenomenoloogia koht semiootikas. 
Nelja temaatilise osa teine osa 2. Uexkülliaanlik fenomenoloogia puudutab 
fenomenoloogia mõistet ning näitab, kui mitmekesine on fenomenoloogia 
valdkond. Seega ei ole võimalik anda ühest fenomenoloogia definitsiooni ega 
ka määratleda fenomenoloogia kindlaid kriteeriume. Semiootika ning fenome-
noloogia alljaotuses vaadeldakse kahe valdkonna vahelisi seoseid ning püstita-
takse järgnevad küsimused: kas fenomenoloogia peab olema husserliaanlik? Ja 
kas semiootiline fenomenoloogia peab olema peirceiaanlik? Kuigi nii Husserli 
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kui Peirce’i fenomenoloogiates leidub teatud ühisjooni uexkülliaanliku fenome-
noloogiaga, on meie vastus nendele küsimustele eitav. Deely fenomenoloogia-
kriitika lükatakse tagasi, sest tema väide, justkui oleks fenomenoloogia oma 
olemuselt idealistlik, vaid epistemoloogiline ning kartesiaanlik, ei kehti paljude 
teiste oluliste fenomenoloogide filosoofiate kohta. Alajaotuses Husserli Lebens-
welti mõistest järeldatakse, et see on osaliselt kattuv Uexkülli omailma mõis-
tega. Husserli mõiste eeldab, et olemas on ka loomade eluilmad (Lebenswelten), 
kuid inimese Lebenswelt on metodoloogilises plaanis kõigi teiste eluilmade 
mõõt ning mudel. Uexkülliaanliku fenomenoloogia mõistet puudutavas lõpu-
osas väidetakse, et Uexkülli üleskutses subjektiivsele bioloogiale kajab vastu 
Husserli üleskutse pöörduda tagasi asjade eneste juurde kõige tähenduslikumal 
võimalikul viisil, eeldades tegelikult tagasipöördumist looduse kui indiviidide, 
looduse kui elusolendite uurimise ja taju juurde. Uexkülliaanlik fenomenoloogia 
erineb enamikust juurdunud fenomenoloogiatest, kuna see ei ole teadvuse 
keskne ning ei võta omaks neutraalsust fenomenide tegelikkuse staatuse osas. 
Töös leitakse, et see on eriti lähedane fenomenoloogilisele arenguliinile, mis 
kulgeb hilisest Husserlist Merleau-Ponty kaudu kaasaegse fenomenoloogi 
David Abramini (kuigi mõningate mööndustega viimase animismi suhtes). 
Kolmas osa 3. Omailma kaardistamine algab aruteluga faktilise diskursuse 
üldise probleemi üle. Väidetakse, et semiootika kui interdistsiplinaarne lähe-
nemine saab edeneda vaid, ammutades teadmisi teistelt, kitsamatelt ning enam 
spetsialiseerunud valdkondadelt. Korralik empiiriline alus on äärmiselt oluline. 
Esimeses alajaotuses tegeletakse Friedrich Brocki visandatud omailma tüpo-
loogiaga ning esitatakse fenomenide väljade kohandus. Väidetakse, et selle 
asemel, et kirjeldada neid võrdlevalt nagu Brock pakkus, võib neid nelja 
fenomenide välja (mis vastavad Uexkülli neljale peamisele funktsiooniringile) 
sama hästi kirjeldada ajaliselt ühe liigi, populatsiooni, individuaalse organismi 
juures. Kui tema bioloogiline tüpoloogia oli staatiline ja lõplik, siis töös välja-
pakutu on dünaamiline ja ajalooline bioloogiline tüpoloogia. Teine alajaotus on 
pühendatud semiootilise põhjuslikkuse mõistele, mida võib defineerida järgne-
valt: kui märk toimib põhjusena, on toimuv kausaalne protsess semiootilise 
põhjuslikkuse protsess. Formaalsemalt väljendudes võib öelda, et semiootiline 
põhjus X põhjustab semiootilise tagajärje Y ilmumise X-i märgina iga kord kui 
Y ilmub X-i märgina. Semiootiline tagajärg on seega semiootilise põhjuse 
tõend. Erinevalt vallandavast põhjuslikkusest pole semiootiline põhjuslikkus 
täielikult ennustatav, sest selles on alati olemas tõlgendulikkuse mõõde. Oma-
ilma terminites võib väita, et olendi omailm koosneb märkidest, mis põhjus-
tavad teda vastama. 
Viimane temaatiline jaotus 4. Juhtumianalüüs: Norra hundimajandus esitab 
kokkuvõtlikult väikse tausta. Hundi roll vaenlasena on vähenenud nii nagu on 
vähenenud lamba roll sotsiaalse kaaslasena. Antakse lühike ülevaade tänaste 
poliitikaaruannete tulemustest Norras ja Rootsis. Selles osas antakse ka üle-
vaade väljasõitudest ja intervjuudest, lisatud on mitmed väljasõitudel tehtud 
fotod. Tehakse põhjalik, kuid mitte kõikehõlmav ülevaade hundi ja lamba 
kultuurisemiootikast. Kaks silmatorkavamat hundi kohta käivat sümboolse 
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kujundi kategooriat puudutavad vägivalda (salasepitsused ja taltsutamatu nälg) 
ja seksi (ning võrgutamist). Shakespeare’i töödes on hunt (teiste seas) kehas-
tunud nälg – kiskjalik nälg – puhas nälg. Lamba märgilisus tuleneb eriti Piiblis 
suuresti tema vastandamisest hundiga. Järgnevas alajaotuses käsitletakse Næssi 
hundimajandamise filosoofiat, järeldades, et Næss ei pakkunud välja konkreet-
set lahendust Skandinaavia hundikaitse probleemile. Järgmine alajaotus puudu-
tab argade loomade invasiivset majandamist ning muuhulgas tegeletakse siin ka 
inimese objektidega hundi omailmas. Viimane alajaotus keskendub Suure Halva 
Hundi sümboolsele konstrueerimisele tänases Norras. Väidetakse, et inimese 
ettekujutus huntidest on suures plaanis lahutatud ökoloogilisest reaalsusest. 
Lamba sümboolsus on Norra kontekstis seotud avatud maastikega, mida pee-
takse Norrale tüüpiliselt omasteks. Lamba sümboolsust seostatakse edukalt väli-
karjamaade sümboolsusega ning ettekujutusega, et Norra maastikud kasvavad 
kinni.  
Osa 6. Järeldused ning edasine areng (mis järgneb 5. osa artiklikokkuvõte-
tele) algab teoreetiliste leidudega. Omailma muutust ei saa võrdsustada kesk-
konnamuutusega tavamõistes, sest tegu on nii bioloogias (olgu see siis arengu-
line või evolutsiooniline) kui kultuuriuuringutes rakendatava laia mõisega. Üks 
selles väitekirjas visandatud omailmateooria ja metodoloogia probleem on, et 
see on superorganismide analüüsiks ebapiisav. Selle puudujäägiga tegelemiseks 
visandatakse edasised kontseptuaalsed arengud. Pakutakse välja mõned üldi-
semad juhised fenomenide väljade kohaldamiseks ning väidetakse, et empiiri-
listes bioloogilistes uuringutes peavad hästi töötavad visuaalsed representat-
sioonid olema juhtumispetsiifilised. Visandatakse inimese omailma kolmetine 
mudel (mida võib rakendada koos fenomenide väljadega ning üldistada nii, et 
seda saaks rakendada loomadele üldiselt). Eelviimases alajaotuses tutvustatakse 
kolme omailma stsenaariumi tuleviku Norra hundiökoloogia ja lambakasvatuse 
tarbeks: 1) status quo poliitika; 2) hunte pole; 3) taaselustatud põllumajandus. 
Viimases alajaotuses väidetakse, et tuleviku hundi märgilisus oma negatiivsetes 
aspektides, mis Norra kontekstis peegeldab põllumajanduslikke arenguid, 
määrab hundikaitse tulevikuväljavaated. Võimud on alahinnanud märgilisuse 
jõudu ja rolli karnivooride poliitikas. Poliitilistes terminites on sügav erinevus, 
kas läheneda Norra hundimajandamisele süva või pealispindsel viisil (Næss 
1973). Ükskõik, kuidas me otsustame hundikaitse küsimusele majandamis-
meetodite jmt kaudu läheneda, oleme määratud läbikukkumisele, kui teised 
oulised ühiskondlikud arengud ei kulge sobivas suunas. Kui pealiskaudne lähe-
nemine eeldab igale ”keskkonnaprobleemile” otse ja ilma kontekstita lähe-
nemist, peab süvalähenemine sisaldama iga probleemi kontekstualiseerimist 
ning seejärel tegelema terve hulga asjadega, mis on ühel või teisel moel sellega 
seotud (isegi kui seda teha vaid nõrga semiootilise kausaalsuse kaudu). 
 
Artiklite kokkuvõtted 
Selle doktoritöö kõik artiklid on kirjutanud Morten Tønnessen ning need on 
avaldatud ajavahemikus 2009–2011, neli neist artiklitena akadeemilistes aja-
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kirjades (artikkel I, artikkel II, artikkel V ja artikkel VI) ning kolm raamatu-
peatükkidena (artikkel III, artikkel IV, artikkel VII). 
 
Artikkel I  Morten Tønnessen 2009. Umwelt transitions: Uexküll and 
environmental change [Omailma muutused: Uexküll ja 
keskkonnamuutused]. Biosemiotics 2(1): 47–64. 
Selle artikli keskmes on “omailma muutused” ehk uexkülliaanliku keskkonna-
muutuse mõiste. Artiklis kritiseeritakse Uexkülli omailmateooria metodoloo-
gilist ja teoreetilist mitte-ajaloolisust. Näidatakse, et eeldus nagu keskkond 
(sealhulgas selles elavad liigid) oleks üldjoontes stabiilne, ei pea paika. Teine 
artikli läbiv mõiste on uexkülliaanlik fenomenoloogia. Seda iseloomustab 
eeldus, et kogu elusale on universaalselt omane esimese isiku perspektiivi ehk 
kogetud maailmade olemasolu. Artiklis näidatakse, et selle omailmateooria 
erpära tunnustamine on oluline nii ökofenomenoloogia kui biosemiootika jaoks. 
Biosemiootika saab seega edasi areneda vaid tõelise olemise semiootikana ning 
mitte pelga “funktsioneerimise semiootikana”. Artikkel annab lühiülevaate 
Uexküllist ja fenomenoloogiast, kokkuvõtliku ülevaate mõningatest kaas-
aegsetest makro-evolutsiooni alastest avastustest ning lõpeb aruteluga omailma-
teooria kui uexkülliaanliku fenomenoloogia ontoloogiliste ja epistemoloogiliste 
väljavaadete üle. 
 
Artikkel II  Morten Tønnessen 2010. Steps to a semiotics of being [Sam-
mud olemise semiootika poole]. Biosemiotics 3(3): 375–392. 
Artikkel visandab olemise semiootika platvormi kümnes jaos. Need kümme 
punkti võtavad suures osas kokku autori käimasoleva uurimistöö. Lühidalt on 
nende sisuks: 1) indiviidi roll olemise semiootikas; 2) lõpptulemusel eksis-
tentsiaalsele vallale viitav omailma mõiste; 3) eksistentsiaalsed universaalid 
(s.t. tunnused, mis on omased kõigile elusolenditele); 4) omailma seos keelega; 
5) uexkülliaanlik fenomenoloogia ja selle seos fenomenoloogide David Abrami 
ja Ted Toadvine’iga; 6) ülesanne portreteerida fenomenide maailma loodus-
lugu; 7) omailma kaardistamise tungiv vajadus kaasajal; 8) ökoloogilise kriisi 
juured loomade ja taimede kodustamises; 9) globaliseerumine, mis väljendub 
vastavates semiootilise mitmekesisuse ja mitmekesistumise hävimise suundu-
mustes; 10) semiootilise majanduse tulevikuvaldkond. Artikkel käsitleb esseist-
likult Keele, Majanduse ja Looduse ”suuri süsteeme” ning väärtust looduses 
(osalt fiktsiooni rolli näitel loodusteaduses), lisaks lahatakse kirjutises omailma 
terminoloogiat ning omailma kaardistamist.68  
 
                                                     
68 Lk. 384 on sattunud kahetsusväärne viga (järgnevalt rõhutatud) lauses: “Omailm (ja 
siseilm), funktsiooniring ja kontrapunktilised suhted (Kontrapunktischen Verhalten) on kõik 
seotud mõisted.” ’Verhalten’ tähendab saksa keeles käitumist, õige sõna on ’Verhältnisse’ 
(suhted). 
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Artikkel III  Morten Tønnessen 2011. Semiotics of being and Uexküllian 
phenomenology [Olemise semiootika ja uexkülliaanlik 
fenomenoloogia]. In: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.): Pheno-
menology/Ontopoiesis Retrieving Geo-Cosmic Horizons of 
Antiquity (= Analecta Husserliana CX/110), 327–340. 
Artikkel käsitleb kokkuvõtlikult olemise semiootikat ja uexkülliaanlikku 
semiootikat. Olemise semiootikat iseloomustatakse kui märkide uurimist moel, 
mis rõhutaks elunähtuste reaalsust. Artiklis seotakse uexkülliaanlik fenome-
noloogia Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990) ökoeksistentsialismiga, ökofeno-
menoloogiaga (s.h. David Abram ja Ted Toadvine) ning põgusalt ka erinevate 
looduse semiootika harudega (biosemiootika, ökosemiootika, zoosemiootika). 
Paari märkuse kaudu viidatakse uexkülliaanliku fenomenoloogia ja Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka ’elu fenomenoloogia’ sarnasustele ning esimese erine-
vusele Peirce’i ’faneroskoopiast’. Ideed fenomenidest kui semioosi kihistusest 
illustreerib näide koomik Larry Davidist ja teda rünnanud puugist. Lõpumär-
kustes, milles puudutatakse ka inimvabaduse teemat, väidetakse, et filosoofia ja 
loodusteaduste vahel ei saa teha teravat eristust, vaid pigem on tegu pideva üle-
minekuga rohkem või vähem filosoofiliselt/üldiselt rohkem või vähem 
teaduslikule/spetsiifilisele. See järeldub uexkülliaanliku fenomenoloogia plura-
lismist ning rõhust elusolendite eripärade uurimisele. 
 
Artikkel IV  Morten Tønnessen 2011. Mapping human impact: Expan-
ding horizons – interdisciplinary integration [Kaardistades 
inimmõju: Laiendades horisonte – interdistsiplinaarne 
lõimumine]. In: Tiina Peil (ed.): The Space of Culture – the 
Place of Nature in Estonia and Beyond (= Approaches to 
Cultural Theory vol. 1), Tartu: Tartu University Press, 93–106. 
Peatükk lahkab küsimust, kuidas kaardistada mõju, mida inimkond avaldab 
üleilmselt ökosüsteemidele (või pigem ökosüsteemides). Põhiliikumine tekstis 
toimub ”mina“ juurest maailma poole ning artiklis väidetakse, et seda, kuidas 
inimeste ”minad” praktiliselt hargnevad teiste maailma, on võimalik Uexkülli 
terminoloogiat aluseks võttes kujundlikult esitada koondatud numbrilise kesk-
konnainfo kvalitatiivse analüüsi kaudu. Artiklis esitatakse kolm joonist, mis 
kõik sisaldavad ontoloogilisi kaarte (vt märkust alternatiivse esituse kohta 
“suhetepõhine omailmakaart” ptk-s 3.1. Brocki fenomeniväljade visuaalsed 
representatsioonid). Üks neist kaartidest (Joonis 1) puudutab laias laastus ini-
meste ja loomade vahelisi traditsioonilisi suhteid. Peatükis arutletakse kvalita-
tiivsete ja kvantitatiivsete uurimuste üle (erilise rõhuga biosemiootilisel lähene-
misel), võrreldakse ökoloogilise jalajälje mõistet ja autori enda väljapakutud 
ontoloogilise niši (esmakordselt kasutatud Tønnessen 2003) mõistet, ning 
pakutakse välja lihtustatud viis numbrilise info kvalitatiivseks tõlgendamiseks. 
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Artikkel V  Morten Tønnessen 2010. The global species [Globaalne liik]. 
New formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics 69 (Special 
Issue guest-edited by Ashley Dawson, Imperial Ecologies): 98–
110. Featured as additional content in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(www.britannica.com). 
Artiklis vaadeldakse ajaloolist globaliseerumisprotsessi seoses inimese ja 
temaga seotud liikide poolt planeedi koloniseerimisega. Arutletakse, et 
globaalse “koloniaalse organismi” teke tähendab ökoloogilise impeeriumi sisse-
seadmist, milles Homo sapiens asetub hierarhias kõrgeimale kohale ning tera-
viljad, lemmikloomad ning kariloomad on privilegeeritud seisuses. Maastikku 
on muudetud selliselt, et see suudaks tagada nende liikide kiire leviku, tehes 
eluvormide globaalse geograafilise leviku üha lihtsmaks. Seejuures oleme meie 
liigina loonud ka globaalse paljunemispinnase teistele liikidele, kes muidu 
poleks globaalselt levida suutnud. Artiklis arutletakse kapitalismi ökoloogia, 
biosemiootika poliitika ning globaliseerumise ökosemiootika üle. Süsteemne 
ülevaade antakse ka olulisemate kariloomaliikide globaalsest levikust. Samuti 
tehakse kokkuvõte terjaviljaliikide üleilmsest levikust, globaalsete andmete 
puudulikkuse tõttu katkendlikum kokkuvõte lemmikloomade üleilmsest 
jaotumusest ning tõstatatakse küsimus, kui palju on miljoni-kassi ja miljoni-
koera linnasid. Artiklis lahatakse ka globaliseerumise alguse küsimust, mis on 
visandatud nelja järjestikuse lainena: 1) inimeste üleilmne kohalolu; 2) inime-
sega seotud liikide kohalolu; 3) inimjuhtimine (meie administratiivne 
haardeulatus); 4) kasvumajandus. Lähtudes Bangkoki näitest, on maakasutuse 
kontekstis võtmehüpoteesiks, et meie globaalne tsivilisatsioon on koondunud 
linnaasulate piirkonda, nii et ökoloogiline ruum jaotub korduvate kontsentriliste 
ringidena linnaasulaks – maa-asulaks – tühermaaks. 
 
Artikkel VI  Morten Tønnessen 2010. Wolf land [Hundi maa]. Bio-
semiotics 3(3): 289–297. 
Artiklis kasutatakse mõistet hundimaa kui kahemõttelist terminit, mis viitab 
“hundi maale” nii hundi perspektiivist kui ka inimese perspektiivist. Esitatakse 
Skandinaavia hundipopulatsiooni üldine olukord, keskendudes kitsamalt Norra 
hunte puudutavatele vastuoludele. Nende loomade uurimisobjektiks valimist 
põhjendatakse järgnevalt: 1) hundid on kohanemisvõimelisemaid imetajaid 
Maal – sellest annab tunnistust tänane koeratõugude (Canis familiaris) suur 
mitmekesisus; 2) hundiliigi majandamine on enamasti vastuoluline, seda ka 
muidu rahulikus Skandinaavia kontekstis, kus see on aluseks sümboolsele võit-
lusele ruraalsete traditsionalistide ja looduskaitsjate vahel, keda avalikkus 
seostatab valitsus- ja linnaeliidiga; 3) tänast Skandinaavia hundipopulatsiooni 
seiret ja uuringuid on teostatud põhimõtteliselt selle algusaegadest saati – 
seetõttu on olemas ka rikkalik teaduslik materjal sel teemal. Artikli teises pooles 
seostatakse praegune hundiökoloogia artiklis välja pakutud hundimaa mõistega 
s.t. ruumilise käitumisega. Artikli viimases osas tuuakse välja muutuvad tegurid 
tänases Skandinaavia hundi ökoloogias selle semiootilist nišši ja ontoloogilist 
nišši silmas pidades. Lõpukommentaaris puudutatakse tänasel päeval vastu-
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olulist metsiku looduse mõistet. Pakutakse välja, et oluline pole mitte küsimus, 
kas inimene on looduse osa, vaid milline on meie suhete täpne iseloom 
looduses. Teisisõnu ei peaks me mitte küsima, kas inimeste artefaktid on 
looduslikud või mitte, vaid mil määral nad esinevad ka teiste elusolendite 
omailmaobjektidena. 
 
Paper VII Morten Tønnessen 2011. I, wolf: The ecology of existence 
[Mina, hunt: Olemise ökoloogia]. In: Ane Faugstad Aarø and 
Johannes Servan (eds.): Environment, Embodiment and Gender, 
Bergen: Hermes Text, 315–333. 
Artiklis käsitletakse kahte teemat: hundi olemust ja inimese olemust. Need kaks 
teemat on kahel põhjusel metodoloogiliselt problemaatilised – inimese loomus, 
kuna me oleme teema, mida uurima asutakse ning millele seetõttu kallutatult 
läheneme; hundi olemus, kuna me ei ole hundid ja ei saa seetõttu vahetult teada, 
mida tähendab hundiks olemine. Arutelu on jaotatud viide ossa, millest 
esimesed kolm tegelevad vastavalt hundi ja lammaste poliitikaga (Skandinaavia 
kontekstis), ökoloogise võõrandumisega ja eripärase olemisega vis-à-vís jaga-
tud olemisega (mõeldud komplementaarsete tähistustena, mis on rakendatavad 
nii inimestele kui teistele elusolenditele). Ökoloogilist võõrandumist võib võtta 
kui meeleseisundi ja sotsiaalse elu kirjeldust, milles vaatluse all oleva olendi 
eluilma olulised koostisosad kas puuduvad või tajutakse ja koheldakse neid 
ebaloomulikul moel. Artiklis väidetakse, et selline võõrandumine korreleerub 
ebanormaalselt madala (metsiku looduse) ja ebanormaalselt kõrge (kari-
loomade) populatsioonitihedusega. Tänane Skandinaavia hundipopulatsioon on 
vähemalt aeg-ajalt allunud säärasele kirjeldusele. Kui ökoloogiline võõrandu-
mine eelneb järk-järgulisele väljasuremisele või toimub see taasasustamise 
faasis, on tegu üleminekunähtusega. Artikli neljanda osa pealkiri on “Inimene ei 
ole märk” ning selles lahatakse antropotsentristlikku viga, s.t. (väära) arusaama, 
nagu inimtegelikkus olekski kõik. Me tavatseme mõelda keele terminites ja 
keele terminites on kõik keel – kõik on inimlik. Artikli viimane osa kannab 
pealkirja “Otsides hundi perspektiivi” ning sisaldab Polaarloomaaia huntidele 
rakendatuna Sartre’i 1958 a. kuulsa lõigu parafraasi. Puudumise ja tähenduse-
tuse reaalsus loomade elus tuleb siin taas kord välja. Selles mõttes annab pea-
tükk oma panuse biosemiootilise suunitlusega eksistentsiaalsesse semiootikasse. 
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